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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
How to Represent:
The Role of Perceptions, Cognitive Biases, and Information on Elite Responsiveness
by
Miguel M. Pereira
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020
This dissertation studies the links between voters and their representatives in Western Eu-
rope. Each chapter explores specific mechanisms through which politicians build their image
of the electorate and translate this image into policy. In the first main chapter, I study why
politicians misperceive voter preferences and how to overcome distorted beliefs about the
electorate. I argue that elite misperceptions result from inequalities in exposure to voters
and egocentric biases of politicians. I find support for these arguments in a panel of Swedish
MPs covering two decades. In turn, a novel experiment leveraging real political events in
Switzerland shows how encouraging Swiss legislators to have a more balanced exposure to
voters can reduce misperceptions. In the next chapter, I explore the ability of politicians to
channel voter preferences. I advance that policy expertise – by inducing overconfidence –
leads representatives to dismiss opinions they disagree with. Consistent with this argument,
I provide experimental evidence that Swedish representatives with more expertise in a given
policy area are paradoxically less capable of voicing public preferences in that field. The
two subsequent chapters study how political elites respond to voter signals on the campaign
trail, leveraging a dataset of campaign statements by 68 European parties. The first study
shows how party leaders update their rhetoric in response to opinion polls. The results
reveal that mainstream parties deviate from their manifestos and emphasize more extreme
positions when underperforming in the polls. The second study shows how pre-election polls
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are also used as mobilization devices, with politicians raising attention to promising polls
while downplaying studies with disappointing results. Overall, the dissertation highlights the
constraints faced by elected officials to act as representatives, and the role of public opinion





Representative democracies rest on the idea that elected officials channel the interests of
the polity. A central question in the process of representation is how politicians gauge and
respond to signals emerging from the electorate. A perfect correspondence between public
preferences and policy outcomes is neither expected nor always desired (Mansbridge 2003;
Pitkin 1967). Still, understanding the links between citizens and their representatives is key
to evaluate the quality of democratic governance.
A common assumption in the literature is that political elites have nearly complete in-
formation about their constituency (e.g., Downs 1957; Geer 1996; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).
As strategic office-seekers, politicians have incentives to be informed. However, there is a
growing recognition that the task of assessing voter preferences is more demanding than
originally suggested (Druckman and Jacobs 2015; Gilens and Page 2014). Representatives
often have distorted images of their constituency (Broockman and Skovron 2018; Converse
and Pierce 1986), and only partially update their beliefs when provided with information on
voter preferences (Butler and Nickerson 2011; Kalla and Porter 2020). The main goal of this
dissertation is to advance our knowledge on the challenges elected officials face to “act on
behalf” (Pitkin 1967) of those who elected them, and the strategies used to overcome these
constraints.
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More specifically, I investigate two specific steps in the chain of responsiveness (Powell
2004). Chapters 2 and 3 explore how elected officials develop their image of the electorate,
and how these beliefs may be affected by incomplete information and cognitive biases of
legislators. In chapters 4 and 5, in turn, I investigate how political elites use public opinion
information to guide their short-term decisions.
Prior work explored how different political and electoral institutions influence the links
between voters and their representatives (Powell 2004; Przeworski et al. 1999; Soroka and
Wlezien 2010). The studies that compose this dissertation contribute to this vast scholarship
by focusing on the individual decision-making processes of elected officials. An interdisci-
plinary understanding of elite behavior is the starting point for the arguments advanced and
tested in each chapter. More specifically, I build upon established theories in behavioral eco-
nomics and cognitive psychology with the goal of providing a more nuanced understanding
of the behavior of elected officials in their role as representatives. The patterns uncovered
in the following chapters speak to different questions left open in prior work on political
representation. That said, the behavioral arguments advanced here complement rather than
replace institutional explanations for the type of relationship elected officials develop with
their constituency.
The first two empirical chapters also contribute to our understanding of inequalities
in responsiveness. Prior work established that affluent voters are more likely to convert
their preferences into policy (Adams and Ezrow 2009; Giger et al. 2012; Persson 2020;
Schakel 2019). The results reported in chapters 2 and 3 suggest this may happen, in part,
because politicians have a distorted image of the electorate: giving disproportionate weight
to the preferences of more visible subconstituencies, and disregarding contrasting views in
their areas of expertise. These arguments imply that unequal responsiveness may happen
even when legislators are not trying to favor any particular subconstituency. If politicians’
beliefs about the position of the median voter (or the median party voter) are skewed,
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efforts to pursue policies in line with this perceived majority can reproduce inequalities in
representation.
Chapters 4 and 5, in turn, contribute to comparative research on policy updating. Ex-
isting scholarship has mainly focused on explaining how parties update their programs from
one election to the next (e.g., Adams et al. 2004; Somer-Topcu 2009). The two studies
presented here complement this work by exploring how public opinion shapes the decisions
of part leaders in the short-run, and specifically in the context of political campaigns. The
analyses reveal the fluidity of elite rhetoric. Rather than sticking with their pre-established
plans throughout the campaign, party leaders use opinion polls to continuously refine their
strategies and update positions in predictable ways.
More broadly, the dissertation hopes to inspire new behavioral research on political elites.
This growing field of work has so far focused on uncovering biases in elite behavior: instances
where the decisions of elected officials deviate from rational choice predictions (Esaiasson and
Öhberg 2019; Sheffer et al. 2018), or from normative understandings of the democratic pro-
cess (Butler 2014; Kalla and Broockman 2016). Moving forward, researchers can use this
information to provide tools for elected officials to overcome those biases. The experiment
with Swiss elected officials in chapter 2 represents a first step in this direction and demon-
strates how theory-driven interventions can bolster the relationship between politicians and
voters.
All four studies presented in the following chapters focus on Europe and combine a variety
of empirical methods and data sources. In chapter 2, I combined existing data from a panel
of Swedish MPs with an original experiment with Swiss representatives to explore why
reelection-seeking officials misperceive voter preferences. For chapter 3, in turn, I conducted
an original survey experiment with Swedish representatives to study how policy expertise
can constrain the ability of legislators to channel voter preferences. Finally, chapters 4 and
5 build upon a dataset of campaign statements by party leaders in 10 European countries to
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explore how elite rhetoric responds to voter signals.
In the following sections, I describe each of the four main chapters in more detail.
1.1 Understanding and Reducing Biases in Elite Be-
liefs About the Electorate
Chapter 2 investigates why reelection-seeking officials misperceive constituency preferences,
and how these misperceptions can be mitigated. I argue that elite misperceptions result from
a combination of differential exposure and personal biases of legislators. On the one hand,
representatives do not interact with all segments of the electorate in the same way. More
affluent and organized groups are more likely to make their voices heard in the policymaking
process (Bouwen 2004; Giger et al. 2012; Gilens 2009; Persson 2020; Schlozman, Verba,
and Brady 2012). If legislators rely on availability heuristics to gauge public preferences,
imbalances in political engagement may lead elected officials to overestimate the support for
policies endorsed by these subconstituencies. Second, personal biases of elected officials may
also hinder the development of accurate beliefs. Representatives may be inclined to engage
in social projection: projecting their own policy preferences on voters (Krueger and Clement
1994). This cognitive bias may lead representatives to overestimate support for policies they
endorse.
I test these expectations in two complementary surveys of elected officials. The first
study is based on a panel of Swedish MPs covering two decades of elite beliefs about the
electorate. This dataset was combined with mass surveys fielded concurrently to create
measures of perceptual accuracy. The analyses reveal that elite beliefs disproportionately
reflect the preferences of high-status voters. The probability of an MP correctly perceiving
the majority opinion on a given policy issue decreases 11-12 points when white-collar voters
disagree with the median voter. The analyses also show evidence of social projection: elected
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officials systematically overestimate public support for policies they personally endorse.
The second study was designed to provide causal evidence for the key predictions derived
from the theory and to assess the degree to which misperceptions can be mitigated. In
an original survey that leveraged real political events, nearly 3,000 Swiss local representa-
tives were asked to estimate support for two upcoming referendums in their constituencies.
Together with the disaggregated results from the popular votes, these data allowed me to
produce precise measures of perceptual accuracy at the local level. Officials were randomly
assigned to informational cues designed to overcome inequalities in exposure and social pro-
jection. The results reveal that representatives were significantly more accurate in their
predictions when encouraged to avoid availability heuristics and to consider the electorate
more broadly.
Together, the findings have several implications for the study of political representation
and responsiveness. On the one hand, they provide a rather pessimistic view of the ability
for constituents to control public policy. The study joins recent scholarship in the United
States uncovering relevant distortions in elite perceptions of public opinion (Broockman and
Skovron 2018; Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019). However, Sweden and Switzerland are two of
the most socially inclusive societies in the world. The fact that in both countries inequalities
in political voice seem to have meaningful effects on elite perceptions of public opinion is
concerning. More broadly, the results shed light on the path yet to cover until societies
are able to sustain fully inclusive political institutions. On the other hand, the Swiss study
suggests that misperceptions are not inevitable. The informational nudges designed to help
legislators avoid availability heuristics induced more accurate beliefs about the electorate.
These results suggest that improving perceptions of public opinion is possible even with low
impact interventions.
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1.2 The Expertise Curse1
In chapter 3, I explore how policy expertise may constrain the ability of politicians to channel
voter preferences. Through their time in office or from prior professional experience, elected
officials often develop expertise in specific policy areas. Parliamentary committees encourage
this form of specialization (Strøm 1998). Individuals with more expertise in a given domain
tend to have more confidence in their own beliefs within that field (Dunning 2005; Fisher and
Keil 2016; Tetlock 2005), to be more dogmatic and close-minded (Ottati et al. 2015). For
legislators with expertise in a specific domain, overconfidence may lead them to disregard
opposing views. This is relevant because accurate beliefs about the electorate are a pre-
condition for responsiveness (Broockman and Skovron 2018). The implication of this process
is that legislators may paradoxically be less capable of channeling voter preferences in areas
where they have more knowledge. I refer to this argument as the expertise curse.
I provide empirical support for the expertise curse in a survey experiment with Swedish
political elites. Legislators were asked to evaluate a hypothetical message from a group
of voters asking them to support a specific policy. The policy was always at odds with
the elicited preferences of the public official. Additionally, I experimentally manipulated
whether the initiative was within a policy area where the legislator had high or low levels of
expertise. The results confirm that politicians are more likely to disregard contrasting views
in areas where they have more expertise. Public officials in the high expertise condition
were more likely to consider that the group of voters contacting them did not understand
the complexity of the issue, did not base their opinion on facts, and did not represent the
majority opinion. These findings are not explained by heterogeneity across the policy issues
considered.
The findings have important implications to research on political representation and
1This chapter results from a collaboration with Patrik Öhberg, from the University of Gothenburg.
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legislative politics. The expertise curse provides a novel explanation for distortions in policy
responsiveness. If legislators with specialized knowledge in a given domain play a central role
in drafting new legislation in their areas of expertise (Makse 2020), the ability of citizens to
control public policy is constrained. At the same time, the study reveals a trade-off between
expertise and the representational roles adopted by legislators. Although voters consistently
prefer their representatives to follow public preferences (Carman 2007; Converse and Pierce
1979; Dassonneville et al. 2020), the expertise required for an efficient policymaking process
limits the ability of legislators to act as delegates.
1.3 Responsive Campaigning2
Chapter 4 explores how party leaders respond to public opinion shifts on the campaign trail.
Previous research based on party manifestos established that political elites are responsive
to different signals emerging from the electorate (e.g., Abou-Chadi 2014; Adams et al. 2004;
Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Budge 1994; Tavits 2007). However, due to data limitations
most existing research relies on election manifestos produced every four or five years. What
happens between elections – and specifically on the campaign trail – is still largely an open
question.
I argue that the dominant collective goals of parties drive how their leaders respond to
shifts in voter preferences on the campaign trail. Parties have both office and policy goals
(e.g., Downs 1957; Riker 1982; De Swaan 1973), but the weight assigned to these goals varies
(Harmel and Janda 1994; Spoon 2011). The competing goals argument suggests that the
salience of different party goals is conditional on the signals received from the electorate.
When performing well in the polls, parties will behave in line with their dominant goals. For
mainstream parties, this means emphasizing moderate policy statements that maximize their
2A modified version of this chapter was published in The Journal of Politics (Pereira 2020).
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electoral prospects (e.g., Calvo and Hellwig 2011; Ezrow 2005). In turn, niche parties will
pursue their policy goals through non-centrist statements that appeal to their base (Ezrow
2008; Ezrow et al. 2011). However, when voters shift away from the party, secondary goals
become more salient and lead to changes in campaign strategies. Mainstream parties will
adopt a less centrist rhetoric to avoid alienating their core constituents. For niche parties,
in turn, office goals become more salient, raising incentives for party leaders to moderate
their rhetoric. In short, campaign responsiveness reflects the struggle parties face to balance
different collective goals.
An analysis of campaign statements by representatives from 68 European parties pro-
vides empirical support for the competing goals argument. The data come from two main
sources: a recent dataset of policy statements reported in the media (Debus et al. 2016); and
an original compilation of pre-election polling studies conducted in the same period. The
analyses show that mainstream parties tend to adopt a moderate rhetoric when performing
well in the polls, while niche parties make significantly more extreme statements. However,
as voting intentions decline, mainstream parties are progressively more likely to deviate from
the center, while niche parties move in the opposite direction, converging on a more moder-
ate rhetoric. Additional analyses reveal that these changes correspond to a movement away
from the main policy agenda conveyed in the election manifestos.
This study represents a first effort to explain how European parties update their policy
rhetoric on the campaign trail. From a normative standpoint, the dynamics uncovered can
be seen in a positive light. Elections are one of the rare times when a large segment of the
electorate tunes into politics (Gelman and King 1993). If parties would simply stick with
their pre-established plan for the campaign – often decided by a small group of members
months before the election –, the opportunities for policy responsiveness would be limited.
Continuous ideological updating is demanding and may divert party resources from other
important areas of activity. Still, at least close to elections it provides a trial-and-error
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process that may produce policies closer to the interests of the public.
1.4 Opinion Polls as Mobilization and Fine-Tuning De-
vices3
Finally, chapter 5 investigates more broadly how party leaders use information from public
opinon polls to inform their decisions close to elections. Opinion polls play a central role
in contemporary political campaigns. Updates on the performance of parties often serve as
the baseline for political commentary on the weeks leading to Election day. We know that
learning about the positions of the electorate can shape the behavior of voters (Duffy and
Tavits 2008; Forsythe et al 1993; Meffert and Gschwend 2011). However, how party leaders
use this information on the campaign trail remains an open question.
I argue that party leaders use polls on the campaign trail (1) to mobilize voters and (2)
to fine-tune their campaign strategies. The success of a campaign is largely contingent on its
capacity to ’spin’ new information in its favor (Hickman 1991). How party leaders respond
to polls is an element of this process. By strategically communicating polling results, parties
can shape voters’ view of the race, promote grassroots mobilization through bandwagon
effects (Morton et al. 2015), and encourage donors. Hence, I expect campaign contenders to
react selectively to opinion studies: offering disproportional attention to results conveying a
positive image of party, while dismissing or criticizing studies with disappointing predictions.
Polling results also offer the opportunity for parties to refine their campaign strategies.
Recent scholarship suggests that when a party has a quasi-monopoly on a given policy,
the potential gains from further communicating on that issue are limited (Tresch et al.
2013). Building upon this argument, I advance that leaders from underperforming parties
should be more likely to discuss policy issues when talking about their own party, relative to
3An extended version of this chapter was published in Electoral Studies (Pereira 2019).
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valence issues. Finally, campaign negativity may also be driven by poll results (Elmelund-
Præstekær 2008; Walter et al. 2014). There is a cost to negativity that may be outweighed
by the potential of harming opponents, and this cost is a function of the party’s current
performance on the campaign trail. Hence, the incentives to go negative should increase
among underperforming parties.
I test these arguments with a database of over 2,000 statements made by Portuguese
party leaders on the campaign trail (Debus et al. 2016) combined with opinion polling
published concurrently. The results show that political elites tailor their depictions of the
electorate instrumentally. Party leaders are more likely to mention their performance in the
polls in response to promising results, and less likely to question the credibility of pollsters.
Moreover, in response to disappointing polls, parties tend to refocus their campaign rhetoric
on policy issues, rather than valence issues. Finally, the propensity for campaign negativity
also increases when parties are underperforming.
These findings have implications to the study of political campaigns, and political rep-
resentation. First, they provide an explanation for why campaigns may not ‘enlighten’ the
preferences of voters (Gelman and King 1993). Party leaders tailor their depictions of the
public to their own benefit. Hence, unless voters are exposed to the messages of multiple
parties, this process may lead to distorted perceptions of the campaign trail. This concern is
particularly relevant in a world of political echo chambers (e.g., Boutyline and Willer 2017).
Second, the results reveal that a thorough understanding of campaign effects requires treat-
ing party strategies dynamically. Party leaders are constantly refining their rhetoric in the
weeks leading to an election. This process provides an explanation for the disconnect between




Understanding and Reducing Biases
in Elite Beliefs About the Electorate
How do elected officials learn about voter preferences? Office-seeking politicians have strong
incentives to be informed (Downs 1957, Geer 1996, Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, Powell 2004).
However, a growing literature suggests that learning about what voters want is more de-
manding than originally suggested (Butler and Nickerson 2011; Druckman and Jacobs 2015;
Gilens and Page 2014). Representatives often have a distorted image of their constituents
(Broockman and Skovron 2018; Converse and Pierce 1986; Erikson, Luttbeg, and Holloway
1975; Holmberg 1989; Kertzer et al. 2020; Miller and Stokes 1963). Hence, a key ingre-
dient for policy responsiveness is often missing. This leads to two crucial questions that I
explore in this chapter: (1) why do politicians misperceive voter preferences; and (2) how
can misperceptions be mitigated.
I develop and test an argument about two related factors that may lead political elites
to misperceive public preferences: inequalities in exposure and personal biases of legislators.
First, representatives do not interact with all segments of the electorate in the same way.
More affluent and organized groups are more likely to make their voices heard in the poli-
cymaking process (Bouwen 2004; Giger et al. 2012; Gilens 2009; Persson 2020; Schlozman,
Verba, and Brady 2012), and consequently, representatives are more likely rely on these
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voices when forming opinions about public preferences.1 This“differential exposure” to more
affluent and organized constituents can lead officials to overestimate support for policies en-
dorsed by these subconstituencies. In short, inequalities in political resources across voters
can generate distorted images of the electorate. Furthermore, legislators’ own personal back-
ground can also influence exposure. Policymakers are drawn disproportionately from more
affluent segments of the electorate (Carnes and Lupu 2015), and the social networks of public
officials can tint their view of the world (Campbell 2013). Taken together, these arguments
suggest that misperceptions are due to the type of information that is more visible to elected
officials.
However, unequal exposure only tells part of the story. Personal biases of elected officials
may also hinder the development of accurate perceptions of the electorate. Representatives
may be inclined to engage in social projection: projecting their own policy preferences on
voters (Krueger and Clement 1994). This cognitive bias may lead representatives to over-
estimate support for policies they themselves endorse. Social projection may result from a
systematic tendency of officials to deem opposing views as uninformed or non-salient (Butler
and Dynes 2016). Hence, even without inequalities in political voice, political elites may
generate images of the electorate that are tinted by their own views.
I test these expectations with surveys of elected officials in Sweden and Switzerland.
Study 1 explores a six-wave panel of Swedish MPs covering two decades of elite beliefs about
the electorate. This dataset was combined with mass surveys fielded concurrently to create
measures of perceptual accuracy for 24 policy issues. The analyses reveal that elite beliefs
disproportionately reflect the preferences of high-status voters. On average, the probability
of an MP correctly perceiving the majority opinion on a given policy issue decreases 11-
12 points when white-collar voters disagree with the median voter. Consistent with the
1Throughout the chapter I use the terms ‘high-status’ and ‘affluent’ interchangeably to refer to more
privileged segments of the electorate, with more political resources. Given the multidimensional nature of
this concept, high-status/affluence is operationalized in a variety of complementary measures: white collar,
high income, high education, or urban voters.
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mechanisms proposed, these effects are moderated by the types of groups MPs interact with
– unions or business organizations –, and by the personal background of legislators. The
analyses also show evidence of social projection: elected officials systematically overestimate
public support for policies they personally endorse.
Study 2 was designed to explore whether the biases uncovered in the first study can be
mitigated. In an original experiment that leveraged real political events, 2,917 Swiss lo-
cal elected officials were asked to estimate support for two upcoming referendums in their
constituencies. Together with the disaggregated results from the popular votes, these data
allowed me to produce precise measures of perceptual accuracy at the local level. Officials
were randomly assigned to informational cues designed to overcome inequalities in exposure
and social projection. The probability of representatives correctly predicting majority pref-
erences in their constituency increased 4 to 9 percentage points when encouraged to avoid
availability heuristics and consider the electorate more broadly. Encouraging officials to avoid
social projection, in turn, reduced the link between their own preferences and perceptions of
public support, as expected, but this effect did not translate into perceptual accuracy.
The patterns uncovered here are consistent with recent scholarship in the United States
showing that political elites systematically perceive their own constituents as more conser-
vative than they actually are (Broockman and Skovron 2018; Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019).
This conservative bias in perceptions of public opinion can be partially explained by inequal-
ities in political voice, since more afffluent voters in the U.S. tend to be more conservative
(Mendelberg et al. 2017; Page et al. 2013; Suhay et al. forth.).
The study sheds light on the constraints faced by elected officials when acting on behalf
of those who elected them (Butler and Nickerson 2011; Pitkin 1967). Hence, it contributes to
research on political representation and elite behavior. The findings provide an explanation
for inequalities in responsiveness. Prior work established that affluent voters have an easier
time converting preferences into policy in Sweden (Persson and Branham 2020), Switzerland
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(Lloren et al. 2015), and elsewhere in Europe (Adams and Ezrow 2009; Giger et al. 2012;
Schakel 2019). If inequalities in political voice bias elite perceptions of voter preferences, as
suggested here, policy outcomes may disproportionately reflect the interests of high-status
voters even when legislators are not trying to favor any particular subconstituency.
In turn, the Swiss experiment has the potential to pave the ground for new behavioral
research with political elites. So far, this nascent area of research has focused on uncovering
biases in elite behavior: instances where the decisions of legislators deviate from rational
choice predictions (e.g., Esaiasson and Öhberg 2019; Sheffer et al. 2018; Sheffer and Loewen
2019), or from normative understandings of the democratic process (Butler 2014; Kalla and
Broockman 2016). However, a natural next step is to use this information to provide tools
for elected officials to overcome those biases. The experiment with Swiss representatives
provides a step in this direction. The results reveal how theory-driven interventions can
encourage elected officials to develop more accurate beliefs about their constituents.
2.1 The nature of elite perceptions of public opinion
Aggregating preferences is intrinsically complex. Time-constrained politicians are exposed to
a vast array of cues available through different channels: direct contacts from constituents,
lobbyists, the media, social networks, and peers. To condense these overlapping demands is
a daunting task, and the information available to legislators is often incomplete (Butler and
Nickerson 2011). This context offers fertile ground for the adoption of cognitive shortcuts.
Individuals rarely conduct extensive information searches before making judgments, partic-
ularly for complex decision-making tasks (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Instead, they rely
on a subset of available information. More accessible information is more easily retrieved
from memory and therefore tends to play a dominant role in individual judgments (Ajzen
1996; Carlston and Smith 1996). However, heuristics have limits. The subset of information
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on which individuals rely may not be representative of all the information available (e.g.,
Fiedler and Schmid 1995; Lodge, Stroh, and Wahlke 1990).
In the context of elite perceptions of public opinion, I argue that (1) inequalities in expo-
sure to voters, and (2) the policy preferences of legislators shape the type of information that
becomes available (more visible) to public officials. When this subset of available informa-
tion is biased, it may translate into misperceptions.Information availability, in this context,
refers not simply to whether the legislator has access to the information but to the “ease
with which instances and occurences could be brought to mind” (Tversky and Kahneman
1974; 15).
The two arguments articulated below are expected to play a central but not exclusive role
in explaining misperceptions. Complementary explanations are discussed in the concluding
section. Additionally, I do not expect exposure and policy preferences to be independent
from each other. Exposure can either influence or be influenced by legislators’ issue posi-
tions. That said, the arguments advanced here suggest that each mechanism should have an
independent effect on perceptions, and the empirical strategy adopted allows me to isolate
these different dynamics.
2.1.1 Exposure and beliefs
Elected officials do not interact with all segments of the electorate in the same way. Systemic
inequalities in political resources among voters, as well as legislators’ own personal networks,
shape the type of information that is more readily available.
A cross-cutting pattern in contemporary democracies is that more affluent (Bartels 2008;
Giger et al. 2012; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014; Persson 2020), organized (Olson 1965),
politically engaged (Adams and Ezrow 2009, Griffin and Newman 2005), and well connected
(Campbell 2013) segments of society are more likely to make their voices heard in the poli-
cymaking process. Hence, the preferences of these subconstituencies are often more salient
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in the public discourse. If officials rely on availability heuristics to gauge public preferences
– as suggested above – the positions of high-status groups may be given disproportionate
consideration. There is some evidence for this argument in the American context. When
Congressional staffers think about subconstituencies relevant for a given policy initiative,
they are more likely to recall groups that often contact and contribute to the legislator
(Miler 2007, 2009). Additionally, in recent years scholars have uncovered a conservative bias
in elite perceptions of public opinion that may result from similar inequalities in exposure
to voters (Broockman and Skovron 2018; Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019).2
Information gathered through legislators’ personal experience is also more accessible.
Familiar information is easier to recall (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). For instance, indi-
viduals who know someone who experienced a heart attack systematically overestimate the
likelihood of heart attacks (Wyer and Srull 1989). More broadly, social scientists have no-
ticed for decades that our social networks tint our image of the world: our political attitudes,
and behavior (Campbell 2013). At the same time, in most countries policymakers are drawn
disproportionately from more privileged segments of society (e.g., Carnes and Lupu 2015).
Hence, if representatives use availability heuristics to develop their images of the electorate,
they may rely disproportionately on the positions of these same privileged subconstituencies.
Together, both mechanisms suggest that the preferences of high-status voters are more
visible to legislators. When the policy positions of affluent constituents are aligned with the
majority of voters, inequalities in exposure are not expected to distort perceptions of pub-
lic opinion. However, when in disagreement, unequal exposure combined with availability
heuristics can lead to misperceptions. Importantly, this process may take place uncon-
sciously. It does not require any active discrimination from legislators (Butler 2014). The
following prediction derives from these arguments:
2However, the specific biases uncovered in the U.S. context are not expected to replicate elsewhere, since
they result from the specific strategies adopted by conservative groups in the country (such as the Tea Party).
The argument advanced here speaks more broadly about systemic inequalities in political voice.
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Exposure Hypothesis: Elected officials are more likely to misperceive public preferences
when the position of high-status voters deviates from the majority.
2.1.2 Personal preferences and beliefs
Differential exposure is not the only source of misperceptions. Personal biases of elected
officials may also distort how constituency signals are processed and incorporated, even
when the information available is not skewed.
Gauging voter preferences is a social inference task. A potential bias associated with
this type of cognitive process is known as social projection (or false consensus bias): the
propensity to overestimate the degree to which others share our attitudes and beliefs (Ross
et al. 1977). Social projection is one of the most robust and well-documented social judgment
biases (e.g., Mullen et al. 1985), since Katz and Allport (1931) found that students who
cheated in tests systematically overestimated the share of peers who had also cheated. The
tendency to project our preferences on others is moderated by perceptions of similarity
(Ames 2004) and is understood as an irrational and unavoidable behavior, rather than a
result of statistical (i.e., Bayesian) reasoning (Krueger and Clement 1994). However, recent
scholarship suggests that social projection can be mitigated through incentives (Epley et al.
2004) or personalized feedback (Morewedge et al. 2015).
Among political elites, there is a large amount of anecdotal evidence suggesting that
representatives engage in this type of bias. In recent years, David Cameron’s decision to call
a referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union is one of the
most consequential episodes resulting, in part, from false consensus bias. The British prime
minister campaigned against Brexit. However, as analysts described at the time, “David
Cameron underestimated the strength of Eurosceptic feeling and probably also the discredit
of which his government [was] the focus” (The Robert Schuman Foundation 2016). Early
scholarship on elite beliefs provides suggestive evidence in line with this view (Converse and
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Pierce 1986; Holmberg 1974). Based on a survey of members of the European Parliament,
Holmberg concluded that “[t]he unpleasant truth is that a largely irrational tendency toward
wishful thinking is more significant for members’ knowledge of voter opinion than other more
rational processes of knowledge acquisition” (1999, 249). These behavioral patterns may be
due to a tendency of public officials to discount opinions they disagree with (Butler and
Dynes 2016). Constrasting views are systematically seen as less informed, and less likely to
represent the majority opinion. Hence, social projection can translate into misperceptions
by altering the type of information that is most visible (or available) to legislators.
Taken together, these arguments suggest the following prediction:
Social Projection Hypothesis: Elected officials are more likely to misperceive public
preferences when disagreeing with the position of the majority on a given policy issue.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
I test the main predictions derived from the theory in two complementary studies. Both
studies conceptualize perceptual accuracy as the capacity of political elites to correctly iden-
tify the position of the majority on a given issue, following established principles of political
representation (Pitkin 1967). Study 1 is based on a long-running panel of Swedish MPs
matched with two mass surveys conducted concurrently for over two decades. To my knowl-
edge, these data sources represent the most comprehensive effort to measure elite beliefs
about the electorate. The analyses are designed to investigate the two main predictions
derived from the theory and the mechanism underlying the exposure hypothesis.
Study 2 complements the first study through an original survey with Swiss local elected
officials. I designed this study to explore the extent to which inequalities in exposure and
social projection can be experimentally manipulated. Days before two federal referendums,
politicians were asked to estimate the share of voters in their municipality supporting each
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initiative on the ballot. Prior to this task, politicians were randomly assigned to informa-
tional “nudges” designed to induce perceptual accuracy by avoiding unequal exposure and
social projection. This empirical strategy allows me to assess the degree to which biases in
elite beliefs about the electorate can be minimize.
Relying on two of the wealthiest countries in the world restricts the scope of the findings.
Relative to the average elected official in Europe, Swedish and Swiss legislators may have
more resources to gauge constituent preferences. However, both countries are also among
the most socially inclusive societies in the world, making them hard cases to uncover the
political consequences of inequalities in political voice.3 The gaps in preferences between
privileged subconstituencies and the majority tend to be starker in contexts with more
income inequality (Rueda and Stegmueller 2016; Voorheis et al. 2015). Additionally, the
prevalence of referendums in Switzerland provides exceptional amounts of information on
voter preferences. Hence, the consequences of informational asymmetries should be harder
to discern in Sweden and Switzerland, relative to other countries.4 Appendices A and D
provide more contextual information about Sweden and Switzerland, respectively.
Sweden and Switzerland have relatively influential political parties, and the decisions of
individual legislators in both countries may be constrained by intraparty dynamics (e.g.,
Giger and Klüver 2016; Öhberg and Naurin 2016).5 However, distorted beliefs about the
electorate are consequential regardless of how party-centric a system is. Political parties
are groups of individuals. If these individuals express similar types of biases when gauging
public opinion, these biases should carry on to the collective decisions of parties. Appendices
A and D provide more contextual information about Sweden and Switzerland, respectively.
3According to the https://www.socialprogress.org/Social Progress Index, Sweden and Switzerland are
globally ranked 11th and 3rd, respectively, regarding basic human needs, foundations of wellbeing, and
individual opportunity.
4Recent evidence from Pakistan is consistent with this perspective. In a survey of Pakistani local officials,
only 59% of representatives correctly perceived the majority opinion in their constituency (Liaqat n.d.). The
equivalent figures for Sweden and Switzerland, as described below, are above 70%.
5This is less of an issue in the Swiss context, where candidates for local office often run without a party
label (Ladner 2005).
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2.3 Study 1: Panel of Swedish MPs
To capture politicians’ beliefs about public opinion, I first rely on a constellation of sur-
vey data from Sweden. Since 1985, the Swedish Parliamentary Survey (RDU) has surveyed
MPs once every term. For each wave of RDU, response rates have been consistently above
90%.6 The panel asks elected officials their own opinions on a large set of policy issues,
along with perceptions of voter preferences on those same issues. For six waves of the parlia-
mentary survey – 1985, 1988, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 –, the Swedish National Election
Studies (SNES) and the SOM Institute Surveys (SOM) asked identical policy questions to
representative samples of voters in the same period.7
In order to compare elite perceptions of public opinion with voters’ expressed policy
preferences, I combined all three datasets. Whenever the SNES and SOM conducted mass
surveys concurrently, I merged both samples. On average, the combined dataset includes
4,865 respondents per wave.8 With these data, I calculated different measures of policy
support, as detailed below. Overall, 24 distinct policy issues were asked simultaneously in
the MP and mass surveys. Additionally, on average each of the policy items was asked in
three of the six matched waves. Table A2.1 (Appendix B) lists all policy issues, waves, and
sources, used in the analysis. Since the key goal of Study 1 is to explain individual variation
in misperceptions of public opinion, the unit of analysis is MP-year-policy.
6In the six waves used in the current study, response rates were the following: 97% in 1985 and 1994; 96%
in 1988; and 94% in 1998, 2002, and 2006 (Karlsson and Nordin 2015). Given the nearly complete coverage
of the survey, full access to the datasets is restricted to the precincts of the University of Gothenburg, where
the survey is hosted.
7All surveys were fielded around general elections. Still, the analyses reported below include fixed effects
by wave to account, among other things, for any systematic differences in the timing of surveys.
8 Combined sample sizes by wave: 4,365 respondents in 1985, 4,135 in 1988, 3,996 in 1994, 5,340 in 1998,
6,184 in 2002, and 5,170 in 2006.
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2.3.1 Measuring perceptual accuracy
The main outcome of interest in the analyses reported below is a measure of perceptual
accuracy. Respondents in the mass surveys were given a five-point Likert scale to answer
each policy support question. In turn, MPs were asked whether a majority of their “own
party’s voters” supported a given policy. In the Swedish context, the party base is considered
the most relevant constituency for representatives (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996).9 In order
to combine the two measures, public support was dichotomized.10 Perceptual Accuracy takes
the value of 1 if an individual MP correctly identifies the majority opinion among party
supporters, and 0 otherwise.11
The average value of Perceptual Accuracy is 0.73. From 1985 to 2006, Swedish MPs cor-
rectly perceived the majority opinion among co-partisan voters 73% of the time. To provide
a more detailed description of the variable, Figure 2.1 plots average values of perceptual
accuracy by issue (gray lines) and for all issues asked in a given year (green line).
Two patterns are worth noting. First, although perceptual accuracy of majority opinion
is generally high, there is considerable variation across issues and time. While 92% of MPs
9This pattern does not seem to be specific to party-centric systems. Lax, Phillips and Zelizer (2019)
recently found similar dynamics in the American context. Republican and Democrat MPs largely respond to
the preferences of their own party members. Still, to assess the robustness of findings to this conceptualization
of constituency, I replicated the main analyses with perceptions of the electorate as a whole (and not just
party voters). These items are only available in the 1985 wave of the parliamentary survey. Besides the loss
in scope, the same results are obtained (see Table A3.3). This result suggests that the theoretical arguments
tested here are not contingent on the definition of constituency adopted.
10Majority support takes the value of 1 if over 50% of party respondents stated that a policy proposal was
“very good” or “fairly good”, and 0 otherwise. Voters without an opinion on a given policy are proportion-
ately distributed among supporters and opponents. However, the same results are obtained when the share
of supporters is calculated with undecided respondents in the denominator (see Table A3.4, in Appendix
A3).
11A potential concern with this empirical approach is that once the mass public samples are split into
partisan groups, we can no longer ensure that the average levels of support for each party are representative.
Given the large sample sizes (see fn. 8) and the relatively small number of sub-groups (7 parties), the
magnitude of the biases resulting from disaggregating the sample are potentially limited. Still, to assess the
robustness of this approach, I re-estimated the main models with bootstrapped standard errors to incorporate
uncertainty from the public opinion estimates. The same patterns are uncovered (see Table A3.5). The results
are also robust to analyses considering only MPs from smaller parties, for whom the measures of partisan
policy support may be more prone to measurement error due to smaller sample sizes (see Table A3.6).
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Figure 2.1: Average perceptual accuracy by wave of parliamentary survey.



























Note: “All issues” includes data from all 24 policy issues asked in the different waves. “1985-2006 issues”
only includes issues asked in at least five of the six waves, including 1985 and 2006: reduce public sector,
reduce defense spending, more private health care, prohibit all kinds of pornography, and the introduction
of 6-hour working days.
correctly perceived the majority opinion on the expansion of privately-run health care in
2006, over 60% of representatives misperceived voters’ opinion on whether to decrease defense
spending in the same year. Second, over the two decades covered there is a gradual decline
in perceptual accuracy. Since this pattern may be simply due to the type of issues asked in
each wave, the figure also plots averages for the five issues that were asked consistently from
1985 to 2006 (orange line). The same general pattern is observed for this constant set of
issues. Overall, average perceptual accuracy went from 78.2% in 1985 to 65.4% in 2006. It
is beyond the scope of this project to explain this pattern. Still, it suggests that the ability
of elected officials to gauge public preferences is dynamic.
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2.3.2 Research Design
If exposure shapes perceptions of public opinion, as articulated above, elected officials should
give disproportionate weight to the preferences of high-status voters. More privileged seg-
ments of the electorate are more likely to make their voices heard in the policymaking process
(e.g., Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Therefore, we should expect perceptual accuracy
to be lower when the preferences of these subconstituencies deviate from the majority. To
capture high-status voters, I use four complementary variables: occupational social class, ed-
ucation, income, and place of residency. Social class is simultaneously a strong indicator of
political resources and a meaningful political cleavage for both voters and politicians (Evans
2000; Carnes and Lupu 2015). Income and education, on the other hand, capture more
directly individual resources and political influence. Place of residence, in turn, captures
connectedness and access to the political sphere more broadly (Busch and Reinhardt 2005;
Tavits 2005). The question wordings and descriptive statistics for all variables included in
the analysis are described in Appendix A2.
In order to produce measures of policy support for different segments of the electorate,
each variable was recoded as follows. Occupational social class was split into three categories:
blue collar (40.6%), white-collar (42.3%), or other. Educational attainment was classified as
low (1-9 grades or less; 31.4%), medium (above comprehensive school but no college; 39.6%)
or high (college degree; 30.0%). The measure of income, in turn, is based on a distributional
scale of household income validated by the Swedish register. From the original variable,
I created three categories: low income, corresponding to respondents in the 15th income
percentile or lower; high income, corresponding to respondents in the 85th percentile or
higher; and medium income, for the remaining subjects. Finally, place of residence is divided
in two categories: respondents from rural areas and villages (42.4%), and respondents from
cities (57.6%).12
12Table A2.2 describes the bivariate correlations between the different variables. Although all four variables
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Based on these typologies, I re-calculated policy support exclusively among high-status
partisans : (1) white collar, (2) high education, (3) high income, or (4) urban voters. Fi-
nally, for each policy item assessed by an MP I created a binary variable capturing opinion
disagreement between high-status party voters and the majority of copartisans.13 As an
example, consider the case where high-status is captured through social class. The variable
takes the value of 1 for a given MP from party X if white-collar copartisans disagree with the
majority of party X supporters on a given policy issue, and 0 otherwise. This process leads
to four complementary predictors: one per measure of affluence. According to the exposure
hypothesis articulated above, the expectation is that when the preferences of more privi-
leged subconstituencies deviate from the majority, representatives are less likely to correctly
perceive public opinion.
To capture the propensity for social projection, in turn, I contrast the self-reported
preferences of MPs with voter preferences on the same policy. MP and Voters dealigned is a
binary variable that takes the value of 1 if an MP disagrees with the majority of co-partisan
voters (either supporting or opposing the policy), and 0 otherwise.
The distribution of voter preferences is likely to affect both the key predictors of interest
in the analysis and perceptual accuracy. Hence, all models account for preference imbalance:
the absolute difference between the share of partisan supporters and opponents for a given
policy. Smaller values suggest a more balanced distribution of preferences, which should be
associated with less perceptual accuracy. Additionally, the models account for two individ-
ual features of the MPs that may shape their capacity to gauge public preferences: policy
expertise, and experience in office. Expertise is based on committee membership. To create
this measure, I matched each policy issue available in the dataset to one of the Riksdag
committees in place during the respective term. Expertise then takes the value of 1 if the
are positively correlated, correlations are moderate to small (Pearson’s r between 0.08 and 0.35). This
suggests that the variables capture different types of affluence.
13The majority includes all party supporters, regardless of levels of affluence.
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MP belongs to the committee associated with a given policy, and 0 otherwise. Experience
in office is measured in log-transformed terms.14
The final dataset includes several sources of variation: across years, parties, policies, and
individual MPs. I am interested in capturing individual-level variation in the capacity of
MPs to gauge public preferences. Hence, the models include fixed effects to account for
any systematic differences across time, party, and policy. Finally, because each individual
MP enters the dataset multiple times (once per policy issue in a given wave, and eventually
across waves), all models include cluster-robust standard errors by individual MP.15
2.3.3 Results
Figure 2.2 reports the main results from Study 1. The estimates for each of the key predictors
(listed on the y-axis) were derived from linear probability models with Perceptual Accuracy
as the outcome variable.16 The predictor High-Status 6= Majority captures instances where
high-status voters deviate from the majority opinion on a given policy issue. Each color
represents a pair of estimates from a different model, based on the measure of high-status
voters adopted. The results provide support for the two main predictions derived from the
theory and are robust across measures of affluence.
As predicted, disagreement between high-status voters and the majority of voters in
a given party is associated with lower perceptual accuracy. The effects are substantively
meaningful. As an example, when white-collar voters disagree with the majority on a given
issue (green estimates), the probability that MPs correctly perceive majority preferences is
12 percentage points lower. Importantly, since both the predictor and the outcome variable
are binary, this decrease implies that elite perceptions of public opinion are swayed by the
positions of high-status voters.
14Table A2.3 presents descriptive statistics of all key variables in the analyses.
15The same results are obtained when the models include fixed effects by individual MP (Table A3.2).
16Logit models produce the same substantive patterns (see Table A3.7).
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Figure 2.2: The role of high-status voters and MP personal preferences on perceptual accu-
racy.
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Note: Dots are estimates from linear probability models with perceptual accuracy as the outcome variable.
Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The main predictors are listed on the y-axis. Exact
color represents a distinct model based on the operationalization of high-status voters. Full model results in
Table A3.1.
A similar pattern is observed when highly educated voters disagree with the majority
(point estimate = −0.11; s.e. = 0.01). While occupational social class and educational
attainment are positively correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.28), only 47.2% of self-identified white-
collar respondents were also classified as highly educated. Hence, the two constructs are not
capturing the same electorate. Finally, the effects of policy disagreement for high-income
voters are also statistically significant and in the expected direction, but smaller in magnitude
(point estimate = −0.04; s.e. = 0.01).
The models also provide support for the social projection hypothesis. Returning to the
social class model, the coefficient for MP 6= Majority suggests that when MPs support/oppose
a policy that is opposed/supported by the majority of their own party voters, the probability
of correctly perceiving partisan opinion decreases 38 points. The estimated effects of social
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projection are sizeable. Holding the remaining variables at their medians, the predicted
probability of correctly identifying the majority opinion on a given issue goes from 0.90
when MPs agree with co-partisans, to 0.52 when MPs disagree. According to the model,
the chances of dealigned MPs correctly perceiving co-partisan preferences are close to a coin
toss.
Importantly, these results are obtained accounting for preference imbalance among party
voters. Opinion dealignment between voters and MPs is more common when public opinion
is evenly split on a given issue. However, all models account for the absolute difference
between copartisan supporters and opponents in a given policy. The results are also not
explained by time-invariant differences across legislators. As reported in Table A3.2, the
same patterns are uncovered when the analyses include fixed effects by individual MP (N =
1,069).
A question that remains open is whether the effects of high-status voters disagreeing
with the majority are something specific to more privileged subconstituencies. It is possible
that the patterns observed mainly capture instances where the distribution of voter pref-
erences is wider, or less crystallized. In that context, it is both more likely that (1) some
segments of the electorate have a distinct opinion from the majority, and (2) that perceptual
accuracy is lower, since gauging public preferences can be more challenging. To assess this
alternative explanation, I reestimated the main models replacing High-Status 6= Majority
with measures of opinion disagreement between low-status voters and the majority.17 If the
patterns observed above result from the lack of opinion crystallization, we should observe
similar effects for privileged and less-privileged voters. The results reported in Figure A3.1
do not support this argument. Across model specifications, the coefficient for disagreement
between low-status voters and the majority is either indistinguishable from zero or in the
opposite direction of what we would expect.
17Low-status voters are identified as (1) blue collar workers, (2) respondents with the ninth grade or less,
(3) respondents in the 15th income percentile or lower, or (4) respondents living in villages or rural areas.
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In sum, the analyses suggest that differential exposure and social projection are relevant
drivers of elite misperceptions. When high-status voters (and not low-status voters) dis-
agree with the majority, legislators are systematically less likely to correctly gauge public
preferences. In turn, when legislators themselves disagree with voters on a given issue, their
ability to identify the majority opinion is meaningfully curtailed.
2.3.4 Mechanism test: MP behavior and personal background
So far, the analysis suggests that, when gauging public preferences, MPs tend to give dis-
proportionate weight to the preferences of high-status voters. This may be happening for a
number of reasons. The argument articulated above is that this pattern results from biases in
exposure to different subconstituencies.18 If this mechanism is correct, we should expect the
weight attached to the opinions of affluent voters to vary according to (1) the active decisions
of MPs to engage with different groups, and (2) the individual background of legislators.
To test the plausibility of this mechanism, I conducted two additional analyses. First, I
reestimated the main model reported above, but conditioning White-Collar 6= Majority on
how often MPs report meeting with (1) blue collar unions (members of the Landsorganisa-
tionen i Sverige), and (2) private businesses and business organizations.19 If the exposure
hypothesis is correct, we should expect the capacity of white-collar preferences to sway elite
perceptions of public opinion to decrease with the regularity of contacts with blue collar
unions. The opposite pattern would be expected for contacts with business organizations.
18An alternative mechanism is that legislators are actively giving more weight to the preferences of high-
status voters with the expectation that this may help them in their reelection efforts (e.g., through donations),
or in their post-legislative careers. The analyses conducted in this section only partially rule out this
mechanism. However, the results in Study 2 are not consistent with this alternative story. If legislators were
strategically misperceiving public opinion, encouraging them to develop more accurate perceptions of voter
preferences should not lead to a decrease in misperceptions. This issue is further discussed in the concluding
section.
19These variables are based on two items from the RDU surveys asking MPs how regularly they interacted
personally, or by letter, with a variety of different organizations. Responses are recorded on a five-point
labeled scale from ‘Never’ to ‘At least once a week’.
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Figure 2.3 provides evidence in line with this argument. Panel (a) reports the marginal
effects of white-collar voters disagreeing with the majority on a given issue, conditional
on MPs’ self-reported contacts with blue collar unions. The distribution of the condition-
ing variable is described along the x-axis and reveals appropriate common support for the
majority of the data (Hainmueller et al. 2018). As expected, the weight of white-collar
voter preferences is significantly smaller among legislators with more exposure to blue collar
unions. According to the model, when white-collar voters disagree with the majority, the
probability that an individual MP who never contacts blue collar unions correctly identi-
fies the majority position decreases, on average, 18.1 percentage points. In turn, for MPs
who interact with unions once or twice a month, the same effect decreases to 11.6 points.
The opposite pattern is observed for interactions with business organizations (Panel (b) in
Figure 2.3). Regular contacts with businesses are associated with a heightened weight of
white-collar voter preferences.
Next, I explore how the personal background of MPs can moderate exposure to different
subconstituencies. I consider the role of MPs’ (1) occupational class prior to joining parlia-
ment, (2) educational background, and (3) place of residence growing up.20 The expectation
is that the preferences of high-status voters carry less weight among legislators with less
privileged backgrounds: non-white-collar MPs (53.1% of the sample), MPs without a college
degree (43.1%), and MPs with a rural background (51.4%).
The analyses reported in Figure 2.4 provide partial support for this prediction. Each
panel reports the marginal effects of high-status voters disagreeing with the majority, condi-
tional on MPs (a) social class, (b) educational background, and (c) geographical background.
The operationalization of high-status voters in each model matches the specific background
feature of the MPs and is described on the y-axes. Across specifications, the results suggest
that legislators with less privileged backgrounds are less likely to misperceive public opinion
20The income levels of MPs are not available in the RDU surveys. However, I believe that the remaining
measures properly capture the background of MPs.
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Figure 2.3: The marginal effects of white-collar voters disaagreeing with the majority on
perceptual accuracy, conditional on MP contacts with (a) blue collar unions, and (b) busi-
nesses.







































6.1% 48.5% 23.1% 22.1% 0.2%
(a) White-collar weight by union contacts







































8.2% 27% 43.1% 19.6% 1.9%
(b) White-collar weight by business contacts
Note: Dots are marginal effects of white-collar voters disagreeing with majority on perceptual accuracy,
conditional on the regularity of contacts with blue collar unions (panel a), and businesses (panel b). Vertical
bars are 95% confidence intervals. Numbers along x-axis describe the distribution of the conditioning variable.
See Table A3.8 for full results.
31
Figure 2.4: The marginal effects of high-status voters disagreement on perceptual accuracy,
conditional on MPs (a) class background, (b) educational background, and (c) geographical
background.







































































































































Note: Dots are estimates of the effect of policy support among different segments of the electorate (described
on the y-axis) on perceived policy support, conditional on MPs individual background (described in each
panel’s legend). Horizontal bars are 95% confidence intervals. See Table A3.9 for full results.
when high-status voters disagree with the majority. The effects are reliable for educational
and geographical background. As an example, the estimates in panel (c) suggest that, when
urban voters disagree with the majority, perceptual accuracy decreases on average 12.4 points
among MP with an urban background, but only 7.5 points among MPs with a rural back-
ground (p-value of interaction term = 0.02). The results are consistent with research on the
substantive impacts of descriptive representation (e.g., Carnes and Lupu 2015).
Together, the analyses reported here provide evidence for the mechanism underlying the
exposure hypothesis. Both the behavior of MPs in office (Figure 2.3) and their idiosyncratic
background (Figure 2.4) shape the type of information taken into account when gauging
voter preferences. The following section attempts to provide causal evidence for the key
patterns observed in this study.
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2.4 Study 2: Experiment with Swiss local officials
The previous study revealed two sources of bias in elite perceptions of public opinion: in-
equalities in exposure, and social projection. I conducted Study 2 to assess whether these
biases can be minimized. Can public officials develop more accurate beliefs about their
constituencies?
The study is based on an original survey of Swiss local elected officials leveraging real
political events. Switzerland offers a unique opportunity to study elite perceptions of public
opinion due to the large number of popular votes held every year. By conducting a survey
of local representatives prior to a set of referendums, I was able to compare elite perceptions
of public support for different issues with accurate behavioral measures of policy support at
the municipal level.21 This is important because it allows me to go around measurement
issues associated with calculating preferences for subnational constituencies.22
I recruited public officials as part of the 2017 National Survey of Local Executive Mem-
bers (NSLEM), a large survey covering roughly 60% of the population of Swiss local elected
officials (Steiner et al. 2019).23 A total of 5,240 participants provided their contact informa-
tion to take part in a follow-up study. From this pool, 2,917 officials completed the online
survey administered through Qualtrics (56.7% response rate).24
21Throughout the chapter I use the terms ‘referendum’ and ‘initiative’ interchangeably. However, in
Switzerland there is distinction between initiatives (new proposals initiated by citizens), and referendums
(mandatory or optional). The two specific issues included in this study are popular initiatives.
22See fn. 11 above. Additionally, since voter preferences are measured through referendum outcomes,
the results cannot be explained by legislators strategically giving more weight to the preferences of affluent
voters because they are more likely to turnout. When asked about the opinion of the constituency as a
whole, legislators may be inclined to discount the preferences of those that are less likely to participate in
politics. This is problematic because it would lead to predictions that are observationally equivalent to the
exposure hypothesis. However, when the goal is to predict referendum outcomes, these considerations about
who turns out are part of the task. Evidence for the exposure hypothesis in this context cannot be explained
by officials discounting the preferences of less privileged subconstituencies because they are less likely to
turnout.
23More information available at: https://www.ipm.swiss/gemeinde/.
24Table A5.1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of the sample, and compares it with the 2017
NSLEM. There are no meaningful differences across the two samples in terms of individual characteristics
of the subjects, or sociopolitical features of the municipalities represented in each sample.
33
The survey was fielded in November 2018, two weeks before a set of federal referendums.25
The questionnaire and all communication materials were translated to Swiss German, Swiss
French, and Swiss Italian.26 The key goal of the survey was to capture elite perceptions of
local public support for a series of popular initiatives voted on that occasion. Respondents
were asked to predict the share of voters in their constituency who would support two distinct
referendums: the self-determination initiative and the horned-cow initiative.27 The first
initiative, initiated by the nationalist Swiss People’s Party (SVP), proposed an amendment
to the constitution that would give primacy to the Swiss constitution and popular votes over
international treaties. The issue attracted substantial public attention and reached record
levels in campaign spending (up to CHF 8 million, or $8M).28 The Horned-Cow initiative, on
the other hand, was a low salience issue. The proposal sought to prevent farmers, through
federal subsidies, from opting to keep hornless animals (VOTO 2019).
2.4.1 Experimental Design
Respondents were asked to predict the share of voters in their constituency who would
support either referendum.29 Prior to the prediction tasks, officials were randomly assigned
to one of three groups.30 A control group received no additional information. After reading
a description of each referendum, subjects in this group were directly asked to anticipate the
outcome of the popular vote in their municipality. Two other groups were presented with
25The median local official completed the survey in the first two days, and 75% by the fifth day since the
invitations were sent. Still, there is some variation in the timing of survey completion that could affect their
capacity to gauge public preferences. Table A6.5 shows that the timing between survey completion and the
referendums did not affect the study results in a meaningful way.
26An English translation of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A7, along with the informed consent.
27A third initiative was voted on the same day, but it was not included in the present study.
28https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/vote-november-25--2018_hotly-debated--swiss-law-first--
i\\nitiative-awaits-public-verdict/44559238.
29It should be noted that although nationally representative polls are often published in the weeks leading
to referendums in Switzerland none of the existing studies provides estimates at the municipal level. Hence,
local officials could not simply rely on existing survey data.
30The experimental design was pre-registered in EGAP (http://egap.org/registration/5322).
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vignettes designed to increase perceptual accuracy, based on my theoretical predictions.
Exposure condition : This group received information about the composition of the elec-
torate in their municipality. The goal of this intervention was to encourage local officials
to avoid potentially skewed availability heuristics resulting from inequalities in exposure.
To do so, respondents took part in a three-stage task. First, they were asked to guess the
prevalence of different segments of the electorate in their constituency (e.g., foreign-born
citizens, supporters of the Green party). This information was recorded and reported on the
following page of the survey along with the official data from the Federal Statistical Office for
their municipality, and for Switzerland as a whole. Finally, officials were asked to take this
information into account when making their predictions of local support for the referendum.
Figure A5.2 provides a specific example of the vignettes.
The type of information provided varied according to the referendum. To ensure that this
information was informative, pre-tests assessed the predictive power of different indicators
on support for similar referendums voted in the recent past.31 For the self-determination
initiative, officials were presented with data on the share of foreign-born citizens and SVP
supporters in their municipality. For the horned-cow initiative, the information provided
was the combined share of SP and Green party supporters in the constituency, and the share
of workers in the primary sector.
Exposure & Self-Awareness condition : The third group received the same informa-
tional treatment provided to the second group plus a recommendation to avoid projecting
their own preferences on the electorate. Box 2.1 provides the exact wording of the vignette.
Recent scholarship suggests this type of feedback is the most effective way to mitigate social
projection (Morewedge et al. 2015).32
31Interviews with Swiss direct democracy scholars and pre-analyses of VOTO, the post-referendum surveys
(VOTO 2019), informed the selection of past referendums used for the pre-tests.
32I favored a cumulative treatments design over a full factorial design to maximize statistical power. To
my knowledge, Swiss local officials had never been invited to an academic online survey before. Hence, it
was impossible to anticipate the sample size that would be obtained.
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Box 2.1: Self-awareness vignette.
Decades of research show that people tend to project their own preferences to
others. Without noticing, we often overestimate approval for issues we
support, while underestimating approval for issues we oppose. Try to take
this into account when making your prediction.
The expectation is that officials in the exposure condition should be more likely to cor-
rectly perceive the majority opinion in their constituency, relative to officials in the control
condition. In turn, subjects who received the self-awareness intervention should be less likely
to project their own preferences on the electorate, and more likely to correctly perceive ma-
jority preferences (relative to the second group). To avoid contagion effects, randomization
was made at the respondent level, and the order of the referendums was randomized. Fi-
nally, I used multivariate continuous blocking to maximize balance between conditions on (1)
partisanship, (2) language (German, French, or Italian), (3) municipality size (population),
(4) canton, and (5) local support for the SVP and the Social Democratic Party (SP) in the
previous general election.
2.4.2 Results
On November 25th, 2018, Swiss voters rejected both initiatives. Nationwide, 33.8% of voters
supported the self-determination initiative, while 45.3% supported the horned-cow initiative.
However, there was considerable variation across municipalities. For instance, local support
for the self-determination initiative ranged from 12.5 to 83.7%. Figure A5.1 describes the
distributions of local-level support for each referendum.
I combined these expressed preferences with the survey results to build a measure of
Perceptual Accuracy. The variable takes the value of 1 if a local official correctly perceived
the majority position in his or her constituency, for a given initiative, and 0 otherwise.33 On
33I favored this outcome over a continuous measure of misperceptions for two reasons. First, I believe it
better captures the key goal of grasping public preferences. While it might be helpful for elected officials to
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Figure 2.5: The effects of exposure and self-awareness to social projection on perceptual
accuracy, by referendum.
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Note: Points are estimates of the difference in the probability of local officials correctly perceiving the
expressed preferences of the majority of voters in their constituency by treatment condition (control =
baseline, and treatment groups described in the row labels). Wider/Thinner horizontal lines are 95/90%
confidence intervals. See Table A6.1 for full results.
average, Swiss local officials correctly identified the majority position in their constituency
72% of the time.34 This figure represents a relatively high baseline, potentially resulting
from the small size of Swiss local constituencies, and the wealth of information provided to
public officials by the regular referendums.
However, the interventions improved perceptual accuracy upon this baseline. Figure 2.5
presents the results of three linear probability models with Perceptual Accuracy as the out-
come variable. Coefficients for each treatment condition (described along the y-axes) repre-
sent the average difference in the probability of correctly perceiving local majority support,
relative to the control group.35
Panel a (from Figure 2.5) reports the treatment effects for the self-determination ini-
know the precise share of voters supporting a given policy, the democratic principles of representation mainly
expect representatives to know the majority opinion (e.g., Downs 1957; Pitkin 1967) . Second, this measure
better mirrors the outcome variable used in Study 1 (Figure 2.2, above). Still, the results for each individual
initiative are substantively similar when an absolute measure of misperceptions is used (see Figure A6.1).
Importantly, I did not register the binary measure of perceptual accuracy in the pre-analysis plan since it
was submitted prior to the analysis of Study 1.
34The average value of Perceptual Accuracy for the self-determination and horned-cow initiatives is .71
and .74, respectively.
35Table A6.4 replicates these models with the subset of respondents who passed the manipulation check
at the end of the survey (see Table A6.3). The same results are obtained, and the magnitude of the effects
increases, overall.
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tiative. On average, local officials who received information on electorate composition (the
exposure group) were 6.4 percentage points more likely to correctly identify the majority
position in their constituency, relative to the control group. This effect is statistically sig-
nificant (p-value = .002) and substantively meaningful. It represents an 8.9% increase in
perceptual accuracy, relative to the mean value of the outcome.36 This pattern is in line
with the theoretical predictions. When representatives are encouraged to avoid availability
heuristics and consider a wider segment of the electorate, perceptual accuracy increases. The
effect of the Exposure & Self-Awareness intervention on perceptual accuracy, in turn, is also
positive and reliable (point estimate = .04; p-value = .04). However, the effect is indistin-
guishable from the Exposure condition (p-value = .31). The analysis provides no evidence
that encouraging political elites to avoid social projection increases perceptual accuracy.
The results for the horned-cow initiative (Panel b) are less conclusive. The estimates
for Exposure (.03) and Exposure & Self-Awareness (.02) are positive, as expected. However,
these differences in the probability of correctly perceiving majority support are indistinguish-
able from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. The analysis does not allow
me to rule out small differences. However, it suggests that if anything the treatment effects
were fairly small in magnitude.37 Finally, Panel c provides the treatment effects for the
pooled initiatives. This analysis includes fixed effects by initiative to account for any sys-
tematic differences between referendums, and cluster-robust standard errors by local official.
The results are consistent with the patterns observed for the self-determination initiative.
The average differences in perceptual accuracy for officials in the Exposure and Exposure &
Self-Awareness conditions are .05 (s.e. = .01) and .03 (s.e. = .01), respectively.
Together, the results suggest that the exposure intervention effectively increased percep-
tual accuracy. However, the manipulation designed to encourage legislators to avoid social
36The average value of Perceptual Accuracy for the self-determination initiative was .72. Hence:
(.064/.72)*100 = 8.9%.
37Formally exploring treatment heterogeneity by issue salience is beyond the scope of this study. However,
it is possible that the lower salience associated with the horned-cow initiative may explain these results.
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projection did not meaningfully alter how elected officials gauged public opinion. On av-
erage, officials who received the self-awareness vignette were not more likely to correctly
perceive the majority opinion. This result is consistent with previous failed efforts to miti-
gate social projection in different contexts, through perspective taking or feedback (Krueger
and Clement 1994).
A question that remains open from the analysis so far is whether the self-awareness in-
tervention shaped the propensity of local officials to project their own preferences on the
electorate. To test this intermediate step, Figure 2.6 shows the results of linear models
predicting perceived public support as a function of personal support (binary), interacted
with the Exposure & Self-Awareness condition. The models omit respondents in the control
group to isolate the effect of the self-awareness intervention, by comparing the two treatment
groups directly. The estimates in each panel are the coefficients of legislator support on per-
ceived support, for respondents in each treatment group. Representatives in both conditions
engaged in some degree of social projection. Regardless of treatment condition, the point
estimates are positive and reliable. Legislators who supported a given issue perceived public
support for that issue to be systematically higher.
However, subjects who were encouraged to avoid social projection were significantly less
likely to project their own preferences on the electorate. The differences in point estimates
are statistically reliable in all specifications at conventional levels of statistical significance
(p-values of .046, .04, and .005, in each panel, respectively). The intervention reduced the
propensity of legislators to project their own preferences on the electorate, but this incentive
was not enough to improve perceptual accuracy. A potential explanation for these results is
that social projection only translates into misperceptions when officials disagree with voters
on a given issue, and over two thirds of local officials in the study sided with the majority
of their constituency in each issue.
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Figure 2.6: The effects of self-awareness on the propensity of legislators to project their
preferences on the electorate, by referendum.
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Note: Points are estimates of the effect of policy support on perceptions of public support, by treatment
group (described in the row labels). Wider/Thinner horizontal lines are 90/95% confidence intervals. Control
group omitted from the analysis to isolate the effect of the self-awareness intervention. Full model results in
Table A6.2.
2.5 Discussion
This project explores how elected officials build their image of the electorate. I argue that
inequalities in political voice and personal biases of elected officials play an important role in
explaining why legislators have distorted beliefs about the electorate. These arguments are
tested with two decades of survey data from Sweden, covering 24 distinct policy issues. The
analyses suggest that Swedish MPs are more likely to misperceive voter preferences when
affluent subconstituencies deviate from the majority opinion. Consistent with the exposure
mechanism, additional analyses suggest that these effects are moderated by the behavior of
MPs in office, and their personal background. The propensity to overestimate support for
policies one supports is also a powerful predictor of misperceptions.
I designed a second study to explore the degree to which misperceptions can be reduced.
In a survey experiment with nearly 3,000 Swiss local officials, respondents were asked to
anticipate the outcome of two federal referendums in their constituency after being assigned
to different informational nudges. The results show that misperceptions can be reduced by
encouraging representatives to avoid availability heuristics when gauging public preferences.
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Raising self-awareness about social projection, in turn, led to a decrease in the propensity
of local officials to project their preferences on voters, but this effort did not translate into
less misperceptions.
An important advantage of the Swiss study is the ability to rule out the possibility
that politicians are only misperceiving public preferences strategicaly: either because some
segments of the electorate matter more for reelection, or because politicians derive utility
from appearing in line with voters (halo effects). If this was the case, the informational
nudges provided in the experiment should not affect perceptions. More specifically, the
self-awareness intervention should not have reduced the propensity of legislators to project
their preferences on voters (Figure 2.6). To be clear, these alternative explanations may still
play a role in explaining misperceptions. What the experimental results suggest is that they
cannot fully account for the patterns observed.
The Swedish and Swiss studies were designed to complement each other. Still, there are
specific limitations that are worth emphasizing. First, in Study 1 it is not possible to ensure
that the measures of public opinion for different subconstituencies (e.g., party supporters)
are representative. The robustness of the results among smaller parties and accounting
for uncertainty in the public opinion estimates mitigate these concerns. Still, future work
developing flexible measurement models to allow subsampling based on different political
dimensions would represent a major contribution to the literature.
A second question that remains open is what best represents a constituency for legislators
in different European countries. The panel of MPs used in Study 1, developed by experts
of political representation (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996), identified party voters as the key
constituency for Swedish MPs. This is consistent with recent scholarship in the United States
(Lax, Phillips, and Zelizer 2019). In the Swiss study, however, the reference constituency
was the group of voters who turned out in the referendums. Seminal work on political
representation suggests that this subset of likely voters is the core constituency for reelection-
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seeking officials (Converse and Pierce 1986; Downs 1957; Powell 2004). The fact that both
studies provide consistent results suggests that the sources of misperceptions identified here
may operate in similar ways regardless of how a constituency is defined. Additionally, it is
reassuring that at least for the first wave of the Swedish parliamentary survey the results
are substantively the same when the constituency is defined as the electorate as a whole
(Table A3.3). That said, future scholarship would benefit from a more careful examination
of how core constituencies are conceptualized in the eyes of representatives.
Future contributions would also benefit from incorporating more directly the role of party
cues into the study of elite perceptions of public opinion. Legislators do not form opinions
about voters in a vacuum. Party organizations constrain the process of responsiveness (e.g.,
Öhberg and Naurin 2016). Above, I argued that the types of biases advanced in the theory
should not cancel out as we move from the individual legislator to the party, since they result
either from the broader informational environment or from cross-cutting cognitive biases.
Additionally, the results from Study 1 account for any systematic differences across parties.
Still, a more careful assessment of the mediating role of party organizations would represent
an important contribution to the field. Novel experimental designs like those developed by
Zelizer (2019) can provide the ideal setting to explore these questions.
The results from the Swiss study suggest that misperceptions are not resulting from the
active effort of political elites to give more weight to some groups at the expense of others.
On the other hand, Study 2 is unable to demonstrate that the decrease in misperceptions
resulting from the experimental interventions is due to a shift away from the positions of high-
status voters, as the exposure hypothesis would predict. To do so, I would need information
on the preferences of different subconstituencies at the local level. Only Study 1 allows me
to provide more direct evidence for the exposure argument. This is part of the trade-off
associated with relying on real political events. Future work would benefit from exploring
different experimental designs to test the exposure mechanism more directly.
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Together, the findings have several implications for the study of political representa-
tion and responsiveness. On the one hand, they provide a rather pessimistic view of the
prospects of democratic representation. The study joins recent scholarship in the United
States uncovering relevant distortions in elite perceptions of public opinion (Broockman and
Skovron 2018; Hertel-Fernandez et al. 2019). However, Sweden and Switzerland are two of
the most socially inclusive societies in the world. The fact that in both countries inequal-
ities in political voice seem to have such meaningful effects on elite perceptions of public
opinion is concerning. More broadly, the findings shed some light on the path yet to cover
until societies are able to sustain fully inclusive political institutions. On the other hand,
the Swiss study suggests that misperceptions are not unsurmountable. The informational
nudges designed to help legislators avoid availability heuristics induced more accurate beliefs
about the electorate. Although more research is needed to confirm the robustness of these
findings, they suggest that improving perceptions of public opinion is possible even with low
impact interventions.
Finally, the tendency of MPs to give relatively more weight to the preferences of subcon-
stituencies with shared backgrounds contributes to research on descriptive representation.
Recent work shows how the social and professional backgrounds of elected officials shape their
behavior in office, even in party-centric systems (Carnes and Lupu 2015; Carnes 2013). The
patterns reported here provide a potential mechanism to explain this relationship. Politicians
with different backgrounds may actually be trying to consider the preferences of the elec-
torate (or party voters) as a whole, but their perceptual representations of voter preferences




Theories of political representation posit that reelection-seeking officials have incentives to
be responsive to voters (e.g., Pitkin 1967, Dahl 1973). Consistent with this view, prior work
in industrialized democracies shows that policy outcomes tend to reflect public preferences
(Budge et al. 2012; Erikson et al. 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Politicians generally
update their positions based on public opinion polls (Butler and Nickerson 2011; Pereira
2020) and election results (Adams et al. 2005). However, there is ample variation in the
patterns of responsiveness. Lax and Phillips (2012) show that only half the policies adopted
in American state legislatures are aligned with majority preferences. In Europe, in turn,
there is growing evidence of inequalities in representation across different subconstituencies
(Adams and Ezrow 2009; Homola 2019; Persson 2020).
Variations in responsiveness may partially result from different institutional incentives
(Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010) or broader contextual dynamics,
such as economic conditions (Ezrow et al. 2019; Ezrow and Hellwig 2014). But system-level
explanations only provide a partial response. Responsiveness varies by policy issue. For
instance, Miller and Stokes (1963) demonstrated that public opinion in the United States
played a central role in shaping policy outcomes on civil rights issues, but a negligible role
on foreign affairs. Why do reelection-seeking officials dismiss the opinion of voters on certain
1This chapter results from a collaboration with Patrik Öhberg, from the University of Gothenburg.
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policy issues?
Part of the answer to this puzzle may rest in the process through which politicians build
their image of the electorate. In this chapter, I argue that policy expertise may constrain
the ability of legislators to channel public preferences. Through their time in office – or from
prior professional experience – elected officials often develop expertise in specific policy areas.
Parliamentary committees encourage this form of specialization (Strøm 1998). Individuals
with more expertise in a given domain tend to have more confidence in their own beliefs
within that domain (Dunning 2005; Fisher and Keil 2016; Tetlock 2005), and to express
more dogmatism (Ottati et al. 2015). For legislators with expertise in a specific domain,
overconfidence may lead them to disregard opposing views on that same issue. As repre-
sentatives, this is relevant because accurate beliefs about the electorate are a pre-condition
for responsiveness (Broockman and Skovron 2018). The implication of this process is that
legislators may paradoxically be less capable of channeling voter preferences in areas where
they have more knowledge. I refer to this argument as the expertise curse.
I provide empirical support for the expertise curse in a survey experiment with Swedish
political elites. Legislators were asked to evaluate a hypothetical message from a group
of voters asking them to support a specific policy. The policy was always at odds with the
elicited preferences of the public official. Additionally, I experimentally manipulated whether
the initiative was within a policy area where the legislator had high or low levels of expertise.
The results confirm that politicians are more likely to disregard contrasting views in areas
where they are more knowledgeable. Public officials in the high expertise condition were
more likely to consider that the voters did not understand the complexity of the issue, did
not base their opinion on facts, and did not represent the majority opinion. These findings
are not explained by whether the constituents support or oppose a given policy initiative, or
by heterogeneity across issue areas.
The findings have important implications to research on political representation and
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legislative politics. The expertise curse provides a novel explanation for distortions in policy
responsiveness. If legislators with specialized knowledge in a given domain play a central role
in drafting new legislation in their areas of expertise (Makse 2020), the ability of citizens to
control public policy is constrained. At the same time, the study reveals a trade-off between
expertise and the representational roles adopted by legislators. Although voters consistently
prefer their representatives to follow public preferences (Carman 2007; Converse and Pierce
1979; Dassonneville et al. 2020), the expertise required for an efficient policymaking process
limits the ability of legislators to act as delegates.
3.1 Expertise and disagreement discounting
Efficient policymaking requires policy expertise. In some contexts, legislators can partially
outsource this skill (e.g., Hertel-Fernandez 2019). However, only elected officials can intro-
duce bills and shape the legislative process directly. Recent scholarship reveals specific ways
through which the individual expertise of legislators can shape the policymaking process.
Policy innovations tend to be introduced by representatives with more specialized knowl-
edge (Makse 2020; Miler 2017). Seminal theories of legislative organization also recognize
the value of expertise in policymaking. According to Krehbiel (1991), the committee system
developed in the U.S. Congress is meant to provide the chamber with information and ex-
pertise necessary for legislating. Similar institutions designed to promote a division of labor
in the legislative branch are common in Europe (e.g., Mattson and Strøm 1995; Strøm 1998).
Committees promote specialization within relevant policy jurisdictions and provide valuable
information to parliaments (Shepsle and Weingast 1994). Committee members act as ‘low
cost’ specialists that make the legislative activity more efficient (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989).
Hence, the institutional framework of most contemporary parliaments encourage legislators
to develop specific policy expertise (Mattson and Strøm 1995).
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However, expertise can simultaneously shape how legislators evaluate information and
make decisions. Expertise produces self-assurance (Fisher and Keil 2016; Tetlock 2005).
Individuals with more knowledge and experience in a given domain tend to have more con-
fidence in their own beliefs within that field. However, this confidence is often unwarranted
(Dunning 2005). Individuals induced to believe they are experts tend to overestimate the
accuracy of their beliefs (Arkes et al., 1987; Trafimow and Sniezek 1994). Specialized knowl-
edge can produce illusions of understanding in part because experts are less willing to admit
they do not know (Bradley 1981). Individuals tend to be more accurate at assessing their
own knowledge in an unfamiliar domain, relative to a familiar field such as the college major
(Fisher and Keil 2016). At the same time, recent scholarship suggests that expertise stimu-
lates close-minded cognition and dogmatism (Ottati et al. 2015). According to the authors,
this relationship results in part from social norms entitling experts to adopt more dogmatic
and forceful positions, while simultaneously encouraging individuals with little knowledge to
be more open-minded and accepting of criticism.
If legislators with specialized knowledge express similar forms of overconfidence and dog-
matism, policy expertise can impair other relevant tasks of elected officials. A central role
of representatives is to voice the preferences and interests of those who elected them (Pitkin
1967).2 However, to be responsive politicians need to channel the preferences of voters they
agree with as well as voters they disagree with. I argue that policy expertise constrains the
ability of legislators to incorporate the preferences of constituents they disagree with. The
overconfidence and dogmatism induced by specialized knowledge can lead representatives to
disregard opposing views in their domain of expertise. My argument implies that specialized
knowledge – although an important feature in the policymaking process – can work as an
obstacle for responsiveness. I refer to this process as the expertise curse.
The argument articulated here builds upon recent scholarship suggesting that legisla-
2Politicians can also be responsive by listening to the wishes of the citizens and by explaining their own
position to their constituency (Esaiasson et al. 2013; Harden 2013).
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tors systematically dismiss the preferences of constituents they disagree with (Butler and
Dynes 2016). The tendency of public officials to discount contrasting views may result from
motivated reasoning: when faced with facts or opinions that challenge pre-existing beliefs,
individuals are more likely to dismiss or actively counterargue these arguments (Lodge and
Taber 2013). The expertise curse hypothesis suggests that the propensity to dismiss con-
trasting views should be more acute in domains where legislators have more expertise.
3.2 Testing the Expertise Curse
To test the expertise curse hypothesis, I conducted an original survey experiment with
Swedish elected officials. The experiment was integrated in the Panel of Politicians, a bian-
nual panel survey with national, regional, and local elected officials, and administered by the
Laboratory of Opinion Research at the University of Gothenburg.3
The main goal of the experiment was to understand whether policy expertise constrains
the ability of legislators to incorporate contrasting views from constituents. Respondents
were presented with a hypothetical message from voters asking the legislator to endorse a
specific policy initiative. Elements of the request – including the specific issue area of the
policy – were experimentally manipulated to isolate the effects of expertise. Finally, officials
were asked to evaluate the constituents’ appeal. The expectation is that legislators are more
likely to disregard the opinion of voters in domains where they have more expertise.
In this section I describe the context in which the study was conducted and the extent
to which the findings should carry over to other contexts. Next, I detail the experimental
design and the empirical strategy adopted to test the expertise curse.
3More information at https://lore.gu.se/.
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3.2.1 The Swedish context
The Panel of Politicians in an online university-based panel that has been running since 2011.
The panel is composed by Swedish politicians from local, regional and national offices. All
major parties are proportionally represented in the sample except for the anti-establishment
party the Sweden Democrats, which are somewhat underrepresented. Participants are re-
cruited via invitations in large surveys like the Comparative Candidates Survey and the
Kommun- och landstingsfullmäktigeundersökningen, as well as by direct contacting efforts
through the websites of elected assemblies at all levels of government. The panel represents
a diverse group of active politicians from the Swedish political system. The experiment used
in this chapter was fielded between October 10 and November 13, 2019. In total, 1,861
elected officials participated in the survey (47 percent response rate). Table B2.1 (Appendix
B.2) summarizes the demographic characteristics of the sample of politicians that took part
in the study.
Sweden has a parliamentary system with strong and cohesive parties, in a proportional
setting. Politicians are first and foremost party representatives. Yet, preferential voting
creates incentives for legislators to cultivate a more personalized relationship with voters.
Candidates on a party list can improve their ranking if they get more than five percent of
the party votes in their constituency. Previous work established that Swedish legislators,
although constrained by intra-party dynamics, are committed to channel public opinion
(Naurin and Öhberg 2018; Öhberg and Naurin 2016), and to act on voter signals (Butler et
al. 2017; Persson 2020). Therefore, I expect the patterns uncovered here to generalize to
most European countries where party-centric systems and incentives to establish a personal
connection with voters coexist.
At the same time, party-centric systems can raise concerns over the substantive conse-
quences of the expertise curse. If the policy positions adopted by each party are decided
collectively, then the individual biases of representatives can cancel out. However, at least
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in the Swedish context there is evidence that legislators are particularly influent within their
own areas of expertise. According to the 2010 wave of the parliamentary survey, 53% of
Swedish MPs reported having very good chances of influencing the position of their party
group within their area of expertise, against only 9% outside their area of expertise (see
Table B2.2 for full results). Hence, it is exactly in the areas where legislators may be more
influential that their ability to adapt to voter preferences might be constrained.
3.2.2 Experimental design
I designed the experiment to assess whether policy expertise leads elected officials to dis-
count positions that go against their own. The design builds upon previous efforts to study
attitudes of political elites when interacting with voters (Butler and Dynes 2016; Harden
2013). As briefly introduced above, elected officials were asked to evaluate a policy appeal
made by a group of constituents. I altered the content of the appeal to isolate the effect of
expertise on the response of politicians to the message. Two pre-treatment items provided
the information needed to build the vignette: 1) measures of policy expertise and 2) the
officials’ preferences on the policies included in the vignette. I describe each item in turn
followed by the constituents’ message and the outcome variables used to capture the response
to the appeal.
Measuring policy expertise and policy preferences
Since actual expertise within a policy domain results from years of accumulated knowledge
and experience, it cannot be credibly manipulated in a survey. Hence, I leveraged the natural
variation in expertise between respondents across five salient issue areas: health care, edu-
cation, immigration, social welfare, and housing.4 To measure policy expertise, I introduced
4An alternative strategy would be to manipulate self-perceptions of expertise within a single issue: in-
ducing respondent to believe they were particularly knowledgeable on that field. However, self-perceptions
of expertise are rooted in psychological mechanisms that differ from those observed in response to actual
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the following item early in the survey:
Public officials have to deal with several different issues as part of
their job, and it is impossible to be an expert in all of them. Below
is a list of common issues that governments have to deal with.






Officials were asked to identify the issue areas where they were most and least knowl-
edgeable, among the five domains listed. The distribution of higher and lower expertise issue
areas is fairly uniform across respondents. While the modal area of expertise was education
(30.5% of respondents), the remaining four issue areas were selected by 11 to 24% of public
officials in the study. The same is true for the areas where legislators have lower levels of
expertise. Table B2.3 (Appendix B.2) reports the distribution of respondents identifying
each area as a high or low expertise domain.
With this information, I were able to randomly assign respondents to a high-expertise
or low-expertise condition. Later in the survey, those in the high-expertise group received
a message from a group of constituents asking the legislator to endorse a specific initiative
in the respondent’s field of expertise. In turn, officials in the low-expertise group received
a policy appeal in the area where they were least knowledgeable, among the five domains
provided.
For each area of expertise, I selected a specific policy initiative. Table 3.1 lists the
initiatives associated to each policy jurisdiction. I picked policies that were salient at the
time of the study, based on pre-tests with data from the Riksdag parliamentary survey and
specialized knowledge (Dunning 2011; Fisher and Klein 2016), and I are ultimately interested in the effects
of the latter.
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Table 3.1: Issue areas and corresponding policy initiatives.
Issue Area Policy Initiative % Supporters
Healthcare Prevent private companies from operating hospitals 41.8
Education Increase funding for charter schools 37.5
Immigration Accept fewer refugees 46.7
Social Welfare Introduce a ban on begging 33.0
Housing Reduce interest rate deductions on house loans 54.6
the Swedish national election surveys. Additionally, I ensured that elite and public support
for each issue were sufficiently split so that any position on the issue could be seen as credible.
As an example, the health care initiative concerned whether private companies should be
prevented from operating hospitals. At the beginning of the survey, I collected officials’
positions on each of these initiatives. To avoid contamination, additional policy questions
were included in this section of the survey and the order of the items was randomized. The
share of respondents supporting each initiative is also reported in Table 3.1. I used the
officals’ expressed preferences to ensure that the position of the group of constituents was
always at odds with the public official. This way, the design accounts for the fact that
legislators are be more likely to disregard opinions they disagree with (Butler and Dynes
2016). By holding policy disagreement constant in the vignette, I can isolate the effect of
policy expertise.
Policy appeal and legislators’ response
Finally, I asked respondents to evaluate a putative message sent from a group of constituents.5
Legislators in the high-expertise condition received an appeal on the issue area where they
were more knowledgeable. In turn, legislators in the low-expertise condition received a
message on the domain where they felt least knowledgeable. Box 3.1 provides an example of
the message presented to public officials. In this particular instance, a group of constituents
5Respondents were fully informed that this scenario was hypothetical.
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Box 3.1: Example of constituents’ appeal on one of the five issue areas: healthcare.
Different groups of voters contact politicians with political
propositions.
Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you
and wants you to [support/oppose] a proposal to ban companies
from running hospitals. They believe that health care is facing
major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their
main argument is that a ban on companies for operating hospitals
makes it [easier/more difficult] for vulnerable patients to
choose the healthcare they need.
contacted the legislator about a healthcare policy. As described above, the position of the
constituents on the policy (in favor or against) was determined by the elicited preferences
of the legislator in order to keep policy disagreement constant. Appendix B.1 presents the
vignettes for the remaining four policy issues.
I measured the reactions of legislators to the constituents’ message by having them indi-
cate their level of agreement with each of the following statements:
• The group likely understand the complexities of the issue
• The group likely based their opinion on facts
• The group likely hold this position strongly
• The group’s opinion is the opinion of the majority of voters
The first three statements capture the extent to which respondents recognized the validity
of the arguments put forward by the group of constituents. The fourth statement captures
more broadly the ability of respondents to accept that opposing views may be shared by the
majority of voters. The responses were recorded on seven-point Likert scales ranging from
“Completely disagree” to “Completely agree”. The question wording comes from Butler
and Dynes (2016). I treat each item as a separate outcome variable. If the expertise curse
hypothesis is correct, I should expect legislators to be more likely to disagree with each of
53
the statements when the message pertained to a high-expertise issue area. According to
the argument advanced here, the overconfidence and dogmatism produced by specialized
knowledge should make elected officials more likely to overlook and discount contrasting
views in their domain of expertise.
To retrieve the causal effects of policy expertise on legislators’ response to the policy
appeal, I use linear regressions with covariate adjustment to improve precision (Gerber and
Green 2012). The models account for respondents’ age, educational level, and party. How-
ever, the same substantive results are obtained from bivariate regressions without covariate
adjustment (see Figure B3.1 and Table B3.1 in Appendix B.3).
3.3 Results
Figure 3.1 presents the main results from the experiment. The y-axis lists the four statements
used as outcome variables to assess the legislators’ response to the policy appeal received.
Each estimate represents the average difference in levels of agreement with the statements,
between officials who received an appeal in a high-expertise domain and officials who received
an appeal in a low-expertise domain. Therefore, the estimates capture the causal effects of
policy expertise on legislators’ response to the policy request. Negative values mean less
agreement with each of the statments.
The results provide support for the expertise curse hypothesis. Policy expertise increases
the propensity of public officials to disregard contrasting views from constituents. On the one
hand, there is no evidence that policy expertise shapes beliefs about the strength of voters’
opinion. On the other, respondents in the high-expertise condition were significantly less
likely to consider (1) that the voters understood the complexity of the issue, (2) that their
opinion was based on facts, and (3) that the appeal reflected the opinion of the majority
of voters. The effect sizes estimated are substantively meaningful. For instance, the top
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Figure 3.1: The effects of expertise on the ability of legislators to incorporate contrasting
views.
Effects of policy expertise
on the assessment of voters opinion
Opinion aligned with
the majority of voters
The voters hold
this position strongly
The voters based opinion
on facts
The voters understand
complexity of the issue
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators’ assessment of voters’ opinion.
Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on
the y-axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from linear
models with covariate adjustment for party, age, and education. Full model results in Table B3.1.
estimate in Figure 3.1 is −0.28 (standard error = 0.09). Since the mean level of agreement
with the statement “voters understand the complexity of the issue” is 2.8 (on a seven-point
scale), the effect of policy expertise corresponds to a 10.0% decrease in the level of agreement
with the statement (−0.28/2.8 = 0.10), relative to the mean value of the outcome variable.
In turn, the estimated effect of expertise on agreement with the “opinion based on facts”
statement (mean = 2.78) is −0.35, corresponding to a 12.6% decrease relative to the mean
value of the outcome.
Importantly these patterns do not result from a general tendency of public officials to
discount opinions they disagree with (Butler and Dynes 2016). The vignettes were designed
so that policy disagreement was held constant: the position of the group of voters was always
in disagreement with the preferences of the legislator. Also, since the position of the group of
voters varied based on the personal position of each individual legislator, the results should
also not be explained by the specific arguments advanced in favor or against a given policy
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initiative.
Still, there might be meaningful differences in the effects across issue areas that could
drive the patterns uncovered. To account for this source of heterogeneity, I replicated the
main analyses with clustered standard errors and fixed effects by issue area (see Figure B3.2
and Figure B3.3, in Appendix B.3). The main findings are robust to these more restrictive
specifications. The only exception is the coefficient for “opinion aligned with majority”
which is no longer distinguishable from zero in the fixed-effects framework. Together, these
analyses suggest that systematic differences across the five policy domains included in the
study can only partially explain the dynamics uncovered in the main analysis.
Together, the results suggest that policy expertise systematically constrains the ability
of legislators to channel voter preferences. Elected officials with more expertise on a given
domain are more likely to overlook opinions opposed to their own. Probably more mean-
ingfully for the role of legislators as representatives, experts are also more likely to consider
that views opposed to their own do not represent the majority opinion. This pattern holds
when voters are either in favor or against the policies considered in the study. In the next
section I explore how formal education moderates the expertise curse.
3.3.1 Does formal education moderate the expertise curse?
Expertise in a given domain may come from the experience of legislators in office, prior
professional experience, or from formal education. The process through which knowledge
is acquired may shape the tendency of legislators to express overconfidence and to dismiss
contrasting views in their area of expertise. For instance, when expertise comes from years
of experience in a legislative committee public officials may feel more entitled to disregard
contrasting views. Consistent with this view, Converse and Pierce (1986) found that French
legislators with more years in office were more likely to misperceive voter preferences. On the
other hand, formal education such as a college major is often acquired early in life and during
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a relatively short period of time. The knowledge accumulated through a college degree can
quickly be forgotten. The failure to accurately recognize the rate of forgetting can give rise
to illusions of understanding (Fisher and Keil 2016).
Understanding the forms of knowledge that are more conducive to disagreement discount-
ing is important to shed light on the processes underlying the expertise curse. In this section
I give a first step in this direction by exploring how formal education moderates the tendency
of legislators to discount contrasting views in their areas of expertise. To do so, I created
a binary measure that takes the value of 1 if a legislator completed a college degree, and 0
otherwise (50.1% of officials in the survey had a college degree). I then replicated the main
analysis presented above interacting expertise with this measure of formal education.
Figure 3.2 presents the results. The patterns suggest that legislators with a college degree
were more likely to downplay the opinions of constituents they disagreed with in their area
of expertise. For the three outcomes that provided results consistent with the expertise curse
in the main analysis, the coefficient for officials with a college degree is consistently larger
(more negative). For instance, the effect of policy expertise on agreement with the statement
that the constituents’ message reflects the majority opinion is virtually zero among officials
without a college degree (estimate = 0.02; std. error = 0.11), but negative and substantively
large for respondents with a college degree (estimate = −0.36; std. error = 0.12). Officials
with more formal education were significantly less likely to accept that opposing views in
their area of expertise could represent the opinion of the majority (p-value for difference in
means = 0.02). The differences for agreement with “voters understanding the complexity
of the issue” and “opinions being based on facts” are narrower but consistently in the same
direction.
This result, although potentially counter-intuitive, is consistent with recent scholarship in
cognitive psychology. Individuals with formal expertise – expertise that arises from extended
study of a particular topic – are less like to exhibit overconfidence outside their fields of
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Figure 3.2: The effects of expertise on the ability of legislators to incorporate contrasting
views, conditional on educational background.
Effects of policy expertise
on the assessment of voters opinion
Opinion aligned with
the majority of voters
The voters hold
this position strongly
The voters based opinion
on facts
The voters understand
complexity of the issue
−0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
No college degree    College degree
Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators’ assessment of voters’ opinion,
among public officials with (black) and without (gray) a college degree. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are
95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the y-axis corresponds to a distinct
outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from linear models with covariate adjustment for
party and age. Full model results in Table B3.2.
knowledge, but more likely to overestimate their ability to explain their own areas of expertise
(Fisher and Keil 2016). This overconfidence may result from “a failure to realize how much
has been forgotten since they had maximum mastery of the topic” (p. 1260). This mechanism
provides a path to mitigate the expertise curse. However, this is only one of several possible
explanations that can be explored in future contributions.
3.4 Discussion
Good policy outcomes require legislators to have expertise on a variety of issues and policy
areas. Committee systems in most legislative branches encourage this form of specialization.
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At the same time, politicians are elected to represent the preferences and interests of their
constituents and elections create incentives for responsiveness. In this chapter I advance
that achieving the dual goal of electing policy experts and representatives who channel the
preferences of those who elect them may not always be compatible.
In a novel survey experiment with Swedish elected officials, I show that policy expertise
leads legislators to disregard the views of voters who disagree with them, regardless of the
actual position expressed by the constituents. I argue that this process results from overcon-
fidence and close-minded cognition induced by specialized knowledge. Experts are also less
likely to consent that voters with opposing policy preferences can reflect the position of the
majority. Additional analyses reveal that representatives with a college degree are actually
more likely to discount contrasting views in their field of expertise. This result suggests that
the expertise curse is not simply driven by politicians with passive expertise obtained from
more practical experience acquired in office.
I find support for the expertise curse across five salient policy jurisdictions: health care,
education, immigration, housing, and social welfare. The patterns uncovered do not appear
to be specific to a particular issue. Still, the study is constrained in a number of ways that
are worth emphasizing. First, the experimental design required legislators to rank a limited
set of policy areas in terms of expertise. These five issue areas are among the most relevant
for the vast majority of elected officials in the sample. Still, this design decision may have
added noise to the results. I have no reasons to believe that this simplification should bias the
findings in any particular direction, but future work would benefit from developing a more
flexible experimental design to incorporate other domains of expertise relevant to legislators.
Additionally, to make sure the experimental design was focused and well powered to
test the expertise curse, I held policy disagreement constant. Public officials were always
presented with a constituent appeal to support a policy they were opposed to. This way,
I ruled out the possibility that the results were due to disagreement discounting (Butler
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and Dynes 2016). It is conceivable that the effects of expertise are less pronounced when
politicians are asked to endorse policies they support. More research is needed to elucidate
this question. That said, the expertise curse is no less relevant if it is limited to instances
where officials are confronted with opposing views. Dealing with disagreement is an intrinsic
element of the policymaking process. Being able to recognize the value of contrasting views
is key to find solutions of compromise often required to move policy forward (Gutmann and
Thompson 2014).
Finally, I speculate that the expertise curse results from a heightened sense of self-
confidence and close-minded cognition, processes associated with more specialized knowledge
in a given domain. The link between expertise and overconfidence is well established in the
cognitive literature (Dunning 2005; Fisher and Klein 2016; Ottati et al. 2015; Tetlock 2005).
Still, the current study does not provide direct evidence to substantiate this mechanism in
the context of legislators interacting with constituents. Future individual-level research with
political elites could test this mechanism directly.
The results contribute to scholarship on policy responsiveness, legislative politics, and
elite behavior. First, the findings speak to seminal debates about constituency control over
public policy. Although macro-level analyses suggest that policy outcomes tend to reflect
public preferences (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2010), politicians only partially update their
agenda in response to voter signals (Butler and Nickerson 2011). The expertise curse, by
constraining the ability of legislators with specialized knowledge to incorporate public signals,
provides a novel explanation for breakdowns in policy responsiveness.
Since policymaking is a collective endeavor, it is possible that the cognitive biases of each
individual representative cancel out. However, legislatures tend to rely on representatives
with more expertise in a given domain to advance new policy solutions (e.g., Makse 2020).
This is also true in Sweden. The ability of Swedish MPs to influence the party is considerably
higher in their own areas of expertise (cf. Table B2.2). Hence, I expect that the judgment
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biases produced by specialized knowledge can have a meaningful impact in the degree to
which public preferences are converted into policy. Future work exploring the downstream
effects of the expertise curse would represent a meaningful contribution to this field of study.
The results can also provide insights to legislative politics. Parliaments around the world
rely on the specialized knowledge of their members to find solutions for different policy issues.
This expertise is key to make the policymaking process more efficient. However, the results
uncovered here suggest the existence of a trade-off between expertise and responsiveness.
Reformers interested in curbing the systemic low levels of trust in the legislative branch
(Leston-Bandeira 2012) may benefit from recognizing this tension and incorporating it in
their efforts to strengthen the links between voters and their representatives in parliament.
Finally, the study joins recent behavioral scholarship on elite behavior (e.g., Butler and
Dynes 2016; Esaiasson and Öhberg 2019; Sheffer et al. 2018). By focusing on the cognitive
processes underlying the decisions of elected officials, these studies shed light on different
questions left open in long-standing debates within the discipline. In the context of this
particular study, a natural next step involves exploring how elected officials can overcome
the tendency to dismiss public opinion in their own areas of expertise. A field experiment in





When Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, called a snap election in April 2017, several
pollsters estimated 25% of voting intentions for the Labour party. Less than two months
later, support for the center-left party rose to nearly 40%. Although this level of volatility
is not the norm, it is certainly not an outlier. In 2010, the British Liberal Democrats
experienced a 13 percentage point increase in voting intentions in the last month before the
election, while the Dutch Socialist Party saw its popular support go from 19% in August
2012 to less than 10% one month after. Cases like these raise several questions. How do
parties react to public opinion shifts on the campaign trail? Do leaders stick to their original
plan, or is campaign rhetoric responsive? Finally, when underperforming in the polls, do
parties moderate their positions to appeal to a broader constituency, or instead polarize to
secure the support of the base?
In this chapter I develop and test a theory of short-term responsiveness that addresses
these questions. Previous research established that parties are responsive to different signals
emerging from the electorate. Building on Budge’s seminal work (1994), Adams and co-
authors have shown that parties respond to changes in the ideological preferences of voters
from one election to the next (Adams et al. 2004; Adams, Haupt, and Stoll 2009; Adams and
Somer-Topcu 2009), although there are meaningful differences across policy issues (Klüver
1A modified version of this chapter was published in The Journal of Politics (Pereira 2020).
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and Spoon 2016; Tavits 2007), subconstituencies (Adams and Ezrow 2009; Enns and Wlezien
2011; Ezrow et al. 2011; Homola 2019), and types of parties (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow et
al. 2011; Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis 2013). Poor electoral performance is also likely to
induce changes in policy positions (Abou-Chadi 2014; Budge 1994; Somer-Topcu 2009) and
issue salience (Meyer and Wagner 2013).
While providing valuable insights into the nature of ideological updating, most existing
research relies on data from election manifestos produced every four or five years.2 Due to
data limitations, what happens between elections – and specifically on the campaign trail – is
still largely an open question. Although campaign responsiveness may share some similarities
with the patterns of ideological updating observed across elections, different time horizons
likely produce a distinct set of incentives to political elites.
I argue that the dominant collective goals of parties drive their responses to shifts in voter
preferences on the campaign trail. Parties have both office and policy goals (e.g., Downs
1957; Riker 1982; De Swaan 1973), but the weight assigned to these goals varies (Harmel
and Janda 1994; Spoon 2011). A common distinction in the literature is made between
mainstream parties – largely office-seekers – and niche parties, who place greater emphasis
on policy objectives (Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2005).
The competing goals argument suggests that the salience of different party goals is condi-
tional on the signals received from the electorate. When performing well in the polls, parties
will behave in line with their dominant goals. For mainstream parties, this means empha-
sizing moderate policy statements that maximize their electoral prospects (e.g., Calvo and
Hellwig 2011; Ezrow 2005). In turn, niche parties in a promising campaign environment will
pursue their policy goals through non-centrist statements that appeal to their base (Ezrow
2008; Ezrow et al. 2011). However, when voters shift away from the party, secondary goals
become more salient and lead to changes in campaign strategies. Mainstream parties will
2See Damore (2004; 2005) for an exception in the American context.
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adopt a less centrist rhetoric to avoid alienating their core constituents. For niche parties, in
turn, office goals become more salient. Most niche parties in Europe have a small voter base.
Even modest decreases in voting intentions bring the threat of being left out of parliament,
in which case their policy goals – although dominant – are harder to achieve. Hence, under-
performing niche parties have incentives to moderate their rhetoric. In a nutshell, campaign
responsiveness reflects the struggle parties face to balance different collective goals.
A pooled time-series analysis of 68 parties in ten European democracies provides empir-
ical support for the competing goals argument. The data come from two main sources: a
new dataset of policy statements made by European parties in recent campaigns (Debus,
Somer-Topcu, and Tavits 2016); and an original compilation of pre-election polling data
published in the same period. The analyses show that, when performing well in the polls,
mainstream parties tend to adopt a moderate rhetoric, while niche parties make significantly
more extreme statements. However, as voting intentions decline, mainstream parties are
progressively more likely to deviate from the center, while niche parties move in the op-
posite direction, giving more emphasis to moderate policy positions. Additional analyses
reveal that both types of parties tend to stick with the main messages from their manifestos
when performing well in the polls. Since manifestos reflect the parties’ dominant goals,
this result provides further support for the argument developed here. Although the observ-
able consequences of poor campaign performance differ for mainstream and niche parties,
the driving mechanism is the same: heightened incentives to accommodate secondary goals.
Importantly, these patterns hold in post-communist and Western European democracies.
The analyses uncover new evidence of the fluidity of party position taking and the im-
portance of treating party goals dynamically (Spoon 2011; Strøm and Müller 1999). To my
knowledge, this study represents the first effort to explain how European parties update their
policy rhetoric on the campaign trail. From a normative standpoint, the dynamics uncovered
here can be seen in a positive light. Elections are one of the rare times when a large segment
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of the electorate tunes into politics (Andersen, Tilley, and Heath 2005; Gelman and King
1993). If parties would simply stick with their pre-established plan for the campaign – often
decided by a small group of members months before the election –, the opportunities for
policy responsiveness would be constrained. Continuous ideological updating is demanding
and may divert party resources from other important areas of activity. Notwithstanding, at
least close to elections it provides a trial-and-error process that may promote policies closer
to the interests of voters.
4.1 A Theory of Campaign Responsiveness
In this section, I develop expectations on the relationship between public opinion and the
campaign strategies adopted by different parties. The overarching theory is that responses
to fluctuations in voter preferences are shaped by parties’ need to accommodate different
collective goals. Before outlining my arguments, some conceptual clarifications are required.
4.1.1 Parties’ dominant collective goals
Parties have both policy and office goals (e.g., Downs 1957; Riker 1982; De Swaan 1973).
Policy or ideological pursuits are defined as the aim to advocate for a specific set of policies
(Budge and Laver 1986). Office- or vote-seeking goals, in turn, refer to an aspiration for
increasing or sustaining control over the benefits of political office. Benefits include both
seats in parliament and private goods granted by governmental appointments. This definition
is intentionally broad to accommodate different baseline expectations. While securing some
seats in parliament may be far from the ambitions of large parties, it represents a meaningful
achievement for a small and nascent party.3
3The typology of party goals adopted here is purposefully parsimonious. See Strøm and Müller (1999)
for a comprehensive assessment of party motivations. Throughout the paper, the terms ‘policy goals’ and
‘ideological goals’ are used interchangeably. Likewise, ‘office-seeking’ and ‘vote-seeking’ goal refer to the
same concept described here.
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Importantly, policy pursuits are not only within the reach of parties in government (Abou-
Chadi and Orlowski 2016; Budge and Laver 1986). Political parties can advocate for a given
issue through multiple channels such as the parliament, the media, or through grassroots
campaigns (e.g., Farrer 2014). Hence, although being in government inevitably enhances
the capacity of a party to shape policy, it is not a requirement for parties to pursue their
ideological goals.
The importance parties attach to these collective pursuits is not static, as they often
generate trade-offs (Müller and Strøm 1999). Previous research uncovered systematic differ-
ences across parties on the primary set of motivations driving their behavior (Harmel and
Janda 1994; Spoon 2011). Some parties are led mostly by vote-seeking goals, while others
give primacy to ideological pursuits.
A common distinction in the literature is made between mainstream and niche parties
(Adams et al. 2006; Meguid 2005; Meyer and Wagner 2013; Wagner 2012). Mainstream or
catch-all parties – such as Labor,Conservatives, or Christian Democrats – are mainly vote-
seeking collective actors. Hence, in policy terms they have incentives to adopt moderate
positions to maximize their electoral prospects (e.g., Calvo and Hellwig 2011; Ezrow 2005;
Ezrow et al. 2011). Niche parties, in turn, are motivated more by the ideological goals of
their members (D’Alimonte 1999; Kitschelt 1994; Meguid 2005). Following previous work
on policy responsiveness (e.g., Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow 2008; Homola 2019), niche parties
are defined as those from the Communist, Green, or Nationalist party families.4 Although
diverse in their policy stances, the similarities of niche parties outweigh the differences once
we consider their role within the party system and the baseline motivations of their leaders
4This umbrella conceptualization - which includes both single-issue and ideologically motivated niche
parties - is favored not only because it is consistent with previous work in the field, but also because it
provides a clearer distinction between collective party goals. As discussed below, the key conclusions of
the study are robust to alternative definitions of niche party, including the exclusion of Communist parties
(Meguid 2005), and the challenger conceptualization proposed by De Vries and Hobolt (2012; Hobolt and
De Vries 2015). Recent contributions have proposed alternative typologies of niche parties based on issue
profiles (Meyer and Wagner 2013; Bischof 2017; Wagner 2012). I do not employ these measures since the
goal of the study is to explore responsiveness on the Left-Right dimension.
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(Meguid 2005).
Hence, mainstream and niche parties have distinct dominant collective goals. But how
are these goals related to the behavior of parties on the campaign trail?
4.1.2 Campaign responsiveness as goal accommodation
I argue that parties’ dominant collective goals determine their preferred strategy for the
campaign: the set of policies and issues that will be offered to voters. That is, parties favor
policy offerings that are expected to maximize their dominant goals.
Campaigns are prepared meticulously (Farrell and Webb 2000). Election programs are
drafted several months in advance and follow detailed party rules, often including an initial
proposal by the leadership, multiple stages of discussion, and a final endorsement by a
representative gathering of the party. The outcome of this effort, according to Budge, is
a “collective policy statement that [...] represents the combined views of the party as an
organization” (2001; 51).
Therefore, parties’ ex-ante plans for a campaign should reflect their dominant collective
goals. For mainstream parties, this means emphasizing moderate positions to maximize
their electoral prospects. Although spatial models offer contrasting predictions regarding
the ideal vote-maximization strategies in multi-party elections (e.g., Adams 2001; Calvo and
Hellwig 2011; Lin, Enelow, and Dorussen 1999), empirical work has consistently shown that
mainstream parties in this context benefit electorally from adopting more moderate positions
(Calvo and Hellwig 2011; Ezrow 2005). This argument is also consistent with research on
party strategies in Western Europe showing that major parties have progressively become
center-oriented vote maximizers, even when this strategy requires shedding the ideological
roots of the party (Kirchheimer 1966; Van Kersbergen 1999; see also Ezrow et al. 2011, and
Somer-Topcu 2015).5
5It is important to keep in mind that this prediction refers to relative issue emphasis on the campaign
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In turn, niche parties should pursue their ideological goals by adopting a more polarized
rhetoric in line with the policy preferences of their base (Ezrow 2008; Ezrow et al. 2011). I
expect this equilibrium to hold to the extent that parties are performing well in the campaign.
Parties are conservative organizations (Adams et al. 2004; Harmel and Janda 1994) and tend
to update their strategies only when there are good reasons to do so (e.g., Somer-Topcu 2009).
From here I derive my first expectation:
Dominant Goals Hypothesis: When performing well in the campaign, mainstream par-
ties adopt a campaign rhetoric that is more moderate than that of niche parties.
However, what happens when voters shift away from a party on the campaign trail? In
the context of an election campaign, drastic policy changes are unlikely as they may lead
to accusations of pandering (Tavits 2007). Still, within the range of policy positions that
compose a manifesto, parties can fine tune their campaign rhetoric. By altering the em-
phasis given to different policy issues, party leaders shape voters’ perceptions of ideological
positioning (Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2014). Previous work suggests that updating
election programs by changing the attention devoted to different policy issues can be an
effective strategy after disappointing elections (Meyer and Wagner 2013), and among in-
cumbent parties facing poor economic conditions (Greene 2016; Hellwig 2012; Vavreck 2009;
Williams, Seki, and Whitten 2016).
But how should voter signals shape campaign rhetoric? I argue that poor performance in
the campaign raises the salience of parties’ secondary goals, and consequently the need for
party leaders to accommodate them. This process manifests itself differently for mainstream
and niche parties.
Underperforming mainstream parties have heightened incentives to appeal to their core
constituents in order to minimize losses. Core voters are individuals who consistently identify
trail. Mainstream parties may still emphasize off-center positions in promising campaign environments. The
expectation is not that parties will converge on the position of the median voter but that campaign rhetoric
should be progressively more moderate to appeal to a broader set of voters.
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with the party and form the party’s natural electoral base (Converse 1966; Green 2011).
Hence, they represent a safe haven for unpopular mainstream parties (Robertson 1976). My
expectation is that this process leads parties to adopt a more polarized campaign rhetoric,
as party activists tend to occupy the far side of a party’s ideological spectrum (e.g., Adams,
Merrill, and Grofman 2005; Karreth, Polk, and Allen 2012; Moon 2004; but see Kitschelt
1989). This argument is in line with the work of Schofield and co-authors (Schofield 2003,
2005; Schofield and Sened 2005). The authors suggest that office-seeking parties with low
valence have incentives to move away from the center to avoid alienating the interests of
more policy-driven activists who provide the necessary time and resources to the party.6
For niche parties, in turn, the secondary aim of maintaining seats (i.e., their office goals)
becomes more prominent as voters begin deserting the party. For most European niche
parties, a small decrease in popular support brings the threat of not reaching the electoral
threshold to elect one of their candidates, or at least losing a significant portion of their
delegation in parliament. In either case, the parties’ ideological pursuits – although dominant
– are harder to achieve. Hence, underperforming niche parties have incentives to adopt
a more moderate rhetoric in order to appeal to a wider range of voters. This argument
is in line with recent work showing that heightened vote-seeking goals lead smaller and
newer parties to switch from niche to mainstream issue profiles after disappointing elections
(Meyer and Wagner 2013). Spoon (2011), in turn, shows that European small parties survive
when their leaders are able to balance the competing goals of vote maximization and policy
differentiation.
Altogether, poor campaign performance is expected to alter the balance of parties’ collec-
tive goals by increasing the relative salience of secondary pursuits, and consequently impelling
6Appealing to core constituents in this context can be interpreted simply as a vote-seeking strategy. In
a case study of the British Conservative party, Green (2011) provides evidence in line with this perspective.
The study shows how leaders of the Conservative party focused on traditionally conservative issues after
disappointing elections. However, as ideologically motivated core voters become a more important asset to
mainstream parties, policy differentiation becomes a more integral part of the campaign strategy.
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leaders to fine tune their campaign rhetoric. The competing goals argument generates two
testable hypotheses:
Competing Goals Hypothesis I: When underperforming in the polls, mainstream parties
adopt a more polarized campaign rhetoric.
Competing Goals Hypothesis II: When underperforming in the polls, niche parties adopt
a more moderate campaign rhetoric.
4.2 Data and Measurement
I test these predictions in ten European countries, based on two main sources of data: (1)
a new dataset of policy statements made by 68 European parties in recent campaigns, from
2005 to 2015; and (2) an original compilation of pre-election polls published in the same
period.
The campaign statements come from the Comparative Campaign Dynamics Project
(CCDP) (Debus, Somer-Topcu, and Tavits 2016). This cross-national project followed the
media coverage of two election campaigns in ten European countries: Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.7
For each campaign, the project compiled data from the two highest circulation daily
newspapers in the last month before Election Day.8 The data collection process involved
three steps. First, country experts identified all election-related articles published in each of
7Three elections in the case of the United Kingdom.
8A relevant concern of using media reports to measure campaign rhetoric is bias in the tone and volume
of coverage. Although all countries in the study regulate print media coverage of elections and prohibit
false statements about candidates (Cappello 2017), campaign reporting is not neutral (Greene and Lühiste
2018). To minimize bias in the coverage of different parties, country experts selected one left-leaning and
one right-leaning outlet for each campaign. Table C1.3 (Appendix C1) lists the newspapers included in the
study. Additionally, to account for biases in the volume of coverage of different parties, all the analyses
control for the number of articles about a given party. Finally, robustness checks with fixed-effect models
account for any systematic differences across parties, including their relationship with media outlets.
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the newspapers in this period. Second, all first-page articles and a random selection of 5%
of the remaining articles were selected for coding. Finally, each selected article was coded by
three research assistants from the respective country, who filled out a questionnaire for each
policy statement made by a party. The coding procedure was based on a comprehensive
survey and posteriorly reviewed for inter-coder reliability.9
Table C1.1 (Appendix C1) summarizes these data. The number of articles coded in
each election ranges from 105 to 142, containing an average of 396 policy statements per
campaign. The daily average of policy statements for mainstream parties is 3.9, while the
average for niche parties is 2.4.10
I used these data to create a measure of the ideological content of campaign statements
made by parties throughout the campaign. For each policy statement, I identified its ideo-
logical tone following the approach adopted by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP;
Budge 2013). The list of campaign statements coded is described in Table C1.2 (Appendix




1, if Rightp ∗ [Right Statementsp,d − Left Statementsp,d] > 0
0, if Rightp ∗ [Right Statementsp,d − Left Statementsp,d] ≤ 0
Where Rightp is 1 for parties identified as right-wing in the CMP, and −1 for left-wing
parties. Hence, Non-Centrist Rhetoric takes the value of 1 when the majority of policy
statements made by party p on day d is aligned with their ideological positioning, and 0
otherwise. Overall, 48% of mainstream parties’ daily statements are non-centrist, against
9More details on the coding procedure can be found in Baumann and Gross (2016), and Somer-Topcu,
Tavits, and Baumann (2017).
10This difference is expected, since media outlets tend to devote more attention to mainstream parties.
The empirical analyses account for this differential treatment.
11Appendix C2 provides a description of the coding decisions along with a series of sensitivity analyses.
See also Somer-Topcu, Tavits, and Baumann (2017) for a similar approach.
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56% in the case of niche parties. I decided to dichotomize the outcome variable because the
daily median number of ideological statements for a given party is 1.12
It is important to note that this measure does not capture changes in positioning for
individual policies. Instead, it follows the methodology of the RILE index by mapping an
array of statements on different policy issues along a left-right scale. It is the weight given
by party leaders to these different issues that ultimately determines the ideological tone of
campaign rhetoric. Although there are different ways of quantifying policy statements, here
I favored an approach consistent with the measure most often used in previous work on
responsiveness.
The main predictor of interest in the analyses is a measure of campaign performance
based voting intentions. To get estimates of popular support for each party throughout the
campaigns, I compiled pre-election polling data for the periods covered in the CCDP. In
nearly all European countries, polling companies regularly measure citizens’ preferences for
parties. Although sometimes varying in the question wording adopted, most studies ask how
citizens would vote “if elections were held today.”13
Overall, I compiled 749 polls for 20 national campaigns.14 On days with more than one
new poll, I took the mean of the voting intention estimates. On average, at least one new poll
was published in 56% of campaign days in the CCDP dataset, although there is considerable
variation across elections (see column 5 in Table C1.1). Finally, on days without new polls I
conducted a linear interpolation of voting intentions.15 This näıve method of poll aggregation
12That said, the main results presented below are substantively similar when a continuous measure of
ideological rhetoric is used (see Table C5.7, in Appendix C5).
13Following Jennings and Wlezien’s (2016) approach, I ignore differences in question wording. Previous
research has shown that differences in question wordings have no discernible effects on poll results (Lau
1994). Moreover, most pollsters in Europe belong to the same international groups such as Gallup, TNS,
Ipsos, or Yougov, which leads to a progressive homogenization of polling practices.
14More details on the sources of polling data and the coding rules adopted in the data collection process
are described in Appendix C3. The 2010 Dutch election – covered in the CCDP – was left out of the analysis
due to data availability.
15Results are substantively similar when piecewise constant interpolation is used. In this case, voting
intentions on days without new polls remain constant at the level of the last published poll.
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was preferred over more sophisticated techniques since the main goal here is not to produce
the most accurate measure of voter preferences, but instead to capture how political actors
perceive levels of support for their party throughout the campaign. Polling data were then
used to create the following predictor:
Campaign Performancep,d = Voting Intentionsp,d − Vote Share in Previous Electionp.
Where the Campaign Performance of party p in day d is the difference between estimated
voting intentions and the vote share received by the same party in the last general election.16
Appendix C4 discusses the choice of this baseline and compares it with alternative reference
points. According to this formulation, regardless of party size, positive values signal good
performance in the polls, while negative values suggest that a party is underperforming
relative to the previous election.
4.2.1 Modeling Strategies
The unit of observation in the database is party-day and the data structure includes several
sources of variation: across countries, years, parties, and time within each campaign. The
predictions made above refer to within-campaign variation, therefore I account for the first
two sources of variation by adding random intercepts for campaigns. Moreover, in order
to deal with potential time dependencies within a given campaign, the models include an
autoregressive term.
Hence, in the baseline specification of the multilevel logistic regressions estimated, the
probability that a given party p produces a set of polarized policy statements on day d and
16Parties running for the first time were dropped out of the analyses.
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campaign c is modeled as:





β3Campaign Performanced−1,p,c × Nichep+
δZd−1,p,c + ε]
αc ∼N(µα, σ2α)
The term αc is a random intercept and accounts for cross-campaign variation, while β0
is the coefficient for the autoregressive term. The main predictor in the model – Campaign
Performance – is interacted with a dichotomous variable that distinguishes between niche
and mainstream parties. Nichep equals 1 if the party is a member of one of the niche party
families. The classification of party families comes from the CMP. This interaction allows
me to test the main predictions of the theory. The dominant goals hypothesis suggests
that for positive values of Campaign Performance niche parties are more likely to adopt a
non-centrist rhetoric than mainstream parties (β3 > 0, for Campaign Performance > 0). In
turn, the competing goals hypothesis is that the effect of campaign performance on non-
centrist rhetoric is negative for mainstream parties (β1 < 0), but positive for niche parties
(β1 + β3 > 0).
17
Finally, Zd−1,p,c is a matrix of control that may shape the relationship between campaign
performance and policy statements. I account for the number of days until Election Day
17Although the hypotheses involve expectations about the same coefficient (β3), it should be noted that
support for one does not mean support for the other. For instance, the competing goals hypotheses are
consistent with a pattern where, regardless of campaign performance, mainstream parties adopt a rhetoric
that is systematically more extreme than the rhetoric of niche parties. In this case, the dominant goals
hypothesis would be rejected. Berry, Golder, and Milton (2012) show the advantages of fully exploiting
model interactions.
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since the dynamics of responsiveness may change throughout the campaign. The models also
control for the distance to the previous published poll to capture differences in the salience
of the signals provided by opinion polls. Third, recent work shows that voters are more likely
to discount the positions of parties in government (Ban and Somer-Topcu 2012). Hence, I
account for whether a party controlled the executive in the last term. Fourth, I account for
statements made by other election contenders about party p in the same time period, as they
may distort voters’ perceptions of the different parties (Somer-Topcu, Tavits, and Neumann
2017). These data also come from the CCDP. Finally, the models control for the effective
number of parties and the proportion of campaign days for which the media content analysis
identified policy statements from a given party. This variable captures potential biases in
media attention to different parties.
4.3 Results
This section begins with a test of the three hypotheses derived from the theory of responsive
campaigning, followed by a series of sensitivity analyses that test the robustness of the key
findings. Finally, I present an additional analysis based on manifesto data to provide support
for the mechanism implicit in the theory.
4.3.1 Public opinion and campaign rhetoric
Table 4.1 reports the results of multilevel logistic models with Non-Centrist Rhetoric as the
outcome. The first two models follow the core specification described above, with random
intercepts for campaigns that account for variation across countries and years. Column 1
presents a baseline specification, while the model in column 2 includes the full set of controls.
The interpretation of the results is based on the latter.
First, I explore the differences in campaign strategies between mainstream and niche
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Table 4.1: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking for main-
stream and niche parties.
DV = Pr(Non-Centrist Rhetoricd)
Campaign Party-Campaign





Campaign Performance −0.04∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.05∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Niche 0.07 0.23 0.32
(0.13) (0.18) (0.28)
Campaign Performance × Niche 0.09∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Controls No Yes Yes
σα 0.24 0.16 0.72
Observations 1,205 1,205 1,205
Log Likelihood −753.1 −738.5 −725.3
AIC 1,518.1 1,501.1 1,474.5
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for campaign
(models 1 and 2) and party-campaign (model 3) (standard errors in parentheses). All predictors that
vary at the day-level are measured at d − 1. Full models in Table C5.1 (Appendix C5). +p<0.1;
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
parties. The expectation is that when Campaign Performance is positive niche parties should
be more likely to make non-centrist policy statements than mainstream parties, in line with
their dominant collective goals. To assess this argument, Figure 4.1 plots the marginal effects
of Niche as a function of Campaign Performance, along with 95% confidence intervals. This
can be interpreted as the estimated difference between niche and mainstream parties in the
likelihood of emphasizing polarized policy positions.
The positive slope suggests that as campaign performance improves, niche parties are
increasingly more likely to make non-centrist policy statements than mainstream parties.
However, as expected, this difference is only reliable when parties are performing as well or
better than in the previous election. For Campaign Performance = 0, niche parties are 5.0
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Marginal effect of Niche, by campaign performance
Note: The figure plots the marginal effects of Niche across different levels of Campaign Performance, as
predicted in model 2 of Table 4.1. Since the predictor of interest is binary, the plot gives the marginal effects
relative to the baseline of mainstream parties. The shaded bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The
distribution of Campaign Performance is plotted at the bottom, along with a rug for the subset of niche
parties.
points more likely to make non-centrist statements than mainstream parties. However, this
difference raises to 14.7 points when niche parties are polling 5 points above the previous
election. Importantly, the distribution of the conditioning variable shows that the estimated
effects for both types of parties are supported by the data. This result suggests that the
preferred campaign strategies of mainstream and niche parties are systematically different,
as theorized. Below I provide additional support for this argument.
Next, I investigate how fluctuations in voter preferences shape the campaign rhetoric
of both mainstream and niche parties, respectively. To do so, I now treat Niche as the
conditioning variable in the interaction. Returning to Table 4.1 (column 2), the coefficient
of Campaign Performance gives an estimate of the effect of voting intentions on campaign
rhetoric for mainstream parties. As expected, the coefficient is negative and reliable (p-
value < 0.01). The likelihood that mainstream parties make non-centrist policy statements
decreases when they perform well in the polls. Put differently, as voters shift away, main-
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stream parties are more likely to adopt a polarized rhetoric. This effect is substantively
meaningful. The model predicts that, on average, a five-point decrease in voting intentions
for mainstream parties is associated with a 7.1% increase in the probability of ideologically
non-centrist statements on the following day.18
Hence, mainstream parties are more likely to deviate from the center following disap-
pointing polls. The same is not true for niche parties. In order to simplify the interpretation
of the interaction, in Figure 4.2 I present the marginal effects of Campaign Performance
for both types of parties. The plot shows that the effects of campaign performance are not
only significantly different for mainstream and niche parties, but in opposite directions. The
coefficient for niche parties is positive and statistically significant (point estimate = 0.05; s.e.
= 0.02). Accordingly, if a niche party experiences a five-point decrease in voting intentions,
relative to the previous election, the predicted probability of making polarized statements
on the following day decreases 11.4%.19 The competing goals argument suggests that this is
due to a growing salience of office goals among underperforming niche parties.
The coefficients of the control variables also provide meaningful information about the
dynamics of campaign rhetoric (see Model 2 in Table C5.1 for full results). Contrary to what
was anticipated, the incentives for rhetorical responsiveness do not change meaningfully as
the election approaches. This result may be explained by ceiling effects: attentiveness to
voter signals should already be at its peak one month before the election. In turn, as
expected, parties are more responsive to the results of a new opinion poll as the number of
days since the previous poll increases (point estimate = 0.05; s.e. = 0.02). This pattern is
consistent with the notion that more informative signals are more likely to alter campaign
rhetoric. Additionally, more statements made by other election contenders about a given
18For mainstream parties, the average value of the outcome variable is 0.48, and the difference in predicted
probabilities for a five-point decrease in Campaign Performance is 3.4. Hence, a five-point decrease in voting
intentions leads to a 0.034/0.48 = 0.071 proportional increase in the probability of non-centrist statements.
19A five-point decrease in Campaign Performance for niche parties decreases the probability of non-centrist
appeals in 6.3 points. Since the average value of the outcome for niche parties is 0.55: 0.062/0.55 = 0.114.
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Figure 4.2: The effects of campaign performance for mainstream and niche parties.
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Niche
Mainstream
Marginal effects of campaign performance, by party type
Note: Entries are point estimates of Campaign Performance for mainstream and niche parties, respectively,
with 95/90% confidence intervals represented in narrow/wide bars.
party increase the likelihood that party leaders emphasize more moderate positions (point
estimate = 0.10; s.e. = 0.03). This result was expected as a reaction to the capacity of
party leaders to distort voters’ images of party positioning (e.g., Somer-Topcu, Tavits, and
Baumann 2017). Finally, I find no evidence that incumbents are more or less likely to update
their rhetoric on the campaign trail, relative to parties in the opposition.20
4.3.2 Robustness checks
The results just described are robust to several alternative specifications (see Appendix C5
for details). First, I re-estimated the original model adding random intercepts for party-
campaign. This specification is more restrictive than the original one since it accounts for
variability across parties in any given campaign. Column 3 in Table 4.1 presents the results
of this analysis. The variance parameter for the intercepts (0.72) is over four times larger
20The measure of incumbency used in the main models does not distinguish between junior and senior
coalition partners. However, the key results remain substantively the same after accounting separately for
parties controlling the PM and junior coalition partners (see Table C5.3, in Appendix C5). Additionally,
Appendix C6 shows that incumbent and opposition parties do not respond differently to voter signals on
the campaign trail. The patterns observed for mainstream and niche parties are not explained by their
incumbency status.
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than in the original model, suggesting this new specification captures considerably more
cross-group variation. As expected, the point estimates are less precise, although the main
substantive results remain. The effect of campaign performance on non-centrist rhetoric is
negative for mainstream parties (point estimate = −0.05; s.e. = 0.02), and positive for niche
parties (point estimate = 0.07; s.e. = 0.03).
Second, I re-estimated the main model with fixed-effects for campaigns and parties.
Hierarchical models have several advantages when dealing with nested data. However, these
models partially pool the estimates for different groups: if a given group only has a few
observations, the group’s estimate will be partially based on the more abundant data from
other groups. This is potentially concerning because there might be systematic differences
across parties or campaigns in the number of observations collected in the CCDP dataset,
and in the volume of media coverage for different parties. Table C5.4 shows that the main
results from the analysis are not altered in the fixed-effects framework. Importantly, by
fully accounting for cross-campaign variation this sensitivity analysis also rules out concerns
that the results are driven by system-level forces such as electoral institutions or economic
conditions (e.g., Adams, Haupt, and Stoll 2011).
The results are robust to alternative conceptions of niche parties. Meguid (2005) defined
niche parties as those rejecting the traditional class-based orientation of politics, raising novel
issues, and limiting their issue appeals. Operationally, her typology is also based on party
families but excludes Communist parties. In turn, De Vries and Hobolt (2012) proposed the
challenger conceptualization of niche parties. Challenger parties are parties that have not
previously held political office. According to the authors, given the marginalized position of
challenger parties, “office-seeking is often not their primary goal” (2012; 253). Tables C5.5
and C5.6 show that the main dynamics of campaign responsiveness are identical under these
alternative conceptualizations. This result also demonstrates the distinct motivations of
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parties without experience in office.21
The effects of public opinion on campaign rhetoric are also robust to different specifica-
tions of the outcome variable. By dichotomizing Non-Centrist Rhetoric in the main analysis,
some information was lost which may induce bias in the estimates. To account for this con-
cern, in Table C5.7 I re-estimated the models with a continuous measure of Non-Centrist
Rhetoric. The main results remain unchanged. Next, I built a three-day version of the
outcome variable by aggregating policy statements made every three days. This alternative
specification had two goals in mind: to test the stability of the results to different time hori-
zons, and to enhance the reliability of the measure. As described above, the median daily
number of ideological statements made by a single party in the CCDP is 1. Hence, small
levels of random error in the coding of statements may lead to different values of the outcome
variable. By increasing the number of statements used to build Non-Centrist Rhetoric, this
concern is minimized. Table C5.8 replicates the analyses with this alternative outcome, and
the results confirm the findings discussed above. Moreover, they suggest that the effects of
public opinion polls on campaign rhetoric do not dissipate quickly.
Finally, the same substantive conclusions are obtained when the main dataset is par-
titioned in different ways. Researchers have raised concerns about the applicability of the
RILE index to post-communist democracies (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2006; Mölder 2016).
Table C5.9 shows that the parties from Central and Eastern European countries respond
to fluctuations in voter preferences on the campaign trail just like their Western European
counterparts. An additional concern regards the variation in polling coverage across elec-
tions, which may lead to systematic error in the measurement of campaign performance.
21A distinct concern regarding the niche typology adopted in the main analyses is that it combines parties
with clear ideological roots and parties that mostly compete on non-left-right issues. For the latter, since
the core issues that motivate their electorate may not be well represented on the ideological scale, a more
appropriate test of the dominant/competing goals argument should use the key issues of each party as the
reference point. The expectation is that issue-specific party leaders should emphasize the core issues of
their party when performing well in the campaign, while deviating to attract a wider consistency when
underperforming. Appendix C7 shows evidence in line with this perspective for populist radical right and
green parties.
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To assuage this concern, I re-estimated the main model splitting the dataset between elec-
tions with new polls in more or less than 50% of the campaign period. Table C5.10 reveals
that similar dynamics are observed in high and low coverage elections. Finally, Table C5.11
shows that the findings are not due to negative autocorrelation between mainstream and
niche parties in the same election. When the models are estimated separately for each type
of party, the same results are uncovered.
4.3.3 Testing the mechanism: voter signals and dominant goals
The main analyses suggest that mainstream and niche parties respond differently to shifts
in voter preferences on the campaign trail. I argue that this is due to differences in parties’
dominant collective goals, and the way voter signals shift the salience of these goals. However,
the patterns uncovered may be driven by different processes. To provide additional evidence
for the theory advanced, I conducted an additional test.
The dominant goals argument implies that when parties are performing well in the cam-
paign their primary goals drive the rhetoric adopted: mainstream parties will emphasize
moderate positions to appeal to a broader set of voters, while niche parties will pursue their
policy goals through polarized rhetoric. These messages should also be more in line with the
main issues emphasized in their election programs. Party manifestos are generally produced
several months before the election and reflect the core goals of the party (Budge 2001).
Hence, if good campaign performance leads to a focus on the party dominant goals, both
mainstream and niche parties should rely more on the main messages from their manifestos
when performing well in the polls.
To test this mechanism, I identified the dominant issue in each party manifesto, as
provided by the CMP, and created a new binary outcome that takes the value of 1 when a
party mentions this issue on a given campaign day.22 The expectation is that, regardless of
22The CMP codes election programs based on the share of quasi-sentences devoted to different policy
82
party type, better performance in the polls is associated with a higher propensity to stick
with the original message devised for the campaign.
Table 4.2 provides support for this argument. The positive coefficient for Campaign
Performance in model 1 suggests that parties are more likely to talk about the dominant
issues in their manifestos when performing well in the campaign. The point estimate (0.02;
p-value = 0.02) is modest but still relevant. On average, a five-point surge in voting inten-
tions is associated with a 6.7% increase in the probability of parties mentioning their modal
manifesto issues on the following day.23 Model 2 finds no meaningful differences between
mainstream and niche parties. The interaction between Campaign Performance and Niche
is indistinguishable from zero, and a likelihood ratio test shows that the added term does
not improve model fit (χ2 = 0.14; p-value = 0.71).
Hence, both types of parties are more likely to rely on the key messages established
in their manifestos when performing well in the campaign. As seen above, this means a
non-centrist rhetoric for niche parties and moderate positions for mainstream parties (cf.
Figure 4.2). Although the observable consequences of fluctuations in public opinion differ
for mainstream and niche parties, the driving mechanism seems to be the same: a pursuit
for the party’s dominant collective goals, and the need to accommodate secondary objectives
when voters shift away from the party.
issues. Based on this information, I identified the most salient topic in each manifesto as the topic with the
highest share of quasi-sentences. To allow for comparability, I restricted the analysis to issues covered in the
CCDP dataset. Table C1.2, in Appendix C1, reports the matched categories. On average, parties mention
their dominant issues 41.5% of the days. See Greene and Jensen (2016) for a similar empirical application
of the CMP.
23A five-point increase in campaign performance is associated with a 2.8 points increase in the probability
of referencing a dominant manifesto issue. Given that the average value of the outcome variable is 0.42:
0.028/0.42 =0.067
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Table 4.2: The effect of campaign performance on the propensity to emphasize dominant
manifesto issues.
DV = Pr(Dominant Manifesto Issued)
(1) (2)









Log Likelihood −875.5 −875.4
AIC 1,773.0 1,774.8
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for cam-
paign (standard errors in parentheses). All predictors that vary at the day-level are measured
at d− 1. Full models in Table C5.2. +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
4.3.4 Discussion
In the months leading up to an election, parties put together a program establishing their
main policy goals for the upcoming term. Researchers have used this information exten-
sively to study dynamics of policy responsiveness. However, between the publication of the
manifestos and Election Day, we still know little about the link between public opinion and
the positions taken by party leaders. In this chaapter, I advance a theory of short-term re-
sponsiveness according to which parties’ dominant goals drive the relationship between voter
preferences and campaign rhetoric. Fluctuations in voting intentions shape the salience of
policy and office goals, leading parties to update their messages. Underperforming main-
stream parties accommodate the policy goals of their core voters by deviating from the
ideological center. In turn, the secondary office goals of niche parties become more salient
when voting intentions decrease, raising incentives for more moderate policy statements. I
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find evidence in line with these arguments in both Western European and post-communist
democracies.
The patterns uncovered here are not at odds with existing research on policy updating
across elections, which mostly relies on measures of mass ideological preferences. Voting
intentions, however, include not only policy evaluations but assessments of party valence.
Moreover, to the extent that changes in support throughout a campaign reflect variation
in policy preferences among voters, they provide no clear signal of direction on the left-
right scale.24 Finally, adjustments in campaign rhetoric may not be reflected in future party
programs, which are likely driven by the parties’ dominant collective goals (Budge 2001).
Overall, short-term responsiveness is not expected to perfectly mirror the patterns observed
from one election to the next one. Further exploring the connection between short-term and
long-term responsiveness is a promising path for future contributions.
In that sense, this study opens new avenues for research on the links between voters and
their representatives. It remains unclear whether the patterns of short-term responsiveness
revealed here hold outside the campaign environment. My expectation is that the capacity
of voter signals to shape the salience of different party goals may be weaker when elections
are distant. However, if parties wait for the last months before an election to respond
to public appeals, it might be too late. A full assessment of this question may require a
different type of data – such as party press releases or social media communication –, as the
media coverage of parties tends to be sparser outside of the campaign seasons. By providing
unfiltered measures of party statements, these data would also allow for further validation of
the measures produced by CCDP. Although CCDP tried to minimize bias in different ways,
it remains an open questions whether media reports are a robust cross-national measure of
party rhetoric.
The findings contrast with the perspective that European parties operate largely as
24For instance, assuming voter policy preferences are unimodal, a decrease in voting intentions for a centrist
party may mean that voters either moved to the right or to the left.
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trustees. At least close to elections, parties seem to be highly responsive to voter signals.
While manifestos are an important guideline for campaign rhetoric, parties quickly update
their pre-established plans when voters shift away from them, and do so in ways that con-
form with their distinct motivations. In that sense, this chapter complements research on the
electoral consequences of policy positioning (e.g., Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow, Ho-
mola, and Tavits 2014). Although manifestos provide a good proxy for the campaign rhetoric
of parties performing well in the polls, the same may not true for those underperforming.
Campaign responsiveness may also explain recent scholarship on political representation.
It has been shown that European voters update their views of parties not from election
manifestos but from the wider informational environment (Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu
2014). As it is shown here, policy statements made on the campaign trail are more fluid
than the set of policy goals inscribed in the election programs. These patterns may explain
how voters update their beliefs about different parties. Importantly, rhetorical fine-tuning
operates not through major shifts in policy positioning, but through parties’ issue emphasis
strategies. In that sense, the study joins a growing line of work on the strategic updating
of issue priorities (e.g., Greene 2016; Tavits and Potter 2015; Williams, Seki, and Whitten
2016).
The findings also provide a new explanation for variation in the fulfillment of election
pledges. On average, European parties follow up on 60% of the promises made in their
manifestos, although there is considerable variation across parties and countries (Thomson
et al. 2017). The results presented here can explain part of this volatility: election pledges
may be updated as new information comes up during the campaign.
Finally, the findings suggest that the salience of parties’ collective goals is not static.
Instead, it is shaped by environmental conditions such as fluctuations in voting intentions.
By endogenizing the salience of party goals we may uncover more nuanced patterns in the
behavior of political elites. The implications of this argument go beyond the context of
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campaigns and responsiveness. At different stages in the career of a public official, or whether




Opinion Polls as Mobilization and
Fine-Tuning Devices1
Opinion polls play a central role in contemporary political campaigns. Updates on the
performance of parties receive considerable attention from news outlets, and often serve as
the baseline for political commentary on the weeks leading to Election day. We know that
learning about the positions of the electorate can shape the behavior of voters (Duffy and
Tavits 2008; Forsythe et al 1993; Meffert and Gschwend 2011; Morwitz and Pluzinski 1996).
However, it is less clear how polling shape the strategies of party leaders on the campaign
trail.
Understanding how parties respond to opinion polls is relevant for several reasons. The
quantification of public opinion has often been criticized for its effects on the perceptions of
voters (Ginsberg 1986; Herbst 1993), and the emphasis attached to popularity rather than
policy issues (Bartels 1988; Patterson 2003). This explains that at the turn of the century
over thirty democracies around the world had embargoes on the publication of opinion polls
close to the election (Chung 2012). However, to fully understand the role of pre-election
polls, we have to account for the supply-side of campaigns: parties and their candidates.
This is particularly important in contexts of enhanced polarization, where parties play a
1An extended version of this chapter was published in Electoral Studies (Pereira 2019).
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growing role in determining which type of information reaches the electorate (Lachat 2008).
How do parties discuss public opinion data on the campaign trail? Do polls distract party
leaders from their election programs, or instead lead them to clarify their policy positions?
Finally, do polling results help explain negative campaigning?
I argue that party leaders use polls on the campaign trail for two main purposes: to
mobilize voters and to fine-tune their campaign strategies. The success of a campaign is
largely contingent on its capacity to ’spin’ new information in its favor (Hickman 1991),
and the way party leaders respond to polls is an element of this process. By strategically
communicating polling results, parties can shape voters’ view of the race, promote grassroots
mobilization through bandwagon effects (Morton et al. 2015), and encourage donors. Hence,
I expect campaign contenders to react selectively to polling data, offering disproportional
attention to results conveying a positive image of party, while dismissing or criticizing studies
with disappointing predictions.
Polling results also offer the opportunity for parties to refine their campaign strategies.
In the long-run, parties shift their issue positions in response to public opinion signals (e.g.,
Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow et al. 2011; Somer-Topcu 2009). On the campaign trail, I expect
a similar refinement process takes place. Although abrupt shifts in policy positions are
unlikely due to the electoral costs of pandering (Adams 2012), parties have room to adjust
the attention devoted to different issues. At any moment, party leaders may choose whether
to talk about their party or other election contenders, and whether to emphasize different
policy or valence issues. Voter signals can shape the decisions of party leaders to balance
these different components of campaign rhetoric.
Recent scholarship suggests that when a party has a quasi-monopoly on a given policy,
the potential gains from further communicating on that issue are limited (Tresch et al. 2013).
Building upon these arguments, I argue that leaders from underperforming parties should
be more likely to emphasize policy positions when talking about their own party. Moreover,
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incentives to address issues ‘owned’ by other parties may also increase for parties trailing
in the polls, as a way to appear in line with the desires of voters (Walgrave et al. 2009).
Finally, campaign negativity may also be driven by poll results (Damore 2002; Elmelund-
Præstekær 2008; Walter et al. 2014). There is a cost to negativity that may be outweighed
by the potential of harming opponents, and this cost is a function of the party’s current
performance on the campaign trail. Hence, the incentives to go negative should increase
among underperforming parties. In line with this view, I expect that parties trailing in the
polls are be more likely to attack their opponents.
These arguments are tested with a new database of over 2,000 statements made by
Portuguese party leaders on the campaign trail (Debus et al. 2016).2 Daily newspaper
articles published over the course of two campaigns were used to compile data on how
parties talk about polling results, themselves, and other election contenders. These data were
combined with opinion polling published in the same period The results show that political
elites tailor their depictions of the mass public to their own benefit. Parties are more likely
to mention their performance in the polls in response to promising results, and less likely
to question the credibility of pollsters. Moreover, in response to disappointing polls, parties
tend to refocus their campaign rhetoric on policy issues, rather than valence issues. Finally,
the propensity for campaign negativity also increases when parties are underperforming.
Relying on pre-election polls to explore how parties shape their campaign rhetoric offers
several advantages relative to other measures of public opinion. In the context of an electoral
campaign, polls provide a picture of the overall performance of the contending parties, and
all parties are focused on maximizing their electoral prospects. This is not necessarily true
at other stages of the electoral cycle. For instance, incumbents may be willing to pursue un-
popular policies early in the electoral cycle (Lindstädt and Vander Wielen 2014). Moreover,
2The project did not restrict the data collection process to statements made by the individual leaders of
the different parties. Instead, it included statements by a variety of party members: incumbent MPs, local
party leaders, or prior cabinet members. Hence the term party leaders should be interpreted broadly to refer
to high-ranked party members.
90
no other measure of public opinion is available at the same rate over the campaign, offering
the opportunity to have a more fine-grained understanding of the dynamic processes that
characterize contemporary political campaigns.
These findings have relevant implications for the study of political campaigns, elite behav-
ior, and political representation more broadly. First, they provide an explanation for why
campaigns may not ‘enlighten’ the preferences of voters (Gelman and King 1993). Party
leaders tailor their depictions of the public to their own benefit. Hence, unless voters are
exposed to the messages of multiple parties, this process may lead to distorted perceptions of
the campaign trail. This concern is particularly relevant in a world of political echo chambers
(e.g., Boutyline and Willer 2017). Second, the patterns uncovered here reveal that a thor-
ough understanding of campaign effects requires endogenizing party strategies. Although
election manifestos provide an important baseline to capture the behavior of political elites
on the campaign trail, parties are constantly refining their rhetoric in the weeks leading to
an election. This process provides an explanation for the disconnect between manifestos
and voter perceptions of parties’ positions after the election (Adams et al. 2011a, 2014;
Fernandez-Vazquez 2014, 2018).
5.1 Public Opinion and Party Strategies
An extensive body of literature has established a link between public opinion and the behav-
ior of elected representatives. The dominant perspective is that political elites are responsive
to public preferences (Geer 1996; Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson et al. 1995; Wlezien 1996).
More recent contributions have explored variability in levels of responsiveness. Researchers
have noticed that political parties are more responsive when public preferences move away
from the position of the party (Adams et al. 2004; Somer-Topcu 2009), and close to elections
(Arceneaux et al. 2016), particularly in more competitive races (Canes-Wrone and Shotts
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2004; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005).
However, most studies explore long-term responsiveness, based on party programs or
policy outcomes (e.g., Clark 2014; Homola 2019; Klüver and Spoon 2016). This focus is
understandable since the ultimate goal of representation is to shape public policy. On the
other hand, existing research has struggled to provide a more fine-grained understanding
of how public opinion shapes the behavior of political elites in the short run. At least in
the context of political campaigns – where the information available on public opinion and
parties’ positions significantly increases –, it is reasonable to expect that the incentives of
political elites to respond to voter signals are distinct from those observed in the long run.
There are some important exceptions to this pattern, mostly inspired by developments of
the issue-ownership theory (Petrocik 1996).3 Damore (2004, 2005) has shown that American
presidential candidates trailing in the polls are more likely to trespass on their competitor’s
issues. This perspective was also articulated by Aldrich and Griffin, who argued that “if
voters identify certain issues as priorities, we would expect the candidates to speak more and
show more advertisements about these issues” (2003, 247), regardless of their reputation on
the issue. Still, most of this literature is based on bipartisan and personalized races. The
extent to which these dynamics extend to other contexts is unclear.
Existing literature on political campaigns also offers some insights on the short-term
interactions between public opinion and party strategies. Most studies in this field treat
party strategies as fully optimized and static as the election nears, focusing instead on the
effects of campaigns on voters (e.g., Farrell 2006; Jacobson 2015). However, research on
negative campaigning has shown that parties underperforming on the campaign trail, and
those facing more competitive opponents, are more likely to attack other election contenders
(Damore 2002; Elmelund-Præstekær 2008; Walter et al. 2014). These findings suggest
that campaign messages can be highly responsive to dynamics of public opinion. In the
3This argument builds on Budge and Farlie’s (1983) saliency theory, according to which parties ’own’
certain types of policies around which they center their campaign messages.
92
following section I articulate different ways in which parties can update their strategies on
the campaign trail in response to public opinion signals.
5.2 The Strategic Use of Polls on the Campaign Trail
Public opinion polls are a central feature of contemporary campaigns. I contend that parties
use this information (1) to mobilize voters, and (2) to fine-tune their campaign rhetoric.
5.2.1 Poll results as mobilization tools
Contenders to public office cannot fully control the flow of information that reaches the
electorate. Still, party elites can shape the salience of different issues and the attention
devoted to them (Hickman 1991; Iyengar and Simon 2000). As Bauman and Herbst put
it, “[how] candidates choose to react to public polls is a vital part of campaign planning”
(1994, 134). I argue that parties’ reaction to polling results is a function of poll standings
and ex-ante expectations. When faced with a poll that exceeds expectations, party leaders
can exploit this information to mobilize their supporters and provide a self-image of success.
In various contexts, it has been shown that voters can be galvanized through bandwagon
effects (Bartels 1988; Kenney and Rice 1994; Morton et al. 2015).4 A recent field experiment
provides causal evidence that polling results shape the behavior of voters (Orkin n.d.). In a
competitive local election in South Africa, voters were randomly assigned to receive results
from two opinion polls predicting different front-runners. The study shows that voters who
learned that their party was ahead in the polls were 12 percentage points more likely to vote
for that party.
Hence, parties have incentives to proactively disseminate the results of promising polls.
4Bandwagon effects are sometimes counterbalanced by the opposite phenomenon – underdog effects –
where voters may be inclined to support a party that is underperforming. However, existing literature
suggests that the former process tends to prevail (Jacobson 2015).
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This effort is particularly important to encourage party activists and local party leaders who
are directly in the field reaching out to voters. Public opinion data are a direct measure of
the success of their efforts. Therefore, by bringing up the results of promising polls in their
campaign events, party leaders are also providing a positive reinforcement to party activists
who are key to the success of the organization (Miller and Schofield 2003). For the same
reasons, poll results that fall below expectations should be avoided and downplayed. The
inherent uncertainty surrounding estimates of public opinion offers parties the opportunity
to question the credibility of any individual poll. I expect that party leaders are more likely
to do so after a disappointing poll. Together, these arguments lead to two predictions:
H1a: Parties are more likely to mention recent opinion polls on the campaign trail after
surveys with promising results.
H1b: Parties are less likely to criticize public opinion studies on the campaign trail after
surveys with promising results.
5.2.2 Poll results and campaign rhetoric
Poll results also allow parties to update their campaign strategies. Previous work has shown
that parties adjust their programs when public opinion shifts away from them (Adams et
al. 2004; Somer-Topcu 2009). With the prominent role played by opinion polls on public
debate and the professionalization of political campaigns, it is reasonable to expect that a
similar process takes place on the campaign trail. In the short-term, parties may not have
incentives to dramatically shift positions on policy due to risks of being accused of political
opportunism, or pandering (Adams 2012). Still, there is leeway for political elites to change
the attention given to different issues or different parties in order to maximize their electoral
goals. Previous scholarship has shown that updating the attention devoted to different issues
from one election to the next is an effective strategy after disappointing results (Meyer and
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Wagner 2013), or in response to changes in economic conditions (Greene 2016; Hellwig 2012;
Tavits and Potter 2014).
At any point in the campaign, parties can decide to devote time discussing their own
policy positions or valence attributes (Stokes 1963).5 I argue that the weight given to these
different types of campaign rhetoric is shaped by public opinion signals. Researchers have
shown that when a party is seen as the owner of a given issue by a majority of the electorate,
the potential gains from further communicating on that issue are limited (Tresch et al. 2013).
The same is not true for moderately ‘owned’ issues, where an emphasis from the party can
help reinforcing perceptions of issue ownership. By focusing attention on moderately ‘owned’
issues, parties can anchor the support of voters mobilized by these policies.6
Opinion polls provide party leaders with a signal of the degree to which their policy pro-
posals are gaining or losing traction among voters. Hence, I expect parties underperforming
in the polls to pay special attention to their own policy proposals on the campaign trail. By
devoting additional attention to those issues, parties can enhance perceptions of issue own-
ership (Walgrave et al. 2009). In turn, parties performing well in the campaign can deviate
from often complex policy proposals and focus instead on valence issues. The intentional
use of valence issues can be an effective way of attracting voters (Curini 2015; Schofield
2003), particularly close to elections (Abney et al. 2013). However, mentions to own valence
attributes can easily be discounted as empty talk. When backed by promising pre-election
polls, campaign rhetoric that focuses on the competence, performance, or unity of the party,
can be seen as more credible. Together, these two mechanisms – heightened incentives for un-
5Following Adams et al. (2011b), I distinguish strategic valence – e.g., name recognition, or campaign
skills – from character valence, defined here as statements about the party or party leader’s competence,
performance, integrity, or unity (see also Abney et al. 2013). Both the theoretical arguments and empirical
strategic focus specifically on the latter. Hence, throughout the text, valence issues/attributes refer to
character valence.
6It is important to distinguish ‘owned’ issues from parties’ ‘own policies’ or ‘own policy issues’, as discussed
throughout the text. While the former concept refers to the issue-ownership theory, the latter simply qualifies
which party endorses a given policy issue. To avoid confusion in the text, references to the issue ownership
concept are wrapped in single quotation marks (e.g., ‘owned’ issue).
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derperforming parties to emphasize policy issues, and more credibility attached to character
valence statements after promising polls – lead to the following prediction:
H2: Underperforming parties are more likely to emphasize their own policy proposals
when talking about themselves.
Public opinion updates may also shape how parties talk about other election contenders.
Like before, when leaders mention other parties on the campaign trail, they can focus both on
policy or valence issues associated with those parties. I expect that the incentives for ’issue
trespassing’ – to raise issues ‘owned’ by other election contenders – should increase when
parties are underperforming in the polls. Parties may opt to trespass in order to appear
in line with the desires of voters (Damore 2004; see also Sides 2006), and to counteract
perceptions that a given issue is dominated by another party (Walgrave et al. 2009). This
reputation does not necessarily translate into public support (Stubager and Slothuus 2012).
Still, at least for salient issues perceived ownership shapes voting behavior (Bélanger and
Meguid 2008).
In turn, parties performing well in the campaign are not expected to engage in this strat-
egy. Issue trespassing may require party leaders to deviate from the messages originally
planned for the campaign, with inevitable risks that parties – as conservative organizations
(Harmel and Janda 1994) – would prefer to avoid. Moreover, it should only be effective for
salient issues in which parties have little reputation, a scenario more likely among underper-
forming parties. The following prediction derives from these arguments:
H3: Underperforming parties are more likely to emphasize policy issues when talking
about other election contenders.
Finally, poll results are also likely to shape the propensity of parties to go negative.
Negative campaigning is arguably the component of campaign strategies most extensively
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studied in this literature. The growing consensus among researchers is that attacks on
different contenders are often an interactive process (e.g., Lau and Rovner 2009). That said,
different studies have shown that the likelihood of negative campaigning increases as parties
trail in the polls (Damore 2002, Walter et al. 2014). Attacking other election contenders
brings the risk of producing lower affect for the attacker (Lau et 2007). The concern of
backlash effects makes this strategy less attractive for parties that are already doing well in
the campaign. Building upon these contributions, I expect that party leaders will be more
likely to adopt an offensive strategy aimed at targeting other parties after disappointing
polls.
H4: Underperforming parties are more likely to discuss valence attributes of other elec-
tion contenders.
5.3 Empirical Strategy
To test my expectations about the sensitivity of campaign rhetoric to public opinion signals,
I rely on data from the Comparative Campaign Dynamics Project (Debus et al. 2016;
hereafter CCDP). This cross-national project compiled data from the media coverage of
election campaigns in ten European countries over the course of two recent elections. For
each campaign, CCDP coded data from the two highest circulation daily newspapers in the
last weeks before Election Day.7
The data collection proceeded in three steps. First, country experts identified all election-
related articles published in each newspaper during the campaign. Second, all first-page
articles and a random selection of 5% of the remaining articles were selected for coding.
Finally, each selected article was coded by three research assistants from the respective
country, who filled out a questionnaire for each statement made by a party. The coding
7Campaign reporting is not neutral (Greene and Lühiste 2018). Hence, to minimize bias in the selection
of newspapers, country experts were asked to select one left-leaning and one right-leaning outlet.
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procedure was based on a comprehensive online survey and posteriorly reviewed for inter-
coder reliability.8
5.3.1 Case selection
The analyses reported below are based on the Portuguese segment of CCDP, since Portugal
was the only country where statements about pre-election polls were included in the coding
scheme. That said, several reasons make Portugal a relevant case. First, the Portuguese mul-
tiparty system shares several characteristics with those found in other European countries,
with high levels of party cohesion and party leaders concentrating significant powers (Pogun-
tke et al. 2016). Second, the relatively small number of parties makes the task of uncovering
patterns of campaign rhetoric based on media content analysis more tractable. For the last
two decades, five parties consistently receive over 90% of the votes (Freire 2010). Although
the arguments advanced here are expected to replicate in more pulverized party systems, a
larger number of parties would make it harder to identify nuances in campaign rhetoric since
media outlets cannot devote the same levels of attention to all election contenders.
Finally, the Portuguese media system also provides an interesting context to study cam-
paign rhetoric based on news coverage. When compared with other European countries,
the levels of political bias in Portuguese mainstream media are low (Santana-Pereira and
Nina 2016). According to a study of media systems in 33 European countries, Portugal is
the second EU-member where the political views of journalists are less discernible to the
public (Popescu et al. 2012). This pattern largely results from strict legislation on cam-
paign coverage in place since the democratic transition in the 1970s. During the official
campaign period (the same period covered by CCDP), news outlets are required to report
daily campaign events of all election contenders.9 These features of the Portuguese case give
8More details on the coding procedure can be found in Baumann and Gross (2016).
9The legislation (Decreto-lei 85-D/75 ) went as far as stipulating a minimum threshold of words devoted
to each party (2,500 for daily newspapers, and 1,500 for other media outlets). In 2015, after the elections
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me additional confidence regarding the empirical strategy adopted here. Concerns about the
generalizability of the findings are discussed in the concluding remarks.
The campaigns covered by CCDP in Portugal took place in 2009 and 2011. Both elections
were fairly competitive, leading to a center-left minority government in 2009 and a center-
right coalition government in 2011. While the 2009 campaign followed patterns familiar to
Portuguese observers (e.g., Freire 2010), the 2011 election took place weeks after Portugal
signed a bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund, which inevitably took
center stage in the campaign (Magalhães 2012). To account for any systematic differences in
the dynamics of campaign rhetoric across elections, all models reported below include fixed
effects for election.
News articles came from Público and Jornal de Not́ıcias. A total of 240 articles were
analyzed: 60 articles per newspaper/election, published during the official campaign period
(two weeks before Election Day, excluding the election’s eve). From these articles, coders
identified 2,140 campaign statements made by leaders of all parties with parliamentary seats
during this period: the Socialist party (PS), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Chris-
tian Democrats (CDS), the Communist Party (CDU), and the Left Block (BE).
5.3.2 Research design
Campaign rhetoric was divided in four main categories: (1) policy statements or (2) valence
statements by party leaders regarding their own party; and (3) policy statements or (4)
valence statements about other parties in the election.10 Valence references correspond to
general statements about honesty, integrity, competence, unity or charisma of a given party.
covered here, this law was replaced by less strict legislation (Lei 72-A/2015).
10The project coded policy positions on 16 different issues: taxes, social policy/public services, inflation,
unemployment, other economic performance, centralization vs. regional autonomy, environment, immigra-
tion, asylum, justice system, law and order, security, terrorism, national way of life, traditional morality,
family values, religion, europe/EU, internationalism (not EU), foreign intervention, agriculture/rural affairs.
For the Portuguese survey, two specific issues were added: corruption, bailout and austerity measures.
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Additionally, coders identified any statements made by party leaders about their placement
and the placement of other parties in recent opinion polls.
Table 5.1 describes the distribution of statements by type and target. As expected,
the majority of statements made by party leaders about their own party regards policy
issues (58%). However, when talking about other parties, political elites emphasize policy
issues as much as valence considerations (49% and 50%, respectively). Finally, references to
recent polls are negligible when party leaders talk about other contenders, but more common
when talking about themselves. These data were used to generate the different measures
of campaign rhetoric used in the analyses. To facilitate the interpretation of the different
quantities produced, I describe them in the respective sections, below.
In turn, the main predictors of interest are based on pre-election polling data published
in the media as the campaigns unfolded. The data come from Magalhães et al. (2011) and
include all publicly available polls released in the period covered by CCDP. When more than
one poll was published on a given day, I took the average estimate for each party.11 Overall,
at least one new poll was published in 59% of the campaign days covered in the study. To
create a measure of performance in the polls that is comparable across parties, I took the
difference between each individual estimate of voting intentions and the party vote share
in the previous general election. Different variations of this variable (Share Difference) are
detailed in the following sections.
Polls published in the media are not the only measure of public opinion that parties
have access to. Nowadays, the vast majority of parties have private pollsters providing
information that is not revealed to the public.12 Private polling may threat the empirical
strategy adopted here if the measures of public opinion used in the study are either (1) too
coarse, or (2) systematically different from the ones produced privately. By itself, the first
11In order to make all poll estimates and election results comparable, the voting intentions and election
outcomes for all five parties were recalculated to sum to 100%.
12But see Druckman and Jacobs (2006) for a rare occasion when researchers had access to private polling
data.
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Table 5.1: The distribution of campaign statements by target and type.
Statement type
Target Policy Valence Poll Standings
Own party 597 367 62
(0.58) (0.36) (0.06)
Other party 544 560 10
(0.49) (0.50) (0.01)
Note: Entries are the number of statements coded by CCDP by target (see row labels) and
type (see column headers). Row percentages in parenthesis.
concern would not bias the results but make the true relationship between public opinion
and elite rhetoric harder to uncover. Hence, the present analysis can be seen as a hard test of
the arguments advanced. The second issue may actually bias the results. However, it is very
unlikely that publicly available polls vary systematically from studies conducted privately.
Existing research on the sources of poll accuracy show that there are only small differences
in the survey methodologies adopted by different polling companies operating in Portugal,
and that the effects of these methodological choices are residual (Magalhães et al. 2011;
Pereira 2011). Finally, the public nature of the polls analyzed here is relevant in itself. The
fact that published polls are part of public discourse raises incentives for parties to react to
them, even when private information is available.
The main goal of the empirical analyses described below is to uncover how the campaign
rhetoric of different parties evolves in response to opinion polls published in the media.
Hence, the unit of analysis is party-day. To account for systematic differences across parties
and elections in the relationship between polls and the behavior of party leaders, all mod-
els include fixed effects for party and year. The analyses, therefore, capture within-party
differences in rhetoric over the course of each campaign. To account for differences in the
error terms across parties, clustered standard errors were estimated by party. Finally, since




The empirical analyses are presented in two stages. First, I test whether parties use polls as
mobilization devices, by emphasizing promising results and downplaying disappointing ones.
Next, I explore how parties update their campaign rhetoric in response to published polls.
5.4.1 Polls as Mobilization Devices
The first prediction derived from the theory is that parties are more likely to bring up recent
polling results as part of their campaign activities when a public opinion survey suggests the
party is performing well. To capture references to polls, I created a binary outcome variable
that takes the value of 1 if a campaign member mentions the party’s placement in recent
opinion polls, and 0 otherwise.13
Since the expected relationship between poll results and mentions to public opinion sur-
veys is non-linear, the baseline measure of campaign performance described above were
transformed in two binary indicators. Positive Share and Negative Share take the value
of 1 when a newly released poll suggests a promising or disappointing result for the party,
respectively. For days without new polls, both variables take the value of 0. The expectation
is that the probability of party leaders mentioning polls in campaign events increases only
when the survey presents a promising result for the party.
Table 5.2 presents the results of three logistic regressions with the probability of party
leaders mentioning their own poll standings as the outcome variable.14 Model 1 only includes
a dummy for whether a poll was published on the previous day. As expected, new polls
13The exact wording on the questionnaire filled by the coders was the following: “Does the subject mention
its own placement in recent opinion polls?”
14The models described here estimate the probability of references to polls in t+ 1, the day after a survey
is published. The results are robust to the inclusion of t+ 2 and t+ 3. Table D1.2 presents these results.
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become part of the campaign discourse, as party leaders are more likely to mention their
own placement in the survey. Although not theoretically relevant, this result offers some
baseline evidence that parties react to opinion polls published in the media, regardless of the
private polling data they may have access to.
Model 2, in turn, distinguishes between polls reporting estimates above and below the vote
share obtained by the party in the previous general election. Again, the baseline category
is no poll being published on the previous day. The coefficients for the two indicators are
positive. However, only promising polls – those with estimates of voting intentions above
the previous vote share – significantly affect the probability of a party referencing them.
The model predicts a meaningfully different reaction to polls based on the results of the
study. The probability that a party mentions its poll standings goes from 10.6% after a
disappointing result, to 32.7% after promising polls. This difference is statistically significant
at conventional levels (p-value of difference in coefficients = 0.04).
Finally, as a robustness check, the third model in Table 5.2 includes a different specifica-
tion of polling performance. Here, the results of a given poll are compared with the estimates
from the previous published poll. Conceptually, this represents a more nuanced measure of
shifts in public opinion, and a harder test of the argument. Substantively, the results hold.
Only parties moving up in the estimates of voting intentions from one study to the next
publicly reference their poll standings on the campaign trail.
Together these results offer some initial evidence that campaign contenders are strategic
in their use of new polling results. However, so far the analysis has not taken into account
the tone of the references. It is possible that parties are simply criticizing or discrediting
polls, regardless of their performance, or reporting them neutrally and favoring instead a
campaign driven by policy issues. Such patterns would not be consistent with the argument
advanced here. Instead, parties should become more critical about polls when the results of
a survey fall below their expectations, and more positive after promising results.
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Above Sharet−1 - 1.56
∗∗ -
(0.55)
Below Sharet−1 - 0.16 -
(0.66)
Above Estimatet−1 - - 1.24
∗
(0.56)
Below Estimatet−1 - - 0.89
(0.55)
Constant −0.38 −0.34 1,242.25∗
(0.74) (0.77) (487.29)
Election Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Party Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150 150 150
Log Likelihood −70.80 −68.63 −70.57
Note: Entries are coefficients of logistic regressions with mention to polls as
the outcome variable (clustered standard errors in parentheses). Full model
results in Table D1.1.∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
CCDP data allows me to test this implication of the theory. For each statement about
recent polls identified in the project, coders were asked to report if the tone of the subject
was positive, neutral, or negative. This information was used to generate a new outcome
variable that identifies the tone of references: −1 (negative tone), 0 (neutral tone), or 1
(positive tone). The same set of controls is included in the model.
Due to the functional form of the outcome variable, I estimated an ordered logit model.
To ease the interpretation of the coefficients, Figure 5.1 displays the predicted probabilities
for the three levels of the dependent variable – negative, neutral, or positive statement –, as a
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Figure 5.1: Predicted probabilities of the effect of promising and disappointing polls on the






























Note: Points are predicted probabilities of negative/neutral/positive references to polls (as described on the
horizontal labels) as a function of newly released polls with disappointing results (Below Share) or promising
results (Above Share). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Predicted probabilities and confidence
intervals estimated from ordered logit (full model in Table D1.3).
function of poll results that are above or below the previous vote share.15 The analysis reveals
that different polling results significantly shape the tone of the statements made by party
leaders. The probability of a negative mention to polls goes from 32.4% after a disappointing
poll, to only 4.9% after a promising result. In turn, the probability of a positive mention
to polls is less than one percent after a Below Share poll, but raises to 7.7% after an Above
Share poll. These patterns are in line with the view that political leaders use public opinion
surveys instrumentally.
15The full model is presented in Table D1.3.
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5.4.2 Polls as Fine-Tuning Devices
The previous section established that parties use public opinion data selectively as part of
their campaign strategy. Now, I explore how parties – regardless of their public statements
about polls – use this information to inform their policy and valence rhetoric on the campaign
trail. In order to test the effects of polls on how parties talk about themselves and about
other contenders, I created three outcome variables.
Own Policy Emphasis is the share of self-statements made about policy issues, defined
for party p in period t as
Own Policy Emphasisp,t =
# Own Policy Statementsp,t
# Own Policy Statementsp,t + # Own Valence Statementsp,t
. (5.1)
This variable captures the attention devoted by party leaders to the policy positions
endorsed by their party. The prediction derived from theory is that political elites facing
disappointing polls will put more emphasis on their own policy issues when talking about
themselves.
Others Policy Emphasis captures a similar construct – the share of mentions to policy
issues – but regarding references to other parties. The variable is calculated as follows:
Others Policy Emphasisp,t =
# Others Policy Statementsp,t
# Others Policy Statementsp,t + # Others Valence Statementsp,t
. (5.2)
This measure captures the emphasis put by party leaders on policy issues when talking
about other parties in the election. As described above, incentives for issue trespassing are
expected to increase for parties underperforming in the polls. Hence, disappointing polls
should lead to an enhanced attention to policies endorsed by other parties.
Finally, Campaign Negativity is measured as the proportion of valence statements devoted
to other parties:
Campaign Negativityp,t =
# Others Valence Statementsp,t
# Others Valence Statementsp,t + # Own Valence Statementsp,t
. (5.3)
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The tone of the valence references is not directly captured in this measure. However,
94.1% of all statements about other parties’ valence characteristics where negative in tone,
while 85.0% of self-valence statements in the dataset were positive in tone. Hence, I expect
a negative relationship between performance in the polls and campaign negativity.16
Polling performance, in turn, is captured as the difference between the voting intentions
for a given party and its vote share in the previous election (Share Difference). For days
without new polls, a linear interpolation was calculated.17 Figure 5.2 plots the measure
produced for each of the parties in the 2009 and 2011 campaigns. Although broad trends
can be identified, each individual poll provides considerable variation for all five parties.18
The analyses reported below leverage this variability.
Table 5.3 presents the results from three linear regressions, where the unit of analysis is
party-day. Model 1 has Own Policy Emphasis as the outcome variable. The negative coeffi-
cient of Share Difference suggests that parties are more likely to emphasize their own policy
positions in the days following disappointing polls. This result is substantively meaningful.
The point estimate suggests that if a party goes from a share difference of +3 to −3, the
proportion of self-statements devoted to policy issues increases 18 points (−6*−0.03 = 0.18).
Since the average number of self-statements in a three-day period is 19, the model predicts
that this hypothetical shift would lead to 3.4 more statements devoted to policy (0.18*19 =
3.42). This finding conforms with the expectation that parties adjust how they talk about
themselves on the campaign trail, in response to public opinion signals.
A similar process takes place with respect to references to other parties. Model 2 has
16All three outcome variable are measured for three-day periods. The distribution of the different variables
can be found in the Figure D1.1.
17For instance, if in t = 1 a poll estimate for a given party is 15%, and the next poll came out in t = 3 with
the estimate of 20%, the estimate associated with day 2 is 17.5%. The results are substantively similar when
piecewise constant interpolation is adopted. In this case, the estimated voting intentions on days without
new polls remain constant at the level observed in the last survey.
18The exception to this pattern is the Communist Party (CDU), which is known for its stable voter base
(Magalhães 2014; Van Biezen 1998). The fixed effects framework accounts for systematic differences across
parties.
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Note: Each panel plots the difference between estimated voting intentions and previous vote
share (Share Difference) by campaign day, for each party, in 2009 (left panel) and 2011 (right
panel).
Others Policy Emphasis as the response variable. The model predicts that the better one
party is performing in the polls, the less likely it is to talk about the policy positions of other
parties. The coefficient of −0.02 suggests that, with the remaining variables held constant, a
6-point increase in Share Difference is associated with a 12-points decrease in the proportion
of statements referencing the policy positions of other parties (6 × −0.02 = −0.12). This
result is in line with the argument that incentives for issue trespassing increase when parties
are underperforming in the polls.
Finally, the third column in Table 5.3 assesses how the parties’ propensity for negativity
is shaped by polling results. Mentions to the valence characteristics of other parties are a
central feature of negative campaigning (Lau and Rovner 2009). The model predicts that
the propensity for negativity increases when parties are underperforming in the polls. The
coefficient for the effect of Share Difference is −0.01 and marginally reliable at conventional
levels (p-value = .052). Although smaller in magnitude, the point estimate is still relevant.
Returning to the hypothetical example used above, the model predicts that a 6-points de-
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Table 5.3: The effects of public opinion polling on campaign rhetoric.
Own Others Campaign
Policy Emphasis Policy Emphasis Negativity
(1) (2) (3)
Share Difference −0.03∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Days to Election 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ −0.01∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.48∗∗ 0.36∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Election Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Party Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150 150 150
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.30 0.29
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients (clustered standard errors in parentheses). Outcome vari-
ables in column headers. Full model results in Table D1.4. †p<0.10; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
crease in the polls is associated with an identical increase in the share of valence statements
devoted to other parties. Since over 94% of references to other parties’ valence characteristics
are negative in tone, this result suggests that underperforming contenders are more likely to
adopt an offensive strategy targeted at other parties.19
5.5 Discussion
For decades, research on campaign effects has explored how different party appeals and
campaign events shape the attitudes and behavior of voters. We know considerably less
about the ways political elites use the ongoing information generated throughout a campaign
to inform their behavior. This chapter sheds some initial light on this question by exploring
how party leaders instrumentally use pre-election polls on the campaign trail.
19The results are substantively the same when the measure of campaign negativity excludes non-negative
valence statements about other parties (point estimate = 0.012; p-value = 0.04). See Table D1.5, in the
Appendix, for more details.
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I argue that parties use public opinion data as tools to mobilize voters and to fine-tune
their campaign messages. The study finds evidence in line with this view based on a novel
database of campaign statements made by Portuguese parties, combined with public opinion
data published during the same period. The results suggest that party leaders use polling
information strategically as mobilization tools. By emphasizing results from promising polls
while criticizing less optimistic studies, parties can try to shape the perceptions of voters
regarding the course of the race. In turn, opinion polling is also used to update campaign
strategies. Party leaders are more likely to emphasize their own policy positions and the
policy positions of other parties after disappointing polls. I argue that these patterns result
from an effort to consolidate perceptions of issue ownership. Previous research shows that
party rhetoric can shape perceptions of issue ownership (Walgrave et al. 2009). Still, further
analyses are required to isolate the precise mechanisms driving this relationship. Finally, in
line with previous work, the analyses reveal that public opinion signals also drive tendencies
for negative campaigning. Parties performing well in the polls are less likely to attack their
opponents’ honesty, integrity, or competence.
The data compiled for the current study has advantages but also limitations that are
worth noticing, as they may pave the way for future contributions. First, the analysis is
restricted to a single European country raising concerns of generalizability. Although recent
scholarship reveals high levels of homogeneity in campaign strategies across European par-
ties (Lilleker et al. 2015), Portuguese campaigns remain less professionalized than in other
Western European countries like Germany, Italy, or Sweden (Lisi 2011). My expectation is
that more resourceful and professional campaigns would be even more efficient at responding
to voter signals, although this remains an open question. Moreover, the Portuguese party
system lacks the same diversity of special-issue or populist parties that are becoming increas-
ingly common across Europe. It is still unclear whether the patterns uncovered here hold
for less established and anti-systemic political organizations. Finally, it is possible that the
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patterns of rhetorical fine-tuning uncovered here are ‘noisier’ in electoral systems with more
personal vote-seeking incentives. Research in countries where the preferential vote system
has been strengthened shows that a sizable number of candidates engage in personalized
campaigns (Eder et al. 2015). The degree to which the key messages of a party remain dis-
cernible in these contexts require further investigation. Still, the arguments advanced here
suggest that this should only be a concern when the campaign performance of an individual
party varies considerably across districts. Otherwise, pre-election polls should be providing
similar signals to the different candidates of a given party.
Second, although CCDP provides invaluable fine-grained data on daily campaign rhetoric,
these data are mediated by journalists who may – inadvertently or not – induce bias in their
coverage. All the analyses reported above include fixed effects by party to account for
systematic differences in coverage across parties. Still, the study is unable to rule out all
sources of bias. A recent survey of European media systems highlights Portugal as one of the
countries with lowest levels of political bias in media coverage (Santana-Pereira and Nina
2016), largely due to strict campaign coverage laws. That said, future contributions would
benefit from contrasting CCDP data with unfiltered measures of campaign rhetoric, such as
party press releases or social media communication.
Finally, the current study is not in a position to make causal claims. The interpretation
of the findings was made with this limitation in mind. Future scholarship is needed to
further investigate the arguments advanced here, and their underlying mechanisms. A survey
experiment with elected officials would be an ideal setting to isolate how political elites
respond to different public opinion signals. Moreover, I encourage researchers to further
explore the nuances of campaign rhetoric. The focus on policy and valence issues in this
study provides an interesting step in this process, but the typology of statements adopted
is coarse. Future data collection efforts would benefit from a more detailed analysis of elite
rhetoric. Additionally, an interesting question left open in the current study is who do
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parties discuss when underperforming in the campaign. Do trailing parties focus on the
front-runner, on more ideologically proximate competitors, or parties with similar sizes?
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Esaiasson, Peter, and Patrik Öhberg. 2019. “The moment you decide, you divide: How
politicians assess procedural fairness.” European Journal of Political Research. Avail-
able online at: https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1475-
6765.12370.
Evans, Geoffrey. 2000. “The Continued Significance of Class Voting”. Annual Review of
Political Science 3: 401-417.
Ezrow, Lawrence. 2005. “Are moderate parties rewarded in multiparty systems? A pooled
analysis of Western European elections, 1984-1998.” European Journal of Political Re-
search 44(6): 881-898.
Ezrow, Lawrence. 2008. “Research note: On the inverse relationship between votes and
proximity for niche parties.” European Journal of Political Research 47(2): 206-220.
Ezrow, Lawrence, Catherine De Vries, Marco Steenbergen, and Erica Edwards. 2011. “Mean
voter representation and partisan constituency representation: Do parties respond to the
mean voter position or to their supporters?” Party Politics 17(3): 275-301.
Ezrow, Lawrence, Jonathan Homola, and Margit Tavits. 2014. “When extremism pays:
Policy positions, voter certainty, and party support in postcommunist Europe.” The
Journal of Politics 76(2): 535-547.
Ezrow, Lawrence, and Timothy Hellwig. 2014. “Responding to voters or responding to
markets? Political parties and public opinion in an era of globalization.” International
Studies Quarterly 58(4): 816-827.
Ezrow, Lawrence, Timothy Hellwig, and Michele Fenzl. 2019. “Responsiveness, If You Can
Afford It: Policy Responsiveness in Good and Bad Economic Times.” The Journal of
Politics. Available online at: https://doi.org/10.1086/707524.
Farrell, David. 2006. “Political parties in a changing campaign environment.” In Richard
Katz and David Crotty (eds.) A Handbook of Party Politics 122-133. London: Sage
Publication.
Farrell, David M., and Paul Webb. 2000. “Political parties as campaign organizations.” In
Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, ed.
Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 102-128.
Farrer, Benjamin. 2014. “A theory of organizational choice: Interest groups and parties as
substitutable influence mechanisms.” Party Politics 20(4): 632-645.
Fernandez-Vazquez, Pablo. 2014. “And yet it moves: The effect of election platforms on
120
party policy images.” Comparative Political Studies 47(14): 1919-1944.
Fernandez-Vazquez, Pablo. 2018. “Voter discounting of party campaign manifestos: An
analysis of mainstream and niche parties in Western Europe, 1971-2011.” Party Poli-
tics. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177\%2F1354068818787352.
Fiedler, Klaus, and Jeannette Schmid. 1995. “Heuristics.” In Anthony Manstead and Miles
Hewston (eds.) The Blackwell Encyclopedia of social Psychology. Oxford: Blackwell
Press, 296-300.
Fisher, Matthew, and Frank C. Keil. 2016. “The curse of expertise: When more knowledge
leads to miscalibrated explanatory insight.” Cognitive Science 40(5): 1251-1269.
Forsythe, Robert, Roger Myerson, Thomas Rietz, and Robert Weber. 1993. “An experi-
ment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election
histories.” Social Choice and Welfare 10(3): 223-247.
Fox, Justin, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2009. “Delegates or trustees? A theory of political
accountability.” The Journal of Politics 71(4): 1225-1237.
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A.1 Study 1: The Swedish context
Study 1 is based on individual-level data from Swedish MPs. Sweden is a typical party-
centered European system. Parties, as organizations, often play a significant role in providing
the link between voters and representatives (Öhberg and Naurin 2016). Between 1985 and
2006, the period studied here, the political landscape was dominated by the Swedish Social
Democratic party, winning the majority of votes in all seven elections with vote shares
ranging from 35 to 45%. Public support for the remaining parties remained fairly stable
throughout the two decades considered in the study. Figure A1.1 summarizes the vote
shares received by the seven parties with at least one seat in the Swedish Riksdag during this
period. Constitutionally, Sweden has influential parties organized in a parliamentary system
with a low degree of separation of powers. Party cohesion is strong, but the relationship
between candidates and voters is encouraged through a preferential vote system (Esaiasson
and Holmberg 1996).
The Swedish Riksdag is composed by 349 members representing 29 multi-member dis-
tricts. The districts vary in size, from Gotland (2 seats and roughly 44 thousand eligible
voters) to Stockholm County (38 seats representing 892,592 voters, in 2014). Since 1985,
the Swedish Parliamentary Study (RDU) regularly asks MPs to describe how important is
promoting views they personally consider important, as part of their legislative work, or pro-
mote the views of their own constituency. Pooling the responses in all six waves of the survey,
less than one fourth of MPs (22.0%) consider that behaving as a trustee is more important
than behaving as a delegate. This statistic is likely to be inflated by social desirability bias,
but still suggests how MPs perceive the value of accommodating voter preferences as part
of their job. See Öhberg and Naurin (2016) for a similar conclusion.
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Figure A1.1: Electoral support for Swedish parties: 1985-2006.






















A.2 Study 1: Descriptives
Appendix A2 describes a series of descriptive analyses from Study 1. Table A2.1 lists the
policy issues asked in each wave of the mass surveys, along with average levels of support.
Table A2.2, in turn, describes the bivariate correlations between the different measures of
high-status in the mass survey. The correlations range from .08 to .35. Finally, Table A2.3
provides descriptive statistics of all the main variables included in the analyses from Study 1.
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Table A2.1: Policy issue questions concurrently asked in elite and mass surveys, and share
of voters supporting each policy by year.
Survey Year
Policy issues SNES SOM 1986 1988 1994 1998 2002 2006
Reduce the public sector X X 41.6 38.5 32.6 26.6 26.8 29.2
Abolish the wage-earner funds X - 55.5 - - - - -
Reduce defense spending X X 35.8 29.5 56.2 49.7 - 35.2
More health care should be privately
run
X X 53.4 47.5 21.6 28.9 - 37.3
Prohibit all kinds of pornography X - 55.9 - 51.5 64.2 60.2 47.6
Allow commercials on TV X X 61.9 - 24.7 - - -
Build child care centers X - 52.9 - - - - -
Introduce six hour working day X X 58.1 53.3 49.2 49.9 55.2 49.1
Retain nuclear power after 2010 X X 29.3 36.5 40.3 - - -
Reduce income differences in society X X - 59.4 60.3 64.4 - 71.6
Ban private driving in inner cities X - - 59.8 49.8 40.9 - 35.8
Raise taxes for high income earners X - - - 75.0 - - -
Accept fewer refugees into Sweden X X - - 53.7 47.3 49.6 42.5
Gender quotas for public management
positions
X - - - 31.8 - - -
Membership in the EMU X X - - - 36.4 35.0 -
Sweden should abolish nuclear power X X - - - 49.6 44.9 41.6
Sweden should leave the EU X X - - - 38.7 - 27.5
Sweden should apply for NATO X X - - 15.1 23.8 22.6 20.2
Less stringent labour laws - X - - - - 29.4 -
Reduce taxes X X - - - - 51.8 57.9
Introduce language test for citizenship X - - - - - 44.0 -
Strengthen the rights of animals X X - - - - 65.8 -
Sweden should introduce the Euro X X - - - - - 35.4
Turkey should be granted membership - X - - - - - 12.3
Note: Entries are shares of supporters by policy issue and year (assuming a proportional distribution of
undecided). SNES and SOM refer to the Swedish National Election Studies and the SOM Institute Survey,
respectively. Xs indicate that a given policy issue was asked in that survey. All policy items were also asked
in the elite surveys.
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Table A2.2: Correlations between measures of affluence in mass survey.
White-collar College degree >85th income percentile Urban
White-collar - 0.28 0.35 0.15
College degree - - 0.21 0.08
>85th income percentile - - - 0.19
Urban - - - -
Table A2.3: Descriptive statistics of key variables in MP-policy dataset.
Variable name Min Max Mean Median SD
Outcome variables
Perceptual accuracy 0.00 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.44
Perceived policy support 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50
Predictors
White-collar 6= Majority 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.00 0.27
Higher Education 6= Majority 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.00 0.32
Higher Income 6= Majority 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.00 0.37
Urban 6= Majority 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.24
Blue-collar 6= Majority 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.00 0.27
Lower Education 6= Majority 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.00 0.31
Lower Income 6= Majority 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.00 0.43
Rural 6= Majority 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.00 0.20
MP and Voters dealigned 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.00 0.50
Moderators
Contacts with unions 1.00 5.00 2.62 2.00 0.90
Contacts with businesses 1.00 5.00 2.80 3.00 0.91
White-collar MP 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.00 0.50
College degree MP 0.00 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.50
Urban MP 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.00 0.49
Controls
Preference imbalance 0.00 0.49 0.21 0.21 0.13
Expertise 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.00 0.32
Experience in office (logged terms) 0.00 2.22 0.77 0.69 0.60
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A.3 Study 1: Additional analyses
This section describes a series of robustness checks and sensitivity analyses complementing
the main results of Study 1. Table A3.1 presents the full models used to build Figure 2.2 in the
main text. Table A3.2 replicates the main analyses with fixed effects by individual MP (1,205
unique legislators). The results are robust to this stricter modelling strategy accounting for
any systematic differences across legislators. In Table A3.3, in turn, I replicate the main
findings based on a different conceptualization of constituency: the electorate as a whole.
This is possible since in 1985 (and only in this wave) the parliamentary survey asked MPs
not only about the preferences of their own party voters (used in the main analyses), but
also of the electorate as a whole. Besides the decrease in scope and statistical power, the
same substantive results are obtained. These results suggest that the key findings reported
in Study 1 (see Figure 2.2) do not seem to be contingent on the definition of constituency
adopted.
Figure A3.1, in turn, reveals that the effects of high-status disagreement does not repli-
cate among low-status voters. When less privileged subconstituencies disagree with the ma-
jority in a given party, perceptual accuracy does not decrease. Tables A3.4, A3.5, and A3.6
replicate the main analyses including a) undecided voters in the measure of public support,
b) bootstrap standard errors to account for uncertainty in public opinion estimates derived
from the mass surveys, and c) distinguishing between large and small parties, respectively.
These analyses mitigate concerns that the findings reported in the main text are contingent
on the measurement strategy adopted. Table A3.7 reestimates the main analyses with logit
models to account for the binary outcome. The same results are obtained. Finally, Ta-
bles A3.8 and A3.9 provide supporting information to the mechanism tests for the exposure
hypothesis, reported in the main text in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.
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Figure A3.1: The role of low-status voters and MP personal preferences on perceptual accu-
racy.
−0.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1









Note: Dots are estimates from linear probability models with perceptual accuracy as the outcome variable.
Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The main predictors are listed on the y-axis. Exact
color represents a distinct model based on the operationalization of high-status voters.
142
Table A3.1: The role of high-status voters and MP personal preferences on perceptual accu-
racy. Complement to Figure 2.2.
Perceptual Accuracy
Social Class Education Income Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-Status 6= Majority −0.12∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.10∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MP and Voters dealigned −0.38∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.38∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Preference Imbalance 0.71∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.75∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Expertise −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience in office 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.45∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Policy FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,373 22,373 22,351 22,373
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34
Entries are coefficients of linear probability models with Perceptual Accuracy as the outcome. Column
headers describe the conceptualization of high-status voters in each model. ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05
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Table A3.2: Determinants of perceptual accuracy, with fixed effects by individual MP.
Perceptual Accuracy
Social Class Education Income Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-Status 6= Majority −0.12∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.09∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MP and Voters dealigned −0.42∗∗ −0.41∗∗ −0.42∗∗ −0.42∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Preference Imbalance 0.61∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.65∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Expertise 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience in office 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.87∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.86∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Legislator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,373 22,373 22,351 22,373
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Entries are model coefficients of linear probability models with fixed effects by individual MP (N = 1,069).
Column headers describe conceptualization of affluence for each respective model. ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05
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Table A3.3: The role of high-status voters and MP personal preferences on perceptual accu-
racy, with whole electorate as the reference constituency.
Perceptual Accuracy
Social Class Education Income
(1) (2) (3)
High-Status 6= Majority −0.09∗ −0.09∗ −0.09∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
MP and Electorate dealigned −0.32∗∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.32∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Preference Imbalance 0.26 0.26 0.26
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Expertise −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Experience in office −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.79∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 0.79∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Party FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,792 2,792 2,792
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.11
Entries are model coefficients of linear probability models (cluster-robust standard er-
rors in parenthesis). Column headers describe conceptualization of high-status for each
respective model. The analyses are based exclusively on data from the 1985 wave of
the parliamentary survey (RDU). Therefore, survey and policy FEs were omitted. Ur-
ban/rural models not estimated due to lack of variability in the predictors. ∗∗p < .01;
∗p < .05
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Table A3.4: The role of high-status voters and MP personal preferences on perceptual accu-
racy, including undecided voters in public opinion measures.
Perceptual Accuracy
Social Class Education Income Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-Status 6= Majority −0.10∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.14∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
MP and Voters dealigned −0.38∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.39∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Preference Imbalance 0.62∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.62∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Expertise 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience in office −0.0005 −0.002 −0.002 −0.0004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.80∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.81∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Policy FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,373 22,373 22,351 22,373
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Entries are model coefficients of linear probability models (cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis).
Column headers describe conceptualization of high-status for each respective model. ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05
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Table A3.5: The role of high-status voter and MP personal preferences on perceptual accu-
racy, with bootstrapped standard errors.
Perceptual Accuracy
Social Class Education Income Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-Status 6= Majority −0.12∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.04∗ −0.10∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
MP and Voters dealigned −0.38∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.38∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Preference Imbalance 0.71∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.75∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Expertise −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience in office 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.45∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Policy FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,373 22,373 22,351 22,373
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34
Entries are coefficients of linear probability models with Perceptual Accuracy as the outcome (bootstrapped
standard errors in parenthesis). Column headers describe the conceptualization of high-status voters in each
model. ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05
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Table A3.6: The role of affluent voter and MP personal preferences on perceptual accuracy,
among large and small parties.
Social Class Education Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High-Status 6= Majority −0.11∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.04∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
MP and Voters dealigned −0.35∗∗ −0.41∗∗ −0.35∗∗ −0.41∗∗ −0.35∗∗ −0.41∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Preference Imbalance 0.76∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Expertise −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience in office −0.002 0.02∗∗ −0.002 0.02∗∗ −0.001 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.48∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.48∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.43∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Policy FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,271 8,102 14,271 8,102 14,271 8,080
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.36
Entries are model coefficients of linear probability models (cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis).
Column headers describe conceptualization of affluence for each respective model. Models 1-3-5 restrict the
analyses to large parties (Social Democratic Party, and Moderate Party); models 2-4-6 restrict the analysis
to smaller parties. ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05
148
Table A3.7: Logit models of the role of affluent voter and MP personal preferences on
perceptual accuracy.
Perceptual Accuracy
Social Class Education Income Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High-Status 6= Majority −0.28∗∗ −0.22∗∗ 0.13∗ −0.20∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
MP and Voters dealigned −2.28∗∗ −2.27∗∗ −2.29∗∗ −2.28∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Preference Imbalance 6.40∗∗ 6.41∗∗ 7.10∗∗ 6.57∗∗
(0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.24)
Expertise −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Experience in office 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 1.80∗∗ 1.81∗∗ 1.70∗∗ 1.79∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Policy FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,373 22,373 22,351 22,373
AIC 17,473.8 17,477.3 17,454.0 17,481.4
Entries are coefficients of logit models (cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis). Column headers
describe the conceptualization of affluence for each respective model. ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05
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Table A3.8: The marginal effects of white-collar voters disagreeing with the majority on
perceptual accuracy, conditional on MP contacts with (a) blue collar unions, and (b) business
organizations. Complement to Figure 2.3.
Perceptual Accuracy
(1) (2)
High-Status 6= Majority −0.20∗∗ −0.09∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Union contacts −0.001 -
(0.004)
White-Collar 6= Majority × Union Contacts 0.02 -
(0.01)
Business contacts - 0.01∗
(0.004)
White-Collar 6= Majority × Business Contacts - −0.02
(0.01)
MP and Voters dealigned −0.36∗∗ −0.36∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)








Policy FE Yes Yes
Survey FE Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes
Observations 16,093 16,099
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.36
Entries are coefficients of linear probability models with Perceptual Accuracy as the
outcome variable (cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis). ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05
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Table A3.9: The effects of different voter preferences on perceived policy support, conditional
on MPs background. Complement to Figure 2.4.
Perceptual Accuracy
Social Class Education Urban
(1) (2) (3)
High-Status 6= Majority −0.11∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
White collar MP 0.01 - -
(0.01)
High-Status 6= Majority × White collar MP −0.01 - -
(0.02)
College degree MP - −0.01 -
(0.01)
High-Status 6= Majority × College degree MP - −0.05∗ -
(0.02)
Urban MP - - −0.01
(0.01)
High-Status 6= Majority × Urban MP - - −0.05∗
(0.02)
MP and Voters dealigned −0.38∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.38∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Preference Imbalance 0.71∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.75∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Expertise −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience in office 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Policy FE Yes Yes Yes
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,373 22,373 22,373
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.35 0.34
Entries are coefficients of linear probability models with Perceptual Accuracy as the outcome variable
(cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis). Column headers describe conceptualization of high-
status for each respective model. ∗∗p < .01; ∗p < .05
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A.4 Study 2: Case selection
Switzerland holds an average of 10 popular voters per year (Giger and Klüver 2016). There
are three types of direct democratic instruments in the country: mandatory referendums for
constitutional changes initiated by the Federal Assembly; optional referendums to vote on
laws already accepted by the Federal Assembly; and popular initiatives where citizens can
propose constitutional amendments, by collecting 100,00 signatures or more. The two issues
explored in this study are popular initiatives. This study leverages referendum results to
produce accurate measures of expressed public preferences at different levels of geographical
aggregation.
It is worth elaborating on this opportunity. Previous work on perceptions of public
opinion contrasted elite beliefs with constituency opinion based on nationally representative
samples (e.g., Converse and Pierce 1986, Miller and Stokes 1963). However, by partitioning
representative samples, the different sub-groups may no longer be representative. Recently,
the combination of larger samples with poststratification techniques (Park et al. 2004)
motivated new work on elite perceptions (Broockman and Skovron 2018; Hertel-Fernandez
et al. 2019). However, this method still relies on important assumptions about the data
(Buttice and Highton 2013), and sample sizes that are rare outside the United States. By
relying on the actual behavior of voters on different referendums it is possible to have accurate
measures of expressed preferences even in small administrative units.
Two other features of the Swiss context make it an interesting case to study elite mis-
perceptions. First, the large number of popular votes gives Swiss representatives ample
resources to develop accurate perceptions of voters. Second, Swiss municipalities are fairly
small. In 2014, the average population was 3,545 inhabitants. Hence, the task of gauging
public opinion is arguably easier than in larger and more diverse constituencies, leaving less
room to improve elite perceptions.
Swiss municipalities are relatively small, with roughly half having less than 1,000 inhab-
itants. Despite their size, municipalities play an important role in the Swiss political system,
being responsible for over 30% of public spending and having wide fiscal autonomy (Ladner
2006).
To collect data on elite perceptions of public support for the policy issues on the ballot, I
fielded a survey with municipal representatives: members of the executive council. Municipal
governments are governed by a local council and headed by a mayor, like most of their
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Figure A5.1: Distributions of local-level support for the horned-cow and self-determination
referendums.














Note: Lines represent density functions of the share of supporters in each municipality for each of the
referendums.
European counterparts (Norton 1991). The legislative side of Swiss local governments can
either take the form of town meetings or city parliaments. But officials in this branch were
not included in the study. Nearly two thirds of all councilors do not belong to a specific
political party. Finally, like in the United States and in other European countries, in most
Swiss municipalities local councilor is a part-time occupation.
A.5 Study 2: Descriptives
This section of the Appendix describes some relevant descriptive information from Study
2. Table A5.1 provides basic demographics of the sample of local officials who took part in
the survey, and compares this sample with the larger pool of officials from which they were
recruited (N = 6,973), representing nearly 60% of the population of Swiss local councilors.
There are no statistically distinguishable differences across the samples on the observed
characteristics. Figure A5.1 plots the distribution of local support for the two initiatives
included in the study. The distributions reveal considerable variation across municipalities.
Table A5.2, in turn, provides a series of covariate balance tests suggesting that the ran-
domization worked properly on these relevant observables. Finally, Figure A5.2 provides
screenshots of the exposure vignette.
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Table A5.1: Descriptive characteristics of the recruitment pool and study participants.
Pool Sample
Female (%) 25.78 22.41
Age (years) 54.02 54.54
University degree or higher (%) 36.29 41.59
Experience in office (years) 7.9 8.0
In majority (%) − 66.45
Hired by local administration (%) 30.90 29.98
Full time politician (%) 17.40 18.14
FDP member (%) 29.40 30.57
SVP member (%) 20.15 18.51
SP member (%) 12.96 15.87
Size of executive (N) 6.1 6.2
Population (N) 4463.0 4421.0
N 6,973 2,787
Note: The left column describes the pool of local officials surveyed in the 2017 National
Survey of Members of Local Executives, representing ≈ 60% of the population of Swiss
local councilors. The right column describes the sample of officials recruited from this
pool who took part in the current study.
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Table A5.2: Covariate Balance across Treatment Groups.
Exposure &
Covariates Control Exposure Self-Awareness p-value
FDP member 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.60
SVP member 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.35
SP member 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.67
German language 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.85
Population 4502.76 4135.50 4620.25 0.57
% SVP support 34.55 34.45 33.89 0.51
% Foreign-born citizens 17.12 16.59 17.54 0.10
% SP+Green support 21.30 21.31 21.71 0.51
% Farmers 13.94 13.44 12.49 0.09
In Majority 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.66
Election expectations 3.37 3.42 3.41 0.68
Support for self-determination 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.99
Support for horned-cow 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.33
Likelihood Ratio Test:
Exposure - Control χ2(24) = 18.2 Pr(> χ2) = 0.79
Exposure & Self-Awareness - Control χ2(24) = 16.8 Pr(> χ2) = 0.86
Exposure & Self-Awareness - Exposure χ2(22) = 15.3 Pr(> χ2) = 0.85
Note: Entries in the top panel are means of covariates across treatment conditions and p-values corre-
spond to F tests of difference in means. The model fit of logistic regressions with treatment assignments
as a function of all covariates was compared with the respective null model. The likelihood ratio tests
described in the bottom panel do not reject the null models.
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Figure A5.2: Example of Exposure vignettes for self-determination initiative.
(a) Policy description (b) Perceived electorate composition
(c) Contrasting perceptions with statistical data
(d) Measuring outcome
Note: Panel labels describe key goal of each step in the treatment, in alphabetical order. Panel (a) remained
constant across treatment conditions (except for the last paragraph). Censored text refers to the municipality
of the respondent.
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A.6 Study 2: Additional analyses
This section presents a series of complementary results and sensitivity analyses regarding
Study 2. Tables A6.1 and A6.2 complement Figures 2.5 and 2.6 in the main text. In turn,
Tables A6.3 and A6.4 provide the results of the manipulation check implemented at the end
of the study, and replicate the main results restricting the sample to respondents who passed
the manipulation check, respectively. The effect sizes are consistently larger among local
officials who passed the manipulation check.
Table A6.5 test whether the time between survey completion and the referendums mod-
erated perceptual accuracy, and the treatment effects. The analysis provides no conclusive
results. Finally, Figure A6.1 replicates the main analysis with an alternative outcome vari-
able: the absolute difference between the official’s estimate and the referendum results. The
results for each initiative separately are substantively the same. Only the coefficient of Elec-
torate Composition in the pooled analysis is no longer reliable.
Table A6.1: The effects of exposure and self-awareness to social projection on perceptual




Exposure 0.06∗∗ 0.03 0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Exposure & Self-Awareness 0.04∗ 0.02 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Horned-cow initiative - - 0.02
(0.01)
Constant 0.69∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.70∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 2,787 2,787 5,574
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.000 0.002
Note: Entries are coefficients of linear probability models (SEs in parenthesis, and cluster-
robust SEs in model 3) of the effect of providing information on the electorate composition
and self-awareness on perceptual accuracy. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Table A6.2: The effects of self-awareness on the propensity of legislators to project their




Own support 3.10∗∗ 4.54∗∗ 3.77∗∗
(0.34) (0.41) (0.15)
Exposure & Self-Awareness 1.22 2.68∗ 1.93∗∗
(1.13) (1.36) (−0.42)
Own support × [Exposure & Self-Awareness] −0.95∗ −1.17∗ −1.04∗∗
(0.48) (0.58) (0.15)
Horned-Cow Initiative - - −7.33∗∗
(−0.07)
Constant 37.63∗∗ 26.88∗∗ 36.01∗∗
(0.80) (0.96) (0.45)
Observations 1,803 1,797 3,600
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.09 0.13
Note: Entries are OLS estimates of the effect of policy support on perceptions of public support, by treatment
group (SEs in parenthesis, and cluster-robust SEs in model 3). Control group omitted to isolate the effect
of the self-awareness intervention. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
Table A6.3: Manipulation check.
Control Exposure Exposure & Self-Awareness
64.1 59.3 67.6
(611) (539) (616)
Note: Entries are the share and absolute number of respondents (in parenthesis) who correctly
identified their treatment assignment, by treatment condition. Main treatment effects are robust
to restricting the analyses to this sub-sample.
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Exposure 0.10∗∗ 0.03 0.06∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Exposure & Self-Awareness 0.06∗ 0.02 0.04∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Horned-cow initiative - - 0.02
(0.01)
Constant 0.68∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.70∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 1,766 1,766 3,532
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.00 0.00
Note: Entries are coefficients of linear probability models (SEs in parenthesis) of the effect of
providing information on electorate composition and self-awareness on perceptual accuracy.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
Figure A6.1: The effects of exposure and self-awareness to social projection on absolute
misperceptions, by referendum.
























Note: Points are average treatment effects of exposure and exposure & self-awareness on absolute mis-
perceptions (control group as reference point). Negative effects represent higher perceptual accuracy.
Wider/Thinner horizontal lines are 95%/90% confidence interval from two-sample t-tests.
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Table A6.5: The effect of distance between survey completion and federal vote on perceptual
accuracy.
Self-Determination Horned-Cow Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance to election (days) −0.003 0.004 −0.004 −0.002 −0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Exposure - 0.185 - 0.055 - 0.120
(0.094) (0.092) (0.064)
Distance × Exposure - −0.008 - −0.002 - −0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Exposure & Self-Awareness - 0.197∗ - 0.045 - 0.121
(0.091) (0.089) (0.065)
Distance × - −0.011 - −0.002 - −0.006
Exposure & Self-Awareness (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Horned-cow initiative - - - - 0.019 0.019
(0.012) (0.012)
Constant 0.766∗∗ 0.632∗∗ 0.800∗∗ 0.765∗∗ 0.773∗∗ 0.689∗∗
(0.038) (0.067) (0.037) (0.066) (0.027) (0.047)
Observations 2,787 2,787 2,787 2,787 5,574 5,574
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.003 0.001 −0.0002 0.001 0.002
Note: Entries are coefficients of linear probability models (SEs for models 1-4 and cluster-robust SEs for
models 5-6) of the effect of distance between survey completion and election day, on perceptual accuracy.
Models 1, 3, and 5 only include the measure of distance to referendum, while models 2, 4, and 6 interact
this measure with the different treatments. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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A.7 Study 2: Informed consent and questionnaire
Informed consent - first page of the questionnaire
We invite you to participate in a research study being conducted by investigators from
the [Name of university redacted for review purposes] and [Name of university redacted
for review purposes]. You are being asked to participate in this research study because
you showed interest in taking part in a follow-up survey of the 2017 National Survey of
Municipal Executive Members. The purpose of the study is to learn about your expectations
for upcoming referendums. Approximately 2,000 people will take part in this study.
If you agree to participate, we would like you to ask about your opinion on different
policy issues, and your expectations about the results of upcoming referendums. The survey
is short and will not take more than 5 minutes. You are free to skip any questions that
you prefer not to answer. If at any point you want to interrupt your participation, you can
simply close the web page.
There are no known risks from being in this study, and you will not benefit personally.
However, we hope that others may benefit in the future from what we learn as a result of
this study. You will not have any costs for being in this research study. You will not be paid
for being in this research study.
We will keep the information you provide confidential by not asking you any personal
questions. However, federal regulatory agencies and [Name of university redacted for review
purposes], including the [Name of university redacted for review purposes] Institutional Re-
view Board (a committee that reviews and approves research studies) and the [IRB office
redacted for review purposes] may inspect and copy records pertaining to this research. If
we write a report about this study, we will do so in such a way that you cannot be identified.
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take
part at all. If you decide to participate in the study you may stop participating at any time.
Any data that was collected as part of this study will remain as part of the study records and
cannot be removed. If you decide not to take part in the study or if you stop participating
at any time, you won’t be penalized or lose any benefits for which you otherwise qualify. If
you do not wish to participate in this study or want to end your participation in the study,
return the survey without answering any of the questions. You will not be penalized or lose
any benefits for which you otherwise qualify.
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We encourage you to ask questions. If you have any questions about the research study
itself or if you feel you have been harmed from being in the study, please contact: Professor
[Name of author redacted for review purposes] ([Name of university redacted for review
purposes], [Email redacted for review purposes]) or [Name of author redacted for review
purposes] ([Name of university redacted for review purposes], [Email redacted for review
purposes]). If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a research
participant, please contact the [IRB office redacted for review purposes] at [Email redacted
for review purposes]. General information about being a research participant can be found on
the [IRB office redacted for review purposes] web site, [Website redacted for review purposes].
To offer input about your experiences as a research participant or to speak to someone other
than the research staff, call the Human Research Protection Office at the number above.
Thank you very much for your consideration of this research study.
Questionnaire
[start=1,label=(Q0):]We would like to start by asking you about your own posi-
tion on a set of issues that will be subject to popular votes. Please indicate how
much you Oppose or Support the following initiatives:
1. • Horned-Cow Initiative [The initiative aims to encourage farmers to raise cows and
goats with horns through federal incentives.]
• Self-Determination Initiative [Requires that in cases of conflict between Swiss law
and international law, the former prevails. ]
• Legal basis for monitoring social insurance beneficiaries [To expand the surveil-
lance capabilities of social insurance agencies investigating cases of suspicion in-
volving social security beneficiaries.]
[Response options: Very opposed, Slightly opposed, Slightly supportive, Very support-
ive]







3. In that election, what vote share did you or your party (if running in a list) receive?
If you are not sure about the answer, just give us your best guess. You don’t need to
look it up.
4. Given your original expectations about the election, how did you feel about your re-
sults? The election results were: [Below my expectations, Slightly below my expecta-
tions, Just as I expected, Slightly above my expectations, Above my expectations]
5. Does you party or list currently hold a majority of seats in the executive? [Yes, No,
Not Applicable]
6. On the 25th of November, Swiss citizens will be asked to vote on three federal referen-
dums. On the next pages, we are interested in your expectations about the results of
the referendums in your municipality: the share of voters in $e://Field/City that you
expect to support each initiative. Read carefully the description of each issue under
consideration before giving your prediction.
[Q7-13: If Control = 1; otherwise, jump to Q14]
7. Title: Self-Determination Initiative (Swiss Law over foreign judges)
Description: The initiative launched by the SVP/UDC seeks to solve conflicts between
the Federal Constitution and the international treaties signed by Switzerland. The idea
is that if a popular initiative supported by a majority is in conflict with a pre-existing
international treaty, the constitution will have to prevail (subject to peremptory rules of
international law, such as the prohibition of torture). Currently, in the event of conflicts
between the constitution and an international treaty, a solution through democratic
processes is favored. In most cases, these conflicts are solved through a law change
subject to an optional referendum.
8. It is always hard to anticipate the results of popular votes, but we would like to ask
you to predict the share of voters in $e://Field/City that will SUPPORT the Self-
Determination Initiative.
Please give us your best guess from 0% to 100%: [0-100%]
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9. How confident are you in your prediction? [Not confident at all, Slightly confident,
Moderately confident, Highly confident]
10. On the next page, you will be asked to consider a different initiative that will be voted
on the 25th of November.
11. Title: For the dignity of livestock (Horned-Cow Initiative)
Description: Launched by the interest group “Hornkuh”, this initiative aims to encour-
age farmers to raise cows and goats with horns. Today, 3 out of 4 cows are dehorned.
Dehorning facilitates free-range cattle growing because it reduces the risk of injury.
However, dehorning is a controversial practice. Since raising horned animals entails
higher costs, the authors of the initiative would like the Confederation to support
livestock producers.
12. It is always hard to anticipate the results of popular votes, but we would like to ask you
to predict the share of voters in $e://Field/City that will SUPPORT the Horned-Cow
Initiative.
Please give us your best guess from 0% to 100%: [0-100%]
13. How confident are you in your prediction? [Not confident at all, Slightly confident,
Moderately confident, Highly confident]
[Q14-26: If Exposure = 1 OR Exposure+Self-Awareness = 1; otherwise, jump to Q27;
randomize order of issue]
14. Title: For the dignity of livestock (Horned-Cow Initiative)
Description: Launched by the interest group “Hornkuh”, this initiative aims to encour-
age farmers to raise cows and goats with horns. Today, 3 out of 4 cows are dehorned.
Dehorning facilitates free-range cattle growing because it reduces the risk of injury.
However, dehorning is a controversial practice. Since raising horned animals entails
higher costs, the authors of the initiative would like the Confederation to support live-
stock producers.
We will ask you to predict the share of voters in your municipality that will support
the Horned-Cow Initiative. However, because it is hard to anticipate the results of
popular votes, we will give you some tips in advance.
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15. Title: For the dignity of livestock (Horned-Cow Initiative)
When thinking about the preferences of voters, it often helps considering the views
of different groups in the constituency. To help you in this process, think about the
residents of $e://Field/City and give us your best guess to the following questions:
• What share of the workers in $e://Field/City works in the primary sector (in-
cluding agriculture, forestry, or fishing)? [0-100%]
• In the 2015 federal elections, what was the combined share of votes received by
the SP and the GPS in $e://Field/City? [0-100%]
16. To give you some reference points, here are your answers along with the most recent
data from the Federal Statistical Office in your municipality and in Switzerland as a
whole.
Your guess $e://Field/City* Switzerland*
% Workers in primary sector from Q15 $e://Field/Farmers 3.2%
% SP and GPS supporters in 2015 from Q15 $e://Field/Left 25.9%
* Source: Federal Statistical Office
[Q17: If Exposure+Self-Awareness = 1, otherwise jump to Q18]
17. Finally, one last tip. Decades of research show that people tend to project their own
preferences on others. Without noticing, we often overestimate approval for issues we
support, while underestimating approval for issues we oppose. Try to take this into
account when making your prediction.
18. With this in mind, give us your expectation of the share of voters in $e://Field/City
that will SUPPORT the Horned-Cow Initiative. Please give us your best guess from
0% to 100%: [0-100%]
19. How confident are you in your prediction? [Not confident at all, Slightly confident,
Moderately confident, Highly confident]
20. On the next page, you will be asked to consider a different initiative that will be voted
on the 25th of November.
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21. Title: Self-Determination Initiative (Swiss Law over foreign judges)
Description: The initiative launched by the SVP/UDC seeks to solve conflicts be-
tween the Federal Constitution and the international treaties signed by Switzerland.
The idea is that if a popular initiative supported by a majority is in conflict with
a pre-existing international treaty, the constitution will have to prevail (subject to
peremptory rules of international law, such as the prohibition of torture). Currently,
in the event of conflicts between the constitution and an international treaty, a solu-
tion through democratic processes is favored. In most cases, these conflicts are solved
through a law change subject to an optional referendum.
We will ask you to predict the share of voters in your municipality that will support
the Self-Determination Initiative. However, because it is hard to anticipate the results
of popular votes, we will give you some tips in advance.
22. Title: Self-Determination Initiative (Swiss Law over foreign judges)
When thinking about the preferences of voters, it often helps considering the views
of different groups in the constituency. To help you in this process, think about the
residents of $e://Field/City and give us your best guess to the following questions:
• In the 2015 federal elections, what share of voters in $e://Field/City voted for
the SVP? [0-100%]
• What share of the population in $e://Field/City is foreigner? [0-100%]
23. To give you some reference points, here are your answers along with the most recent
data from the Federal Statistical Office in your municipality and in Switzerland as a
whole.
Your guess $e://Field/City* Switzerland*
% SVP Supporters in 2015 from Q22 $e://Field/SVP 29.4%
% Foreigners from Q22 $e://Field/Foreigners 24.6%
* Source: Federal Statistical Office
[Q24: If Exposure+Self-Awareness = 1, otherwise jump to Q25]
166
24. Finally, one last tip. Decades of research show that people tend to project their own
preferences on others. Without noticing, we often overestimate approval for issues we
support, while underestimating approval for issues we oppose. Try to take this into
account when making your prediction.
25. With this in mind, give us your expectation of the share of voters in $e://Field/City
that will SUPPORT the Self-Determination Initiative. Please give us your best guess
from 0% to 100%: [0-100%]
26. How confident are you in your prediction? [Not confident at all, Slightly confident,
Moderately confident, Highly confident]
27. In the prediction tasks above, which tips were you provided?
• No tips
• Information about the electorate
• Information about the electorate and a suggestion to avoid projecting my own
preferences
• The results from an old referendum
[Q28: If Control = 1, otherwise jump to Q29]
28. This is your final screen. We know that survey questions sometimes don’t allow one
to tell the full story. We would welcome any feedback or suggestions you have on the
survey in the box below: [open answer]
29. Would you like to be contacted with any reports we create based on this survey? We
believe this can make your experience in the study more interesting. [Yes/No]




This supplementary appendix includes the following sections:
• Appendix B.1 - Versions of the policy appeal
• Appendix B.2 - Descriptive statistics
• Appendix B.3 - Sensitivity analyses
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B.1 Versions of the policy appeal
The vignette used to test the expertise curse hypothesis varied both the issue domain of
the policy appeal (to manipulate expertise), and the position of the group of voters sending
the message (to hold issue disagreement constant). In total, the study included ten different
versions of the hypothetical message: 5 policy issues× support/opposition. Below we present
English tranlation of all ten versions.
Health care
In favor : Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to
support a proposal to ban companies for running hospitals. They believe that health care
is facing major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that
a ban on companies for operating hospitals makes it easier for vulnerable patients to choose
the healthcare they need.
Against : Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to
oppose a proposal to ban companies for running hospitals. They believe that health care is
facing major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that
a ban on companies for operating hospitals makes it more difficult for vulnerable patients
to choose the healthcare they need.
Education
In favor : Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to
support a proposal to provide more resources to charter schools. They believe that the
school faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is
that more resources for charter schools make it easier for vulnerable children to get a place
in a school that takes care of their needs.
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Against : Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you
to oppose a proposal to provide more resources to charter schools. They believe that the
school faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument
is that more resources for charter schools make it more difficult for vulnerable children to
get a place in a school that takes care of their needs.
Immigration
In favor : Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you
to support a proposal to receive fewer refugees. They believe that integration policies
face major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that
receiving fewer refugees allows Sweden to take care of the most vulnerable groups in
society.
Against : Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to
oppose a proposal to receive fewer refugees. They believe that integration policies face major
challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that accepting
refugees allows Sweden to take care of the most vulnerable groups in society.
Social Welfare
In favor : Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to
support a proposal to ban panhandling. They believe that the issue of social security faces
major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that a ban
on panhandling would help protecting vulnerable groups in society.
Against : Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to
oppose a proposal to ban panhandling. They believe that the issue of social security faces
major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main argument is that a ban
on panhandling would not help protecting vulnerable groups in society.
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Housing
In favor : Imagine the following: A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to
support a proposal for reduced interest deductions for home loans. They believe that the
housing market faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main
argument is that lowered interest deductions for home mortgages would reduce the risk
that vulnerable groups end up subsidizing the houses of more affluent people.
Against : Imagine the following. A group of voters is approaching you and wants you to
oppose a proposal for reduced interest deductions for home loans. They believe that the
housing market faces major challenges. They see equality as a central issue. Their main
argument is that lowered interest deductions for home mortgages would increase the risk
that vulnerable groups end up subsidizing the houses of more affluent people.
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B.2 Descriptive statistics
Table B2.1 summarizes the political and demographic characteristics of the sample of elected
officials that took part in the study. The sample is part of the Panel of Politicians and in-
cludes a diverse group of representatives from all main parties and levels of government.
Table B2.2 describes perceptions of influence within the party group among Swedish MPs.
The data comes from the 2010 Riksdag parliamentary survey and suggests that Swedish
legislators influence their party group mainly within their own areas of expertise. Finally,
Table B2.3 presents the distribution of issues areas identified by study participants as the
domains of highest or lowest expertise.




College degree or higher (%) 50.1
Social Democrats (%) 27.8




Green Party (%) 8.2
Christian Democrats (%) 5.2




Note: Entries are percentages or average values for the 1,861
officials who completed the survey.
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Table B2.2: Perceptions of influence within party, by type of issue, from parliamentary
survey.
% Ability to influence party position within
Own area of expertise Outside area of expertise
Very good 53.2 8.8
Fairly good 43.2 62.9
Fairly bad 3.2 26.4
Very bad 0.3 2.0
Note: Each column represents the distribution of MPs responses to the ques-
tions: “How do you rate your ability to impact your party group’s position on
issues within/outside your own expertise”. Source: 2010 Swedish parliamentary
survey.
Table B2.3: Distribution of issue areas by high/low policy expertise.








Table B3.1 complements Figure 3.1 in the main text. Figure B3.1, in turn, replicates the main
analyses without covariate adjustment. Figure B3.2 and Figure B3.3 reestimate the effect of
expertise on officials’ response to the policy appeal including clustered standard errors and
fixed effects by issue area, respectively, to account for heterogeneity across domains. Finally,
Table B3.2 complements Figure 3.2 in the main text with the full models estimated to test
how formal education moderates the expertise curse.
Figure B3.1: The effects of expertise on the ability of legislators to incorporate contrasting
views, without covariate adjustment.
Effects of policy expertise
on the assessment of voters opinion
Opinion aligned with
the majority of voters
The voters hold
this position strongly
The voters based opinion
on facts
The voters understand
complexity of the issue
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators’ assessment of voters’ opinion.
Horizontal narrow/wide bars are 95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on
the y-axis corresponds to a distinct outcome variable. Estimates and standard errors derived from bivariate
linear models. See Table B3.1 for full model results.
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Table B3.1: The effects of expertise on the ability of legislators to incorporate contrasting
views. Complement to Figure 3.1 and Figure B3.1.
Understand Opinion based Hold position Represents
Complexity on facts strongly majority opinion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Expertise −0.24∗∗ −0.28∗∗ −0.34∗∗ −0.35∗∗ 0.05 0.01 −0.13+ −0.17∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Educational Level −0.05+ −0.03 0.09∗∗ −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.002 0.002 −0.01∗∗ 0.01∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Social Democrats 0.23 0.02 −0.23 −0.06
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Centre Party 0.14 0.12 −0.01 −0.19
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Liberals 0.15 −0.03 −0.13 −0.04
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Moderate Party 0.06 −0.25 −0.22 −0.31∗
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Christian Democrats 0.23 0.13 −0.10 −0.08
(0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Green Party 0.24 0.29 0.07 0.05
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Sweden Democrats 0.02 −0.21 −0.26 −0.48∗
(0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Feminist Initiative 0.55 −0.16 0.16 −0.07
(0.43) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39)
Other Party 0.15 0.44 −0.34 −0.01
(0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28)
Constant 2.96∗∗ 3.01∗∗ 2.96∗∗ 2.97∗∗ 5.36∗∗ 5.87∗∗ 2.96∗∗ 2.74∗∗
(0.06) (0.32) (0.06) (0.29) (0.06) (0.30) (0.06) (0.29)
Observations 1,669 1,511 1,667 1,509 1,668 1,511 1,667 1,510
R2 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.0002 0.03 0.002 0.01
Note: Entries are coefficients of linear models (SEs in parenthesis) with legislators’ responses to the policy
appeal as the outcome variable. For each outcome (described in the column headers), we estimated a bivariate
regression (Models 1, 3, 5, and 7) and a multivariate regression with covariate adjustment (Models 2, 4, 6,
and 8). ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Figure B3.2: The effects of expertise on the ability of legislators to incorporate contrasting
views, with clustered standard errors by policy issue.
Effects of policy expertise
on the assessment of voters opinion
Opinion aligned with
the majority of voters
The voters hold
this position strongly
The voters based opinion
on facts
The voters understand
complexity of the issue
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators’ assessment of voters’ opinion,
among public officials with (black) and without (gray) a college degree. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are
95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the y-axis corresponds to a dis-
tinct outcome variable. Estimates and clustered standard errors derived from linear models with covariate
adjustment for party, age, and education.
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Figure B3.3: The effects of expertise on the ability of legislators to incorporate contrasting
views, with fixed effects by policy issue and clustered standard errors.
Effects of policy expertise
on the assessment of voters opinion
Opinion aligned with
the majority of voters
The voters hold
this position strongly
The voters based opinion
on facts
The voters understand
complexity of the issue
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Note: Points are estimates of the causal effect of policy expertise on legislators’ assessment of voters’ opinion,
among public officials with (black) and without (gray) a college degree. Horizontal narrow/wide bars are
95%/90% confidence intervals. Agreement with each statement listed on the y-axis corresponds to a distinct
outcome variable. Estimates and clustered standard errors derived from linear models with fixed effects by
issue and covariate adjustment for party, age, and education.
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Table B3.2: The effects of expertise on the ability of legislators to incorporate contrasting
views, by levels of formal education. Complement to Figure 3.2.
Understand Opinion based Hold position Represents
Complexity on facts strongly majority opinion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expertise −0.17 −0.22+ 0.02 0.02
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
College Degree −0.03 0.08 0.26∗ 0.30∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Social Democrats 0.24 0.04 −0.25 −0.02
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Centre Party 0.14 0.12 −0.001 −0.16
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Liberals 0.15 −0.03 −0.12 −0.02
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Moderate Party 0.05 −0.24 −0.21 −0.30+
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Christian Democrats 0.21 0.12 −0.10 −0.09
(0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Green Party 0.23 0.29 0.09 0.05
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Sweden Democrats 0.03 −0.18 −0.27 −0.41+
(0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24)
Feminist Initiative 0.58 −0.14 0.16 −0.06
(0.43) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39)
Other Party 0.14 0.44 −0.32 0.01
(0.31) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28)
Age 0.002 0.003 −0.02∗∗ 0.01∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Expertise × College Degree −0.22 −0.24 −0.02 −0.38∗
(0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
Constant 2.68∗∗ 2.72∗∗ 6.31∗∗ 2.48∗∗
(0.26) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23)
Observations 1,511 1,509 1,511 1,510
R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
Note: Entries are coefficients of linear models (SEs in parenthesis) with legislators’ responses to the policy




This supplementary appendix includes the following sections:
• Appendix C.1 - CCDP Data – Tables describing the CCDP data used to produce
measures of daily campaign rhetoric.
• Appendix C.2 - Coding CCDP Policy Statements – A discussion of how the ideological
tone of campaign statements was measured, and a test of the main analyses with
alternative issue classifications.
• Appendix C.3 - Measuring Campaign Performance from Polling Data – Description of
the pre-election polling data used to produce measures of campaign performance.
• Appendix C.4 - Comparing Baselines for Campaign Performance – A series of sensi-
tivity tests of the main findings to different baseline measures used in the calculation
of Campaign Performance
• Appendix C.5 - Additional Tables – Twelve tables with the full specifications of the
main models in the text, and different robustness checks.
• Appendix C.6 - Incumbency Status and Campaign Responsiveness – A test of an
alternative mechanism with incumbency status as the key driver of campaign respon-
siveness.
• Appendix C.7 - Campaign Responsiveness for Populist Radical Right and Green Parties
– An analysis of campaign responsiveness for special-issue niche parties.
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C.1 CCDP Data
Table C1.1: Campaign statements and polls.
Number of Number of Share of days
Country Campaign articles policy statements with new polls
Czech Republic 2010 107 368 0.13
2013 122 503 0.32
Denmark 2009 119 415 0.66
2013 124 502 0.75
Germany 2007 121 310 0.52
2011 108 310 0.65
Hungary 2008 86 258 0.21
2011 107 298 0.17
Poland 2006 119 277 0.07
2010 133 511 0.79
Portugal 2012 114 377 0.36
2007 111 378 0.79
Spain 2011 99 322 0.8
2009 108 376 0.53
Sweden 2011 114 524 0.64
2010 114 570 0.5
UK 2014 110 412 0.68
2005 128 435 0.84
2010 137 568 1
The Netherlands 2015 97 282 0.62
Campaign Averages - 114 399 0.55
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Table C1.2: Categorization of policy statements: Comparative Campaign Dynamics Project
(CCDP) and the Comparative Manifesto Project.
Category in CCDP Category in CMP Direction
Taxes - Increase Equality: Positive Left
Taxes - Decrease Incentives: Positive Right
Tackle with/ reduce inflation Economic Orthodoxy Right
Tackle with/ reduce unemployment Economic Growth Left
Increase spending for various social policies Welfare State Expansion +
Education Expansion
Left
Decrease spending for various social policies Welfare State Limitation +
Education Limitation
Right
More centralization/ less regional autonomy Centralization Neutral
More regional autonomy/ less centralization Decentralization Neutral
Pro-environmental policies Environmental protection Neutral
Critical of environmental policies Free Market Economy Right
More open/supportive of immigra-
tion/asylum
National Way of Life: Immi-
gration: Positive
Neutral
Tougher/ restrictive on immigration/asylum National Way of Life: Immi-
gration: Negative
Right
Stronger justice system Right
Weaker justice system Neutral
Strong on law and order, security, terrorism
(more police/less crime)
Law and Order: Positive Right
Support for individual liberties, less police
presence, and criticism of police state
Law and Order: Negative Neutral
Pro national way of life National Way of Life: Positive Right
Anti-national way of life National Way of Life: Nega-
tive
Neutral
Pro-traditional morality Traditional Morality: Positive Right
Anti-traditional morality Traditional Morality: Nega-
tive
Neutral
Pro-European Union European Union: Positive Neutral
Anti-European Union European Union: Negative Neutral
Pro-Internationalism Internationalism: Positive Left
Anti-Internationalism Internationalism: Negative Neutral
Pro-Foreign Intervention Military: Positive Right
Anti-Foreign Intervention Military: Negative Left
Support for farmers and agricultural policies Agriculture and Farmers:
Positive
Neutral
Opposing support for agriculture and farmers Agriculture and Farmers:
Negative
Neutral
Note: See Appendix C2 for a description of the coding decisions in the ideological tone of the issues.
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Table C1.3: Daily newspapers included in the CCDP.
Newspaper
Country Right-leaning Left-leaning
Czech Republic Mladá fronta Dnes Právo
Denmark Jyllands-Posten Politiken
Germany Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Süddeutsche Zeitung
Hungary Magyar Nemzet Népszabadság
The Netherlands De Telegraaf de Volkskrant
Poland Rzeczpospolita Gazeta Wyborcza
Portugal Jornal de Not́ıcias Público
Spain El Mundo El Páıs
Sweden Aftonbladet Dagens Nyheter
United Kingdom The Daily Telegraph The Guardian
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Table C1.4: Parties included in the empirical analyses.
Czech Republic CSSD KDU-CSL
ODS KSCM
TOP09
Denmark Socialdemokraterne Det Radikale Venstre
Venstre Dansk Folkeparti
Det Konservative Folkeparti Socialistik Folkeparti
Enhedslisten Ny Alliance/Liberal Alliance
Germany CDU-CSU FDP














Sweden Moderate Party Center Party
Social Democratic Party Feminist Initiative
Christian Democratic Party Liberal Party






UK Conservative Party Liberal Democratic Party
Labour Party UKIP
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C.2 Coding CCDP Policy Statements
The key outcome variable in the main analyses describes the ideological tone of policy state-
ments made by party leaders throughout the 20 campaigns included in CCDP. The strategy
adopted here follows the same logic used by CMP to produce the RILE index: label a series
of policy positions as right, left, or neutral, and then aggregate the number of statements in
each category.
To do so, I started by matching the the full set of policy issues coded by CCDP with
the list of CMP issues (see Table C1.2 for full list). Only two of the 28 CCDP issues were
not possible to match: stronger justice system, and weaker justice system. The ideological
label of these issues - Right and Neutral, respectively - is based on Somer-Topcu, Tavits,
and Baumann (2017) coding of CCDP issues. For the remaining issues, the ideological labels
come from the typology in the RILE index (Budge 2013), with three exceptions: Taxes -
Increase (left), Taxes - Decrease (right), and Tougher/restrictive on immigration/asylum
(right). RILE treats these three issues as neutral potentially given its focus on the writings
of early modern theorists to identify the ideological positions of different issues (Budge 2013).
Again, this coding decision follows Somer-Topcu, Tavits, and Baumann (2017).
Overall, the direction of 23 of the 28 CCDP issues follows CMP. To explore the sensibility
of the main findings reported in the manuscript to the decisions made on these five additional
issues, I created three new versions of the outcome variable: (1) treating all justice system
statements as neutral; (2) restricting the set of issues used to calculate the outcome variable
to the 23 categories directly matched with CMP; and (3) including the full set of issues
but increasing the number of left statements by switching the coding of Pro-environmental
policies, Open to immigration, Support for civil liberties, and Anti-traditional morality from
neutral to left.
Table C2.1 replicates the main specification from Table 4.1 (model 2) with these alterna-
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tive measures presented in the order described above. The results are largely consistent with
the main findings. Although the coefficients vary slightly across specifications, the differ-
ences are residual, particularly for the key predictors in the model: Campaign Performance,
and Niche.
C.3 Measuring Campaign Performance from Polling
Data
To produce measures of campaign performance for the different parties and campaigns cov-
ered in the CCDP, I compiled 749 pre-election from several sources. In putting together this
database, I followed consistent procedures and coding rules that are detailed here.
Polling houses use different sampling and weighting schemes to generate their estimates.
These different methodological strategies are often a challenge for researchers interested in
aggregating polls (e.g., Jennings and Wlezien 2016; Erikson and Wlezien 2012). However,
for the purposes of this study different methods of arriving at polling estimates are not a
concern, since the goal is to capture how different political actors perceive levels of support
for their party, as reported in the media. Therefore, I collected headline figures of voting
intentions, as this is the data made available to the public.
Still, in order to compare poll estimates with previous election results, two manipulations
were required. First, for polls that did not allocate undecided voters, I distributed the
estimates among the contesting parties, as it is the norm in previous research (e.g., Kou
and Sobel 2004, Traugott 2001). Second, both election results and poll estimates were
recalculated to account for (1) small parties not included in polls, (2) parties that disappeared
from one election to the next, and (3) parties that were running for the first time. In order
to produce comparable estimates of vote share from polls and election returns, new parties
were dropped from the analyses (as they lacked a benchmark for performance) and election
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Table C2.1: The effects of campaign performance on different versions of the Non-Centrist
Rhetoricd.





Campaign Performance −0.03∗ −0.02+ −0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Niche 0.11 0.30 0.27
(0.21) (0.19) (0.18)
Campaign Performance × Niche 0.09∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Days to Election 0.003 −0.004 −0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Poll Distance 0.04 0.06∗∗ 0.05∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
ENP −0.08 −0.11∗ −0.01
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
% Days Covered 1.35∗ 1.29∗ 0.87+
(0.64) (0.51) (0.53)
Others’ Statements −0.06∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.13∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Incumbent −0.43∗ 0.27 −0.28
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Constant −1.41∗ −1.84∗∗ −1.47∗
(0.71) (0.57) (0.59)
σα 0.36 0.02 0.23
Observations 1,205 1,205 1,205
Log Likelihood −739.7 −661.7 −737.2
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,503.4 1,347.3 1,498.4
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for campaign (standard
errors in parentheses). Model 1 treats Stronger justice system statements as Neutral. Model 2 treats Stronger
justice system, Tougher on immigration, Taxes-Increase, and Taxes-Decrease statements as Neutral. Model 3
treats Pro-environmental policies, Open to Immigration, Support for individual liberties, and Anti-traditional
morality statements as Left. +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
186
results and voting intentions were recalculated for the same set of parties.
A final concern regards the dating of polls. Most public opinion surveys are conducted
over multiple days. Since the goal here is to identify when a poll becomes public, I compiled
the publication dates associated with each poll. In the few cases when this information
was not available, I considered the publication date to be the last day in the field plus one
additional day.1
The polls come from multiple sources, listed in Table C3.1. Exit polls were excluded
from the analyses. The massive dataset recently compiled by Jennings and Wlezien (2016;
henceforth JW), with over 26,000 pre-election polls from across the world, served as the
baseline. To expand upon JW’s collection, I first contacted national experts with previous
experience on polling data in the 10 countries included in the CCDP. A number of datasets
and sources were kindly shared by these scholars. Next, I compiled data from survey reposi-
tories available either online or through international polling companies (Gallup, TNS, Ipsos,
and Yougov). Finally, the data compiled through these sources was cross-checked against
JW’s collection to flag inconsistencies and maximize the number of data points.
1The results are robust to treating the last day in the field as the publication day itself.
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Table C3.1: Sources for polling data.
Country Source





The Netherlands van der Velden (2014); www.allepeilingen.com; Data Archiv-
ing Network Service (DANS)
Poland JW; en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion polling for the Polish par-
liamentary election, 2007
Portugal Magalhães, Aguiar-Conraria, and Pereira (2011);
www.popstar.pt
Sweden JW; www.novus.se
Spain El Mundo; www.electocracia.com; Centro de Investigaciones
Sociológicas
UK JW; ukpollingreport.co.uk
Note: JW stands for Jennings and Wlezien’s (2016) database of polls.
C.4 Comparing Baselines for Campaign Performance
In the main analyses reported in the manuscript, campaign performance is measured as the
difference between estimated voting intentions at a given point in the campaign and the vote
share received by the party in the previous election. Although elections represent arguably
the strongest signal of public support available to parties, it is possible that parties use
different baselines to infer their performance on the campaign trail: voting intentions on the
previous day or week in the campaign, since the election of a new leader, or even the results
from a recent midterm election.
If these complementary baselines represent a stronger or distinct signal used by party
leaders, they could influence the relationship between my measure of campaign performance
and campaign rhetoric. To account for this concern, I estimated a series of models that add
alternative measures of performance to the original specification To allow for comparability
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across campaigns, the baselines for these new measures are based exclusively on polling data:
average voting intentions on (1) the previous day, (2) the previous week, (3) the previous
month, (4) the previous two months, (5) the previous year, or (6) the previous two years.2
For a preliminary assessment of these alternative measures, I calculated bivariate corre-
lations between the original campaign performance variable and the new performance vari-
ables. Table C4.1 shows that as the time frame of the baseline increases, the performance
measures become increasingly correlated with the variable used in the study. This pattern
makes sense, as moving back in time necessarily implies approaching the previous election.
Moreover, it suggests that using the previous election as the baseline seems to capture both
the election itself but also a broader notion of performance over the course of the last term.
Table C4.1: Bivariate correlations between the campaign performance measure adopted in
the study, and alternative measures with varying baselines.
Alternative Performance Measures
Previous Previous Previous Previous Previous Previous
Day Week Month Two Months Year Two Years
ρXY 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.48
Note: Cell entries are bivariate correlation coefficients between the measure of campaign performance
used in the study (X) and alternative measures based on different baselines (Y ).
Table C4.2 presents the results of the extended specifications. Differences in the number
of observations are due to polling availability for larger time frames. Substantively, two
patterns stand out. First, the coefficients for the original measure of campaign performance
remain largely identical to the original model specification, and statistically significant. The
only exception is the relationship between performance and campaign rhetoric among main-
stream parties, which is no longer distinguishable from zero once accounting for performance
measures based on average voting intentions in the previous year or two (Models 5 and 6).
2Midterm contests such as sub-national or presidential elections would not be comparable across countries,
and their distance from the election under study would also vary.
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The same is not true for niche parties. This result suggests that mainstream parties may
use a richer source of information to determine their performance on the campaign trail.
That said, the correlation coefficients reported above suggest that the information provided
by averaging polls over multiple years progressively overlaps with what we may learn from
previous election results. Second, and more importantly, none of the alternative measures of
performance is meaningfully associated with campaign rhetoric for either mainstream and
niche parties. Hence, overall the analyses demonstrate that the measure of performance
adopted in the study, although not perfect, is not overshadowed by alternative baselines.
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Table C4.2: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking: comparing the election baseline with alter-
natives.
DV = Pr(Non-Centrist Rhetoricd)
Previous Previous Previous Previous Previous Previous
Day Week Month Two Months Year Two Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Campaign Performance −0.04∗∗ −0.03∗ −0.03∗ −0.03∗ −0.02 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Niche 0.24 0.35+ 0.24 0.27 0.44+ 0.49∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24)
Campaign Performance × Niche 0.09∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Alternative Performance 0.13+ −0.05 −0.05 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Alternative Performance × Niche −0.22 0.07 0.05 0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant −1.73∗∗ −1.98∗∗ −1.80∗∗ −1.85∗∗ −2.13∗∗ −2.23∗∗
(0.56) (0.62) (0.70) (0.70) (0.76) (0.75)
σα 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.12
Observations 1,205 987 959 959 881 881
Log Likelihood −736.5 −598.7 −579.2 −579.4 −534.6 −534.4
AIC 1,501.0 1,225.5 1,186.5 1,186.8 1,097.3 1,096.8
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for campaign (standard errors in parentheses). Column
headers identify the baseline used to produce the alternative measure of performance in each model. All models include the same set of




Table C5.1: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking for
mainstream and niche parties.
DV = Pr(Non-Centrist Rhetoricd)
Campaign Party-Campaign





Campaign Performance −0.04∗∗ −0.03∗∗ −0.05∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Niche 0.07 0.23 0.32
(0.13) (0.18) (0.28)
Campaign Performance × Niche 0.09∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Days to Election - 0.003 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Poll Distance - 0.05∗ 0.05+
(0.02) (0.03)
ENP - −0.02 −0.04
(0.06) (0.08)
% Days Covered - 1.14∗ 1.48∗
(0.51) (0.70)
Others’ Statements - −0.10∗∗ −0.05+
(0.03) (0.03)
Incumbent - −0.22 −0.22
(0.18) (0.30)
Constant −0.93∗∗ −1.72∗∗ −1.91∗
(0.11) (0.56) (0.76)
σα 0.24 0.16 0.72
Observations 1,205 1,205 1,205
Log Likelihood −753.1 −738.5 −725.3
AIC 1,518.1 1,501.1 1,474.5
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for campaign
(models 1 and 2) and party-campaign (model 3) (standard errors in parentheses). All predictors that
vary at the day-level are measured at d− 1. +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
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Table C5.2: The effect of campaign performance on the propensity to emphasize dominant
manifesto issues.







Campaign Performance × Niche - 0.01
(0.03)
Days to Election −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03)




% Days Covered 0.02∗ 0.02+
(0.01) (0.01)










Log Likelihood −875.5 −875.4
AIC 1,773.0 1,774.8
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for cam-
paign (standard errors in parentheses). All predictors that vary at the day-level are measured
at d− 1. +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
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Table C5.3: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking for
mainstream and niche parties, accounting for role in incumbent government.
DV = Pr(Non-Centrist Rhetoricd)
Campaign Party-Campaign









Campaign Performance × Niche 0.08∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Days to Election 0.004 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)




% Days Covered 1.10∗ 1.46∗
(0.51) (0.70)
Others’ Statements −0.10∗∗ −0.05+
(0.03) (0.03)
Senior Coalition Partner −0.28 −0.25
(0.19) (0.31)






Log Likelihood −738.0 −725.2
AIC 1,502.0 1,476.4
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for cam-
paign (model 1) and party-campaign (model 2) (standard errors in parentheses). All predictors
that vary at the day-level are measured at d− 1. +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
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Table C5.4: Logit fixed-effects models of the effects of campaign performance on
policy position taking.
DV = Pr(Non-Centrist Rhetoricd)
Campaign Party









Campaign Performance × Niche 0.10∗∗ 0.09∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Days to Election 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Poll Distance 0.05 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03)
% Days Covered 0.72 2.67+
(0.66) (1.62)







Log Likelihood −725.4 −657.1
AIC 1,508.8 1,448.1
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of logit models with Non-Centrist Rhetoric as the out-
come variable and fixed effects for campaign (Model 1) and party (Model 2) (standard
errors in parentheses).+p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
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Table C5.5: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking:
Meguid’s (2005) typology of niche parties.
DV = Non-Centrist Rhetoricd
Campaign Party-Campaign








Campaign Performance × Niche 0.09∗∗ 0.10∗
(0.03) (0.05)
Days to Election 0.003 0.005
(0.01) (0.01)




% Days Covered 0.97 1.07
(0.61) (0.84)








Log Likelihood −660.8 −649.9
AIC 1,345.6 1,323.8
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for campaign
and party-campaign, respectively (standard errors in parentheses). +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01,
two-tailed test.
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Table C5.6: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking: chal-
lengers and mainstream parties.
DV = Non-Centrist Rhetoricd
Campaign Party-Campaign








Campaign Performance × Challenger 0.09∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Days to Election 0.002 0.005
(0.01) (0.01)




% Days Covered 1.46∗∗ 1.87∗∗
(0.46) (0.65)








Log Likelihood −734.2 −721.4
AIC 1,492.4 1,466.8
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for campaign
and party-campaign, respectively (standard errors in parentheses). +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01,
two-tailed test.
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Table C5.7: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking with
continuous measure of campaign rhetoric.
DV = Non-Centrist Rhetoricd
Campaign Party-Campaign








Campaign Performance × Niche 0.07∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Days to Election 0.002 0.003
(0.01) (0.01)




% Days Covered 0.82+ 1.18+
(0.45) (0.67)









Log Likelihood −2,438.8 −2,396.1
AIC 4,903.5 4,818.2
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of linear models with random intercepts for campaign (N=19)
and party-campaign (N=105), respectively (standard errors in parentheses). All predictors that
vary at the day-level are measured at d− 1. +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
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Table C5.8: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking on the
next 3 days.
DV = Pr(Non-Centrist Rhetoricd:d+2)
Campaign Party-Campaign








Campaign Performance × Niche 0.10∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.02) (0.05)
Days to Election 0.003 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)




% Days Covered 1.94∗∗ 3.24∗∗
(0.37) (0.93)








Log Likelihood −1,372.9 −1,240.8
AIC 2,769.8 2,505.5
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for campaign
and party-campaign, respectively (standard errors in parentheses). +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01,
two-tailed test.
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Table C5.9: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking: Western Euro-
pean and post-communist countries.
DV = Pr(Non-Centrist Rhetoricd)










Campaign Performance × Niche 0.10∗∗ 0.15+
(0.03) (0.08)
Days to Election 0.01 −0.0001
(0.01) (0.02)




% Days Covered 0.95 2.00
(0.60) (2.27)








Log Likelihood −585.7 −147.4
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,195.3 318.9
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for campaign (standard
errors in parentheses). Due to the small number of groups, σα cannot be calculated in Model 2. Model 1
includes parties from: Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and the UK. Model
2 includes parties from: Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
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Table C5.10: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking: high-coverage
and low-coverage campaigns.
DV = Pr(Non-Centrist Rhetoricd)
≥ 50% days < 50% days









Campaign Performance × Niche 0.10∗∗ 0.14
(0.03) (0.08)
Days to Election 0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.02)




% Days Covered 1.03+ 2.24
(0.59) (2.33)









Log Likelihood −607.1 −126.2
AIC 1,238.2 276.4
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of a hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for campaign
(standard errors in parentheses). Due to the small number of groups, σα cannot be calculated in
Model 2. +p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01, two-tailed test.
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Table C5.11: The effects of campaign performance on policy position taking: analysis by
party type.







Campaign Performance −0.03∗ 0.05∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Days to Election 0.003 0.0002
(0.01) (0.01)




% Days Covered 0.91 1.45∗
(0.87) (0.58)








Log Likelihood −464.6 −272.6
AIC 949.2 599.9
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random
intercepts for campaign (standard errors in parentheses). Due to the small




C.6 Incumbency Status and Campaign Responsiveness
Recent scholarship has shown that voters respond differently to the positions of parties in
government and opposition parties (Bawn and Somer-Topcu 2012; Greene 2016). While
opposition parties perform better when adopting more moderate positions, the opposite is
true for incumbent parties. For this reason, the models reported in the previous sections
control for incumbency. Still, since the mainstream-niche typology partially overlaps with the
governing status of the parties in the sample (Pearson’s r = 0.41), it is possible that the key
findings are explained not by different party goals - as suggested - but by the context-specific
incentives of incumbent and opposition parties.
To assess this alternative mechanism, I re-estimated the main models replacing the
mainstream-niche typology with different measures of incumbency. Figure C6.1 reports the
marginal effects of Campaign Performance for parties in government and opposition (left
panel), senior coalition partners and opposition (center panel), and junior coalition partners
and opposition (right panel). A party is identified as a senior coalition partner if the prime-
minister is a member of the party. Junior coalition partners correspond to the remaining
members of government. The results are consistent across specifications and suggest that
incumbency status does not reliably alter the dynamics of rhetorical responsiveness on the
campaign trail. Although the point estimates for parties in government are more negative
than for opposition parties - suggesting a more moderate rhetoric when performing well in
the campaign - the differences are not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of
statistical significance.
The analysis suggests that the different patterns of responsiveness observed for main-
stream and niche parties are not explained by incumbency status. This result is consistent
with the theoretical argument advanced here since both office-seeking and vote-seeking par-
ties can be in government or in opposition at a given point in time.
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Figure C6.1: The effects of campaign performance for different specifications of incumbent
and opposition parties.















Note: Entries are point estimates of Campaign Performance for coalition members and opposition parties
(left panel), senior coalition partners and opposition parties (central panel), and junior coalition partners and
opposition parties (right panel), respectively, with 95/90% confidence intervals represented in narrow/wide
bars.
C.7 Campaign Responsiveness for Populist Radical Right
and Green Parties
The main analysis in the manuscript relies on the mainstream-niche typology to distinguish
between parties with different dominant collective goals. However, a concern with this
empirical strategy is that some niche parties do not compete on left-right issues. For them, a
more appropriate test of the competing goals argument would focus not on variation in issue
emphasis along the left-right ideological scale but on the specific set of issues they care most
about. According to the theoretical argument advanced in the manuscript, special-issue niche
parties performing well in the campaign should emphasize their core issues, consistent with
their collective policy goals. When underperforming, in turn, these parties should deviate
from these issues to appeal to a broader constituency.
I test these expectations among populist radical right and green parties in the sample.3
3Based on Mudde (2007) typology of radical right parties, I identified six radical right parties in CCDP:
Sweden Democrats (Sd), Party for Freedom (PVV), Danish People (DF), Alternative for Germany (AfD),
Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP), and the League of Polish Families (LPR). Although Mudde
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From the set of issues available in the CCDP dataset (see Table C1.2 for the full list), I iden-
tified three core issues for radical right parties: tougher measures on immigration/asylum,
support for law and order/security, and support for national way of life. The core issue
identified for green parties is support for environmental protection.
Models 1 and 2 in Table C7.1 report the effects of campaign performance on the prob-
ability that (1) populist radical right and (2) green parties emphasize the core issues of
their platforms. Both models are underpowered, given the small number of parties in each
group. Still, the coefficient for Campaign Performance is in the expected direction in both
specifications. To increase statistical power, Model 3 combines the data for radical right and
green parties. The outcome variable in this model is still the probability that an individual
party makes a statement on one of their core issues, as defined above. The coefficient for
the key predictor is positive and reliable (point estimate 0.13; s.e. = 0.06). Substantively, it
suggests that a five-point increase in campaign performance is associated with a 9.9 points
increase in the probability that these parties make a statement on one of their core policy
issues. Put differently, a five-point decrease in voting intentions leads to a nearly 10 point
increase in the probability that radical right and green parties deviate from their core issues.
This result is in line with the competing goals argument articulated in the main text.
In sum, the analyses reported here show that similar patterns of campaign responsiveness
occur for the broad sample of niche parties identified in the CCDP and the issue-specific
radical right and green parties. Although these parties compete on different dimensions, the
dynamics of responsiveness are motivated by similar collective goals.
(2007) does not include UKIP in his typology, additional analyses with the inclusion of UKIP reveal the
same substantive results. In turn, four green parties are included in CCDP: the Swedish Green Party (Mp),
the Green Left (GL), and the Alliance 90/The Greens.
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Table C7.1: The effects of campaign performance for radical right and green parties.
Pr(Core Issues Rhetoricd)
Radical Green Radical Right + Green
Right Parties Parties Combined
(1) (2) (3)
Campaign Performance 0.19∗∗ 0.06 0.13∗
(0.07) (0.12) (0.06)
Days to Election −0.05∗ −0.01 −0.03+
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
% Days Covered 4.95∗∗ 5.59∗ 4.81∗∗
(1.64) (2.51) (1.43)
Constant −3.22∗∗ −4.76∗∗ −3.84∗∗
(0.83) (1.26) (0.72)
σparty−campaign 0.00 0.24 0.27
Observations 222 226 448
Log Likelihood −63.0 −67.6 −133.7
AIC 135.9 145.1 277.5
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of hierarchical logit models with random intercepts for party-
campaign (standard errors in parentheses).Column headers identify (1) the outcome variable
in each model specification, and (2) the group of parties included in the analysis. RR+G




Opinion Polls as Mobilization and
Fine-Tuning Devices
This supplementary appendix includes the following tables:
• Table D1.1 – Full specifications of models estimating the probability of references to
recent opinion polls: complement to Table 5.2.
• Table D1.2 – Probability of parties referencing polls in the following three days, by
type of poll results.
• Table D1.3 – The effect of poll characteristics on the tone of references to polls. Com-
plement to Figure 5.1.
• Figure D1.1 – Distributions of continuous outcome variables (from Table 5.3).
• Table D1.4 – Full specification of models estimating the effects of public opinion polling
on campaign rhetoric.
• Table D1.5 – The effects of public opinion polling on campaign negativity, excluding
non-negative valence statements about other parties.
D.1 Additional tables
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Table D1.1: Probability of party leaders referencing polls on the







Above Sharet−1 - 1.56
∗∗ -
(0.55)
Below Sharet−1 - 0.16 -
(0.66)
Above Estimatet−1 - - 1.24
∗
(0.56)
Below Estimatet−1 - - 0.89
(0.55)
Days to Election −0.18∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.17∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
CDS 0.70 0.32 0.67
(0.74) (0.82) (0.73)
CDU 0.90 0.76 0.91
(0.69) (0.75) (0.70)
PS 0.90 1.36 0.94
(0.67) (0.77) (0.69)
PSD 0.26 −0.22 0.30
(0.73) (0.79) (0.73)
2011 Election −1.19∗ −1.08∗ −1.24∗
(0.48) (0.49) (0.49)
Constant −0.38 −0.34 −0.41
(0.80) (0.85) (0.81)
Observations 150 150 150
Log Likelihood −70.80 −68.63 −70.57
Note: Entries are coefficients of logistic regressions with mention to polls as
the outcome variable (clustered standard errors in parentheses). ∗p < .05;
∗∗p < .01
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Table D1.2: Probability of parties referencing polls in the following 3 days, by
features of poll results.
Dependent variable:
















Days to Election −0.13∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
2011 Election −1.44∗∗ −1.32∗∗ −1.40∗∗
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Constant 0.58 0.81 0.63
(0.71) (0.72) (0.70)
Observations 150 150 150
AIC 185.58 181.83 186.05
Note: Entries are coefficients of logistic regressions with mention to polls as the outcome
variable (clustered standard errors in parentheses).∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Table D1.3: The effect of poll characteristics on the tone of ref-




















x Negative — Neutral 1842.1∗∗
(0.04)




Note: Entries are coefficients of ordered logistic regressions with direc-
tion of mention to polls as the outcome variable (clustered standard




Table D1.4: The effects of public opinion polling on campaign rhetoric.
Own Others Campaign
Policy Emphasis Policy Emphasis Negativity
(1) (2) (3)
Share Difference −0.03∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.01†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Days to Election 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ −0.01∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
CDS 0.02 0.11∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
CDU −0.04 0.06 0.09∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
PS −0.42∗∗ −0.26∗∗ 0.23∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
PSD −0.05 −0.04 0.13∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
2011 Election 0.02 −0.08∗ −0.13∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.48∗∗ 0.36∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 150 150 150
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.30 0.29
Note: Entries are OLS coefficients (clustered standard errors in parentheses). Outcome
variables in column headers. †p<0.10; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Table D1.5: The effects of public opinion polling on campaign negativity, excluding non-




















Note: Entries are OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
Outcome variable calculated without accounting for neutral or pos-
itive valence statements about other election contenders. †p<0.10;
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
213








































Note: Histograms of each outcome measure used in Table 5.3.
214
